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ABSTRACT
The aim of the present study was to investigate the
development of children's ability to make use of external 
sources of information when they are studying or remembering 
different types of information. More specifically, the 
research was directed at two recurring problems for
theories of memory development: the production deficit; 
and the problem of change.
The production deficit describes children’s failure to 
spontaneously use a strategy which is ’in' their behaviouri&l 
repertoire. Use of the strategy can be induced with 
minimal training. The study contains a set of experiments 
which suggest a number of reasons why children may fail 
to use available strategies. ■
Another major problem with theories of memory development 
lies in explaining changes in strategy use. Three 
experiments address the issue, and suggest two mechanisms 
which produce such changes. The experiments indicate 
that feedback may provide one means by which routines 
already in the cognitive system are generalised to serve 
memory goals. Monitoring of one’s own performance may 
also produce such changes. These mechanisms are incorpor­
ated into a model of how early strategies might develop.
Other theories of memory development have stressed young
iii
children’s lack of knowledge about their own memory 
processes. This has been invoked to explain both the 
production deficit and developmental change. Apart from 
the demonstrations that monitoring may influence strategy 
generalisation, the study found little evidence that 
knowledge about memory is related to either of these 
phenomena. Current theories of the development of knowl­
edge about memory are reviewed, and it is suggested that 
there are major problems with explanations of memory 
which appeal to such knowledge. One weakness of such 
theories is that they fail to explain the origins of 
this knowledge. The present study provides an account of 
the early development of knowledge about memory.
The results of the experiments are also considered in 
the light of recent speculations about developmental 
theories.and also memory processes in adults. It is 
suggested that the mechanisms of change demonstrated in 
this study may well apply to other areas of development. 
It is also argued that recent theories may 'have misrepre­
sented the nature of adult memory processes.
iv
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1INTRODUCTION COGNITIVE .THEORIES AND MEMORY DEVELOPMENT
0.1 The issues
This chapter provides the background both for the .review 
of literature in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 and the experiments 
conducted in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It begins by discussing 
what attributes an adequate developmental theory should 
possess and then focusses on particular issues which 
have been controversial in recent developmental psychology 
These issues are ralso discussed in the light of theories 
of memory development. Thereafter, the concern is with 
psychological accounts of memory and the importance of 
the environment in everyday remembering.
0.2 Criteria for a developmental theory
Despite the enormous amount of research effort which has 
been dedicated to the study of particular theories of 
development, there has been little speculation about what 
criteria theories of development in general have to 
satisfy. There are of course, some exceptions to this, 
(e.g. Atkinson, 1982; Brainerd, 1978a; Flavell, 1972; 
Flavell and Wohlwill, 1970; Wohlwill, 1973). Simon (1962) 
characterises the construction of developmental theories 
in the following way:
We select certain instants in the course of ....
dynamic change, take ’snapshots’ of the system at
these instants, and use these snapshots as descri­
ptions of the system at a particular stage of devel­
opment. (p. 130).
Though this account will explain some aspects of behaviour 
at different points in development, it is not truly 
developmental because it fails to provide a mechanism 
which will explain the transformation of the system from 
one 'instant' to the next. The account is misleading in 
a second respect; there are many different approaches to a 
given psychological field (e.g in the field of language 
we have theories of pragmatics, syntax and semantics), and 
it is clear that no Single theory will account for all 
the phenomena within one of these fields. A developmental 
theory should therefore have a limited domain of applic­
ation within its field.
Atkinson (1982) offers a detailed set of five criteria for 
judging the adequacy of theories of language development. 
Following Newell (1962), he proposes that a developmental 
account requires the construction of a series of explan­
ations of behaviour at different points in development. He 
labels each of these explanations as a theory (T,...T^...
T ) which applies at a given point of development (t.... n x
t,...t ) in a domain D. l n
Atkinson's first two conditions concern the relationship of 
the developmental theories to general psychological ■ :
accounts. He argues that each development theory (T^...
T^...T^) should constitute an adequate psychological 
explanation and that all the theories (T^...T^...T )
2
3should be constructed in accordance with a particular 
general theory. While the first condition seems acceptable, 
the second may be problematic because there are acceptable 
developmental accounts which appeal to different general 
theories. Atkinson is aware of this possibility "if the
(l<i<n) are not so constructed, then additional argument 
may restore the explanatory status of T." (p. 26), but in
adding' this qualification, the original condition has
been weakened.
Atkinson borrows from Flavell’s (1972) analysis of develop­
mental sequences in the construction of his next two 
conditions. It is important to note that Flavell’s 
analysis was intended to operate at the level of individual 
cognitive ’items’, and not at the level of theory constru­
ction discussed by Atkinson. His third condition is that 
if theories admit of additive complexity, then they are 
explanatory only if T^+1 is additively more complex than
. The latter part of the statement seems to capture an 
important intuition we have about development: that the 
organism becomes more complex (see Harris, 1957 and Brown, 
1973, for these arguments). As Atkinson and Flavell note, 
however, it is possible that some sorts of developments may 
lead to the simplification of the theories explaining 
behaviour. One such mechanism by which this may be achieved 
is generalisation, by which a single cognitive item takes 
over the functions which had been served by a number of 
different items, thus simplifying the theory we offer to 
explain behaviour. Atkinson recognises this by introducing
an alternative third condition, that if the theory operates
within a domain of constraints, then T. should be less i+l
complex than T\ . This explains the qualification in the 
first version of the third condition, that the theories 
must ”admit of additive complexity”. However, there are 
sequences in theories which admit of additive complexity 
which may not result in more complex theories. Flavell 
(1972) notes that the substitution of one item for
another may have this result.
Atkinson’s two final conditions concern the explanation of 
of theoretical sequences. The fourth condition states that 
a developmental theory has explanatory status only if the 
sequence of theories CTlf...,Tn) admits of a teleological, 
a reductive or an environmental explanation. A teleolo­
gical sequence occurs when an early theory is included 
in a later one. To give an example at the level of 
individual cognitive items: the ability to name objects 
quickly is a prerequisite for verbal rehearsal, and it 
would be impossible to imagine an account in which rehearsal 
emerged before this ability. A reductive sequence involves 
appeal to some other level of explanation in attempting to 
account for the sequence. To give another example: it has 
been argued (e.g. Denney and Ziobrowski, 1972) that 
children change from clustering items in recall according 
to functional criteria, to recall according to taxonomic 
criteria. Denney (.19 72) argues this is due to a change in 
underlying cognitive structures, and a corresponding shift 
from the classification of objects according to functional
4
5criteria, to their taxonomic classification.1 Other types 
of reductions are possible e.g. to the level of physiology, 
but the basic principle remains that certain items at one 
level of our theory can be related to items at a different 
level of explanation, that the sequence of the items of 
the reducing theory is repeated at the level of the theory 
to be reduced, and that the items emerge in the reducing 
theory before they do in the theory to be reduced. The 
environmental reduction argument is that items could not 
emerge before time t^, because they were simply not avail­
able in the environment before this time. One such sequence 
may relate to arguments about Motherese (e.g. Snow and 
Ferguson, 1977). The argument is that children base their 
early utterances on the speech of caretakers, which is 
carefully tailored to match the linguistic and cognitive 
demands of the child. Caretakers thus exclude complex 
syntax or complex concepts from their speech to children.
Thus the environment could'not be said to make such infor­
mation available to the children.
The final condition concerns the proposal of the mechanism 
of change discussed earlier. Atkinson states that theor­
etical adequacy is only achieved when a mechanism is prov­
ided to explain the sequence of theories described above.
It seems that overall, despite the problems with
Atkinson's second and third conditions, his account is well
1 Other research has failed to find such a change, but 
this does not affect the argument.
6motivated. While his criteria will not be explicitly 
applied to the theories of memory and metamemory develop­
ment discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, the arguments he 
offers are important, especially concerning explanation 
and the mechanism of change, and some attention will be 
paid to the problems he raises.
0 •3 Th-e Piagetian legacy and recent issues in developmental
psychology
Leaving aside these normative statements about develop­
mental theories, there are a number of particular issues 
which have generated controversy in recent developmental 
psychology. The dominant theory in this field has been- 
that of Piaget, and the controversies have mainly arisen 
from demonstrations that his predictions are not fulfilled.
0.3.1 Generality •
The first concerns the generality of cognitive structures. 
Piaget’s structuralist approach led him to propose that 
children's logical skills could be explained by a limited 
number of highly general logico-mathematical structures. 
According to Piaget, all tasks which tap the same struc­
tures should be performed with equal facility. However 
a large number of experimental studies have shown this 
assumption to be false. In particular, it has been shown 
that subjects do not perform at the same level on tasks 
which are logically isomorphic.(Donaldson, 1978;
7Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977). While these studies have 
shown a lack of generalisation, and recent theories 
of development (e.g Fischer, 1980; Keil, 1981) recognise 
this fact, there have been no real attempts to specify 
the factors which constrain generalisation.
In principle, the above studies do not demonstrate that 
thought processes are necessarily context-specific, all 
they show is that generalisation does not occur for the 
logically isomorphic tasks which Piaget studied. It may 
be that generalities can be found if a different level of 
analysis is employed.
A first step towards such an analysis may be provided 
by recent studies which have offered explanations for 
the context-specificity of thought. Two sorts of arguments 
have been made to explain young children's failure to 
generalise a skill which is ‘in’ their cognitive reper­
toire. The first (.e.g. Brainerd, 1973; Bryant, 1974) , 
suggests that our criteria for inferring the presence of 
a skill require abilities in addition to those under study. 
Simplify the task, and the skill will be manifested. The 
context-specificity here is explained by the fact that the 
'simple' and 'complex' tasks may be logically isomorphic, 
but they place different information-processing demands 
upon the children. Other writers, (e.g. Bruner, 1966; 
Donaldson, 1978) suggest that children have problems 
in accessing the appropriate cognitive skill in certain 
tasks. Both suggest however that within certain domains,
8cognitive skills will generalise.
The problem of context-specificity is not limited to 
the study of purely cognitive skills, however, for as 
Chapter 1 will illustrate a major feature of young chil­
dren's memory behaviour in certain task situations, 
is that they fail to use strategies which are clearly ’in’ 
their behavioural repertoire. A major aim of Chapter 4 
is to examine what underlies preschool children’s failure 
to employ a memory strategy in various situations.
0.3.2 Competence in preschoolers
Another problems for Piagetian theory was the finding 
that the cognitive structures which were supposed to 
emerge late in development could sometimes be found in 
very young children. Piaget’s theory can explain away the 
late emergence of cognitive structures in terms of "environ 
mental factors", but early emergence clearly cannot be 
incorporated into the theory.
Aside from the implications for Piagetian theory, the 
research into preschoolers' capabilities is - important . in 
the consideration of other developmental problems, such 
as change. If the demonstrations of preschool competence 
are correct; we have clearly simplified the problem of 
explaining change. If the thought processes of adults 
and children are "similar", then the mechanism we propose 
to explain change will have to be considerably less
9powerful, than if adult and child thought are radically 
different. Of course, it still remains to be specified 
exactly what is meant by arguing for the ’similarity’ or 
’difference' of thought processes through development, 
and this is a rmajor problem with recent accounts (e.g.
Keil, 1981) which adopt this position.
Whatever we might find out about memory skills in preschoolers 
therefore has implications for such theories, but there 
is also some internal debate within the memory development 
literature about the extent of the preschooler's memory 
skills. Early studies (e.g. Appel, Cooper, McCarrell, 
Sims-Knight, Yussen and Flavell; Yendovitskaya, 1971) 
suggested that young children were incapable of using 
deliberate cognitive strategies in order to remember.
This led to a further set of studies (Wellman, Ritter and 
Flavell, 1975? Yussen', 1974) which indicated that this was 
false. These in turn generated other studies which showed 
that apparently intentional strategy use may have a 
stimulus-response type characteristics (e.g. Gordon and 
Flavell, 1977? Ritter, 1978).
One aim of the experiments conducted in Chapters 4, 5 and 
6 is to assess exactly the nature of strategy use in very 
young children. In addition to resolving an empirical 
dispute, the memory capabilities of preschoolers will 
clearly influence the nature of the developmental change 
we have to explain.
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0.3.3 Change
A final issue concerns the mechanism proposed to account 
for change. Piaget explains this process in terms of a
homostatic mechanism of assimilation and accommodation.
Fodor (1972) points out one major problem with this
explanation. According to Piaget, development takes the 
form of long periods of ’preparation' in which minor changes 
in structures occur. These are followed by 'achievement 
phases' in which structures undergo radical and general 
change. Fodor argues that one mechanism cannot explain 
these two radically different types of change. We might
r-wish to argue, as Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) have done, 
that Piaget's preparation-achievement description is 
incorrect, and that all development consists of steady 
quantitative type change. If there is only one type of 
change, then Fodor's argument does not apply. There is, 
however, a much more serious problem with Piaget's account: 
it is circular, because the processes of assimilation and 
accommodation proposed to explain change, cannot be 
inferred independently of the changes they are proposed 
to explain.
Other developmental research has not suggested much to 
replace such an account. There have been a set of more 
piecemeal attempts to investigate possible mechanisms 
in particular the role of conflict in inducing change 
(e.g. Bower-r 1974; Bryant, 1974; Poise, Mugny and 
Perret-Clermont, 1975; Russell/ 1982) but these could not
11
be said to represent a coherent alternative. Evidence 
from training studies could be utilised in the search for 
change-inducing mechanisms, but for the most part such 
studies have concentrated on demonstrating that a behaviour 
which is not spontaneously manifested may be induced with 
suitable training. A further problem with training 
studies are that they show sufficient but not necessary 
conditions for change.
The approaches described above also tend to assume a 
single change-inducing mechanism. There are two pieces 
of evidence suggesting'this may not be entirely justified. 
Firstly, the earlier discussion of context-specificity 
might lead one to propose that a single mechanism cannot 
explain change in a widely fragmented system. If thought 
is context-specific, then the mechanisms which lead it to 
change may be also context-specific. Secondly, cross­
cultural research (e.g. Greenfield, 1969) has indicated 
that there may be separate routes to the same cognitive 
acquisition, which would again imply the need for multiple
mechanisms.
In contrast to cognitive theories, the problem of explaining 
change has been considered in some detail by theories of 
memory development. In particular, Flavell (1971) and 
Brown (1978) have argued that changes in cognitive 
strategy use are the result of children’s increased knowl­
edge of their own memory processes. The adequacy of this 
explanation is subjected to theoretical analysis.in
12
Chapters 2 and 3, and to experimental test in Chapters 4,
5 and 6. A further reason for conducting these studies 
is that there has been little investigation of preschool 
children’s knowledge of their own memory processes, and 
none of it has been attempted to establish how this 
knowledge influences memory.
0.4 Memory
0.4.1 Defining memory
It is important that any developmental account of something 
must include an analysis of what that thing is. One 
problem with undertaking such an analysis lies in the 
diversity of the phenomena which are describable by 
the term memory. A core meaning to the term would seem 
to involve the reproduction of autobiographical events, 
but it is clear that such a definition is too restrictive, 
because it is possible to remember things one has not 
experienced (e.g. the date of Queen Victoria’s coronation), 
and there are certain things which are not event-like 
which are remembered (e.g. the colour of a friend’s eyes 
or how to drive a car).
In addition to the different types of information which 
can be remembered, we must provide some account of how 
such information is initially acquired and also appro­
priately accessed. We must also explain the phenomenon 
of being unable to access information once known, i.e.
13
forgetting. Now given the diversity of types of inform­
ation to be remembered, it is likely that there will be 
different explanations for the processes involved in 
acquisition and access of these different types. Thus, 
remembering the plot of a book or story may occur as 
a byproduct of comprehension and interest, whereas remem­
bering facts for examinations may require detailed inten­
tional strategies such as imposing organisation on the 
materials or note-taking. Accessing information will 
clearly depend not only on the type of information, but 
also on the requirements of the situation. Thus, for 
example, remembering in the absence of environmental support 
may be considerably different from remembering when the 
environment provides support such as diaries, reference 
books or other people as external information sources.
A related point is that the criteria we use in applying 
the term memory, may vary with the type of material and 
situation. Thus, verbatim recall is unnecessary.if we 
are to attribute someone with remembering an incident or 
story, whereas absolute accuracy of reproduction is 
necessary if we are to claim to have remembered a telephone
number.
0.4.2 Domains and theories •
As we noted earlier for the case of language development 
there are a number of different approaches to the same 
field within psychology. This is also reflected in the
different focusses of theories of memory. Thus, early
14
approaches to memory investigated only the processes 
involved in learning and forgetting of arbitrary stim­
uli, whereas later ones proposed that the organism trans­
forms the information it receives, and the focus became 
the internal organisational structure of the organism 
which enabled such transformations. More recently there 
has been some stress on how memory is used in other cog­
nitive tasks (e.g. Baddeley and Hitch, 1974).
The present thesis will be constrained to the study of 
constructive and reconstructive processes in memory, 
i.e. children’s preparation for retrieval, and retrieval,
when external sources of information such as cues are
present. Such processes were chosen for study because 
they reflect the types of processes involved in everyday 
remembering and also those required in schools. In 
particular, I shall be interested in the use of intentional 
strategies in memory, because knowing when something 
has to be done in order to remember is again important
in education.
One problem is choosing such a domain is that there is no 
obvious theory of adult memory to account for these pheno­
mena. An obvious strategy in constructing developmental 
theories is to take the adult account and to investigate 
how it relates to developmentally prior phenomena.
Although Reitman (1970), Norman (1973) and Collins, Warnock 
Aiello and Miller (1975) do have some useful suggestions 
about these memory processes, the major attempts to
15
deal with this problem have been developmental, and it 
is these which are reviewed in Chapters 1-3.
16
CHAPTER 1 FLAVELL’S THEORY OF MEMORY DEVELOPMENT
1.1 Historical background and mediational theories
It has often been suggested that a qualitative change
takes place in the nature of thought processes sometime 
between infancy and school-age, and this has sometimes 
been attributed to the increased role of language in 
controlling thought. (e.g. Vygotsky, 1962; Luria, 1961; 
Kendler and Kendler, 1961; 1962). These theories claim 
that the infant is largely stimulus-bound and incapable 
of reflection- but that the development of language and 
the symbolic function enable the older child to generate 
mediators between stimuli and responses, allowing him to 
exercise increasing control over his own behaviour.
Although there are differences of detail among the theories, 
two reasons are generally given to explain the younger 
child's failure to mediate. The early theories (e.g. Kuenne,
1946; Kendler, Kendler and Wells, I960; Reese, 1962) sugg­
ested some form of mediation deficit, i.e. the child 
generated a verbal response but for some unspecified rea­
son it failed to mediate performance. The second reason, 
was advanced by Kdndler (1964) and Maccoby (1964), who 
drew attention to the fact that children may notmediate 
because they fail to produce a mediator. These were com­
bined in Kendler*s (1964) model where the development of 
discrimination learning is represented as a three stage 
process. In the first,stage, the child does not generate
17
the mediator spontaneously, nor does it improve perfor­
mance when generated: this Kendler attributes to some 
unspecified 'structural deficit'. As children mature, 
the mediator does begin to influence performance, but 
they do not generate the mediator spontaneously. In 
the final stage, the mediator is generated in all appro­
priate situations and it does improve performance;.
It is worth noting several problems with these theories. 
There is a failure to make explicit the processes by 
which mediation facilitates recall, and the related problem 
of explaining the mediation deficit (why a potential med­
iator sometimes fails to mediate) is not dealt with. In 
addition, no reason is given for the change from mediation 
to production deficit:- why should a word suddenly begin 
to mediate performance? Finally, there is the problem of 
why children fail to utilise a mediator which is 'in' 
their behavioural repertoire, and which does improve perf­
ormance. These problems are not unique to the above 
theories of discrimination learning; they also appear in 
the mediational theories of memory, which were derived from
such theories.
1.2 The early experiments
In the late 1960's Flavell began a series of experiments on 
memory development utilising notions derived from the 
framework of mediational theories. Although he originally
operates with concepts similar to the classical mediational
18
theorists, Flavell’s experiments led him to suggest that 
the discriminative learning model of Kendler must be 
changed in important ways if it is to account for memory 
development. In the following account we see how theor­
etical concepts like mediation are extended to a range 
of non-verbal behaviours, and terms like production 
deficit are shown to have less precise meaning than was 
originally foreseen.
In 1966, Flavell, Beach and Chinsky conducted an experiment 
to investigate the role of verbal mediation in a simple 
task of memory for an array of objects. Children were 
shown a set of objects, which were named, and then the 
experimenter indicated a subset of the objects. The 
child had to remember this subset during a delay period- 
during which the objects were removed from view and point 
to the correct subset on a recall instruction. , In contrast 
to the earlier discrimination learning experiments 
(Kuenne, 1946; Kendler et al,1960) observation of mediation 
was carried out directly; one of the experimenters simply 
lip-read the instances of verbalisation. Rehearsal incre­
ased with age; about 10% of 5-year-old children were 
observed to name the objects,.compared with 10 0% of 10-year- 
olds.
As recall data were not available in this experiment, it 
was impossible to directly test the relationship between 
verbalisation and recall. Flavell’s next experiment 
investigated this issue, in the form of four different
19
hypotheses:
1. Does rehearsal increase performance? Spontaneous 
producers of the rehearsal strategy should outperform non­
rehearsers. If they do not, this is evidence of a mediation
deficit.
2. Can non-rehearsers be induced to rehearse? If they can, 
this indicates a production deficit.
3. Is induced rehearsal as effective a mediator as spont­
aneous strategy use?
4. Do children who are trained to rehearse maintain this
strategy when they are not explicitly requested to use it?
The experimental task was the same as in the Flavell et 
al (1966) study: children were first classified as spont­
aneous producers if they rehearsed on 9 out of 10 pre­
trials, or non-producers if they failed to rehearse on 
more than one pre-trial. Children who did not fall into 
either of these groups were dropped from the experiment.
The producers were further sub-divided into a group who 
were given instructions on how to rehearse, and a group 
who were not given training. All non-producers were 
instructed in the rehearsal strategy, and all the three 
groups were given a retest on the original task, with 
both training groups being given instructions to rehearse 
before the retest began. Following this, more trials were 
administered,., before which the experimenter explained to 
the children that they could say the names if they wished 
but it was no longer required of them to do so.
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The results of the study gave clear answers to each of 
the questions. Children who spontaneously rehearse remem­
ber more items than non-rehearsers, and the rehearsal 
strategy can be trained in children who do not spontaneously 
produce it; these children now rehearsed on 75% of the 
trials. When trained producers use the strategy their 
recall is improved to the level of spontaneous producers.
All this indicates that rehearsal doe£ mediate recall, 
and that failure to rehearse is the only reason why non­
producers do not perform well.
In theoretical terms we have clear evidence for a production 
deficit; the non-producers can be easily induced to prod­
uce a behaviour which mediates recall. Whenever rehearsal 
is used, recall increases, so there is nothing to indicate 
a mediation deficit. In answer to the final question, it 
was found that children who rehearsed only under instru­
ctions, quickly abandoned this strategy when they were 
no longer directly requested to use it. Ten of the 17 non­
producers failed to use the strategy when given the choice
2whether to do so.
Flavell had therefore demonstrated a clear relationship
between mediation by simple verbal rehearsal and recall.
He had found strong evidence for a production deficit, but
little to indicate problems of mediation.
2 But see the later discussion of the effect of instru- 
/ctions and priming on strategy selection.
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In his next study (Moely, Olson, Holmes, and Flavell, 1969), 
Flavell attempted to investigate whether his results 
generalised to mediators of a more complex cognitive form 
than simple verbal rehearsal. It has often been demon­
strated in the adult literature (G. Mandler, 1967) that 
sorting conceptually related items during study will 
considerably improve recall of lists of items. The 
question of interest was whether and when this would medi­
ate performance in the young child. The study differed 
from early mediational research in another way: Flavell 
suggested that the change from production deficiency 
to spontaneous production may not occur as a dudden qual­
itative shift, as the mediation theories imply by the 
dichotomy they propose between elicited production under 
conditions of explicit instruction, and spontaneous prod­
uction where no cues are given. Flavell argued that every 
situation includes some clues to the strategy required 
and that strategies first emerge when they are explicitly 
requested and gradually generalise to situations which 
provide weaker clues for strategy selection. To test 
this, Moely et al introduced an intermediate instruction 
condition in which the children were given a hint as to 
the strategy they should employ.
In the experiment, the children (aged from 5 to 11 years) 
were shown a set of pictures, which could be categorized 
into sets of animals, furniture, vehicles and articles 
of clothing. They were told they should study the pic­
tures, so that later they could say them back to the
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experimenter. It was suggested to the children in the 
control group that they could move the pictures or do 
anything they liked to help them remember. A second 
group (Naming) received more explicit cues for strategy 
selection - the experimenter named all the categories 
(e.g. "Things to ride in") and then pointed out each 
category member. In the explicit cue condition (Teaching) 
the children were told to sort the items manually, then 
label them, and then count the number of items in each
category.
Strategy use was again directly observed by filming 
the subject’s activity through a one way mirror. Following 
the test trials, the subjects were asked to sort the items. 
This is important, because it must be established
whether failure to sort was due to an inability to cate- 
go-rise/. whether this is another example of a perfor­
mance deficit, i.e. the subjects can category-sort but 
they just do not do so in order to remember.
The results of the sorting task indicated that even the 
youngest children were capable of some category"*sorting, 
although the absolute level of performance increased with 
age. The interesting comparison, however, is between ' 
children’s sorting behaviour under instructions to 
remember, with that under instructions to sort, that is 
how good are children at employing their sorting skills 
as a strategy to mediate recall? Moelv' et al compared 
sorting performance under the two sets of instructions
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within subjects to control for differences in absolute
sorting ability. They found that the ratio of clustering 
produced
category sorting/under instructions to remember, to 
category sorting made under instructions to sort, 
increased from 0.07 in 5-year-olds to 0.60 in children 
aged ten, indicating that the older children were much 
more likely to employ their sorting skills to mediate 
memory. These results indicate that young children 
have a production deficit as regards this particular med­
iator, but even the oldest group failed to make maximum 
use of their categorisation skills. Moelv et al’s 
observations suggest one reason for this may be the use 
of other strategies such as rehearsal or self-testing
(looking away from the pictures and trying to reproduce 
them from memory).
Another difference between the age-groups was in the ji 
explicitness of the instructions required to elicit 
clustering as a memory strategy. While only the 10-year- 
olds sorted spontaneously, to remember, both this group 
and the 8-year-olds showed sorting behaviour in the Naming 
condition. For the 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds only 
the strong prompts of the Teaching condition induced 
appreciable clustering.These results are important • 
because they suggest that mediational strategies do not 
enter the child’s repertoire, and immediately generalised, 
to all situations. Younger children may need highly 
explicit prompts to engage in a mediational strategy,
which older children will produce under mild prompting.
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In neither case could the strategy be said to be fully 
productive however.
In addition to these differences in production ’threshold' 
the data suggest that even when a strategy is elicited, 
it may be executed more or less efficiently. For example, 
the youngest group in the Teaching condition showed 
evidence of category sorting, but often only applied 
this to a few of the list items. So, the ability to 
execute a given strategy like the ability to evoke it 
is not an all-or-none phenomenon, as the older mediational 
theories would seem to suggest. The Moely et al study 
showed that many different behaviours in addition to 
speech may serve to mediate memory. This was supported 
by Corsini, Pick and Flavell (1969), who demonstrated 
that the modified mediational framework could be applied 
foratask which involved specifically non-verbal cueing. 
Children were required to remember a pattern and provided 
with materials which made it possible to construct a 
replica of this pattern. The replica could then be used 
to remember the pattern. Again there was no evidence 
of a mediational deficit; children who correctly cons­
tructed recall cues recalled equally well, independent 
of age (as in the other studies, there was strong evidence 
for the production deficit). The Moely et al finding that 
production threshold for a given strategy decreased 
with age was also replicated.
The final experiment in this series, conducted by Daehler,
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Horowitz, Wynns anddFlavell (1969), attempted to look 
at the effect df different recall demands on strategy 
selection. Subjects were shown the same stimulus array, 
a set of coloured lights flashing in sequence, but were 
variously required to remember the colours which flashed, 
the order they flashed, or both. Daehler et al predicted 
that a verbal rehearsal strategy would mediate recall 
of the colours, whereas gestural rehearsal (pointing) 
would improve recall for the sequence. It was also 
expected that older subjects would be better able to select 
the appropriate strategy for each task.
The results for' the colour-naming and colour-and-sequence 
tests essentially replicated Keeney et al (1966). Most 
subjects at some time used verbal rehearsal, this incre­
ased with age, and was positively correlated with perfor­
mance .
In contrast, the sequence and gestural rehearsal data 
were completely at variance with this. The incidence of 
rehearsal was equal in both older and younger children, 
in addition it was unrelated to memory performance. Overt, 
gestural rehearsal does not seem to mediate recall of 
position sequences.
There were also some interesting asymmetries in strategy 
transfer for the two strategies. Half the subjects had 
received colour-only and then sequence-only tests with 
the other half being tested in the opposite order. Few
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subjects who received colour-only trials first and used 
verbal reheardal on these trials, then used it as a 
strategy to remember sequence. In contrast, gestural 
rehearsal seemed to generalise from early sequence trials 
to later trials for colour. This result is important 
because it shows that strategy selection is not only 
influenced by the instructions before a given trial, but 
depends on what has previously occurred in the experiment - 
certain strategies may be ’primed’ by what has happened
earlier.
1.3 The mediational model
On the basis of these experiments Flavell produced an 
mediational account of memory development. Before attemp­
ting a detailed explication of the model, I shall make 
a few preliminary remarks about the nature of the develop­
mental theory he was proposing.
Firstly, the basic emphasis was on the similarity of 
memory processes throughout development and the same mech­
anism, mediationfwas proposed to explain memory. This 
is in contrast with the then predominant Piagetian account 
of the development of cognitive processes which stresses 
qualitative differences between the processes in operation 
at different stages of development.
In addition to proposing the basic mechanism of mediation, 
Flavell argues that development is the result of changes
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in the mediational strategies available to the young 
child, in the number of strategies available, and in the 
child’s increasing efficiency in using an appropriate 
mediational strategy, often as a result of having a 
larger'-mediational repertoire to choose from.
The model also provides a description of various mediatorsz 
a set of theoretical concepts for analysing changes in 
mediational activity within and among tasks (e.g. product­
ion and mediation deficits, production threshold), a 
descriptive account of various developmental sequences 
which obtain among mediatorst and some speculations about 
what might explain these developmental sequences.
1.3.1 Memory is mediation
Flavell argues that memory occurs as a result of media­
tional strategies. When subjects are induced to,'or spont­
aneously employ, a behaviour such as rehearsal, category 
clustering or cue construction, these mediational activi­
ties result in increased recall. Evidence for this is
provided by the finding that ppontaneous strategy producers 
recall more than those who do not produce, but the argument 
is made much more powerfully by the demonstration that 
when non-producers are induced to employ a strategy they 
improve their recall.
Flavell’s account of the mediation process is much richer 
than that of his predecessors; the notion of mediator is
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extended from a simple verbal response interposed between 
stimulus and response(as in Kendler and Kendler’s (1962) 
S-(s)-R account of mediation) to encompass a whole variety 
of cognitive activities from rehearsal to self-testing or 
constructing images. He does not only focus on the diff­
erences among strategies, he points to the variations in 
what seems to be essentially ’the same’ strategy. For 
example, the young child’s ’rehearsal’ activity may stretch 
only as far as the simple naming of objects which are 
physically present, while the older child might rehearse 
in the absence of the objects, re-order them to construct 
links amongst items and self-test to see whether the 
items are well-encoded. Although it is not explicitly 
stated, the account suggests that the sophisticated memor- 
iser may resort to the use of more than one strategy in 
a given task.
Flavell regards all these activities as the result of
deliberate problem-solving activity by the child:
a memory task can be profitably regarded as a 
type of problem-solving situation in which efforts 
at mnemonic mediation constitute the means or
' problem-solving strategy and recall the goal or 
problem solution. Cl970, p.195.)
Tt is important to note that Flavell characterises such 
problem-solving as a deliberate conscious activity, a 
fact which will assume greater significance in our later
discussions.
There are, however, several problems with the memory as 
mediated activity model, some of which are raised by
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Flavell*s own data. The first concerns the mediation
deficit. There are two separate issues involved here.
The first concerns the traditional mediation deficit, 
and the question of why behaviours which mediate memory 
in adults, do not do so in younger populations. Secondly 
there is the problem of explaining why some behaviours 
mediate, whereas others do not. I shall deal first with 
the general problem of certain behaviours failing to 
mediate. While this was much emphasised by the early 
mediational theorists, it seems to play almost no role 
in Flavell’s account. It is of crucial significance to 
the theory to establish whether such deficits do exist, 
because if they do, it means that not all activity results 
in improved memory. While it is possible to generate 
trivial examples of activities not having memory pay­
offs (e.g. going to the pub* (does not help exam re/isioi) there 
is an important counter-example to the principle in the 
Daehler et al experiment. Gestural rehearsal/which on prima 
facie grounds appears to be adequate strategy for remem­
bering- isequences, does not result in improved memory for 
any age group. This suggests that for every memory 
task there are a limited range of activities which will 
benefit recall,and the research has identified some of these 
by the study of adult processing (as in rehearsal and 
category clustering) or on intuitive grounds (cue 
' construction). An adequate theory must specify the const- 
taints on those activities which will facilitate memory
for a given task and explain why certain activities Ce.g. 
gestural rehearsal) show no effects on performance in those
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tasks. The questions of why behaviours may not mediate 
at one age level, but do so later in development is also 
not tackled. In one sense Flavell is justified in ignor­
ing this problem because he found little evidence for it.
Flavell’s data also show the opposite effect; memory
occurs in the apparent absence of mediation. For example,
children who show no signs of rehearsing or category
clustering nevertheless retain several items when tested.
(Keeney et al, Moely et al). How can we account for this?
Flavell’s solution is to retain the ’memory is the result
of mediational activity’ axiom but to suggest that some
mediation may occur in an involuntary manner.
One must assume that some mnemonic processes - 
no less "mediational" in the literal sense - are 
not ordinarily subject to voluntary control.
(1970, p.193).
If this is so, then the model must both specify what 
processes underlie involuntary mediation, and criteria 
for distinguishing it. from deliberate mediation if it is 
to remain more than an ad hoc means of explaining away 
awkward data. Suggestions as to how involuntary mediation 
might occur, are the most important way in which Flavell’s 
(1970) model has been modified. The notion of involuntary 
mediation is discussed in the next chapter.
A second solution to the problem of "recall without strat­
egies" is to propose that the youngest groups are in fact 
employing deliberate strategies but we do not know what 
they are, because they are covert and because the children
are unable to describe them to us. This form of
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explanation is both implausible and inadequate;’ implaus­
ible, because adults typically remember some items when 
they are prevented from rehearsing (e.g. Baddeley and 
Hitch, 1974), and yet cannot and do not report the use of 
any strategy; and inadequate, because it does not specify 
the processes involved in these 'unobservable' strategies, 
(see later discussion of methodology).
The notion that memory occurs as a result of deliberate 
problem-solving activities is further weakened by Flavell's 
suggestion that under certain circumstances task materials 
may 'elicit' various behaviours, which do mediate behaviour 
but are not the result of intentional activity. In his 
discussion of a study in which children had to set up 
pictures as cues, to locate various animals (Ryan, Hegion 
and Flavell, 1970), Flavell appeals to this notion(1970, 
P.206)
.... another(child)might idly bring the pictures
up next to their animal referents, on one or more 
trials (a prepotent high-probabili ty response to 
these particular task materials for young chil­
dren, we think,' even without a recall' set).
Again Flavell appeals to the notion of mediation following 
on involuntary behaviour, though this account better 
explains recall than in the rehearsal case, because on this 
occasion the effective mediating process is specified.
There seem therefore,to be three problems with the media­
tional model proposed by Flavell. The first concerns his 
failure to answer the question of which activities can
serve as mediators for different stimuli in different
situations. Secondly, he weakens the mediation principle
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by allowing that memory may occur in the absence of media­
tion, without saying when this might occur, or what princ­
iples determine memory under these conditions. Finally 
he suggests that mediation may not always involve the inten­
tional access of cognitive routines. This notion is
derived from his demonstration that mediations can be
generated without intention to remember (Ryan et al,
1970). The theory must therefore include some account of 
the child's other activities which will allow the explan­
ation of why a certain stimulus array "elicits" particular 
behaviours. All these problems have led to modifications 
of the model which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
1.3.2 Changes in mediational activity
In addition to the axiom that memory occurs as a result ■ 
of mediational activity, Flavell argued that the develop­
ment of memory followed changes in the number and type 
of mediators available. Older children have a broader
range of strategies from which to choose, and are therefore 
more likely to possess one which is task appropriate. In 
addition, they have more powerful strategies in their 
repertoire, as. well as being more flexible in their 
control and use of strategies. ■
The theoretical constructs inherited from the mediational 
theorists mediation and production deficits, and spontan­
eous production,suggested . neat distinctions and qualitative
stage-like shifts between them, and one of Flavell’s
major contributions to this field is his emphasis on
the continuity of development in mediational skills, and 
the complexity of factors involved in the selection and 
use of a particular strategy.
The original conception of mediation (leaving aside the 
mediational deficit which has already been discussed in 
detail) represented development as the smooth execution of an 
invariant behaviour, first only in those situations in which 
it was elicited by the experimenter and then its sudden 
generalisation to all situations where it would facili­
tate memory.
Flavell’s experiments suggested that this account was
wrong on two ^counts. The mediational behaviour itself
undergoes changes in efficiency over the entire course
of its development, although the changes themselves may 
periods there may be '
be gradual, over long / radical changes in form. In 
addition, the process of a strategy becoming productive 
involves slow generalisation from those situations where 
the behaviour is strongly elicited by experimenter instru­
ctions and the materials employed, to situations where 
few such cues are present. Flavell’s account differs 
from Piaget’s general cognitive model, firstly because 
behaviours undergo discrete changes with development, and 
also because of the lack of generality of a given mediator 
across different tasks.
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Flavell describes two types of changes in the form of a
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given strategy. The first he calls changes in efficiency; 
the young child may correctly elect to employ a certain 
strategy, but fail to execute it correctly or completely. 
Examples of such behaviour occur on the Moely et al task 
where young children only partially category sort, or in 
the Corsini et al experiment where they decide upon a cue 
construction strategy, but sometimes construct the cues in 
an inaccurate way.
The second type of change is more radical; in the same
task children show behaviours which are so dissimilar that
we do not regard them as variants or increases in efficiency 
of the same strategy, but as different strategies. For 
example, in the Moely et al experiment, young children 
labelled stimulus items when the items were physically 
present, a lower order verbal strategy which appeared in 
a more sophisticated form in the older groups who averted 
their gaze and attempted to name all the stimulus- ideas 
in a self-testing strategy. In the Keeney et al experiment 
subjects demonstrated an intermediate form of this strategy - 
they used verbal rehearsal as a simple means of retaining 
ideas in memory while the stimuli were physically absent.
While it is possible to dispute that the above behaviours 
are all variants of the 'same’ strategy, it is obvious 
that a simple production deficit a spontaneous production 
model will not satisfactorily account for the data, 
because it ignores changes in the mediating behaviour.
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The acceptance that mediational behaviour may increase 
in efficiency or exist in different forms creates a 
whole series of new explanatory problems. We now have 
to give an account of these changes in strategies and 
allow for the possibility that a subject may use more 
than one strategy in a given task, and possibly build in 
some form of executive decision maker to determine which
strategy variant is accessed.
According to Flavell, the original conceptualisation of 
the production deficit was wrong in a second sense; a 
mediational behaviour does not suddenly change from being 
highly situation-specific and elicited only under condi­
tions of explicit instruction to aidecontextualised general 
strategy. This view is to some extent derived from studies 
which contrast training with no-instruction conditions.
The experiments of M£>ely et al and Corsini et al demonstrate 
however that the discontinuous notion of production deficit 
ought to be replaced by something like a production thres­
hold, with less and less explicit situational ones being 
required to evoke a given strategy as it develops. This 
suggests that a mediational behaviour should show a 
pattern of slow generalisation across different situations.
This has two implications for the model; firstly it means 
that the actual task context is a crucial determinant of 
memory performance as to whether it elicits a particular 
strategy. We must therefore attempt a detailed analysis
of tasks to determine the factors which are critical in
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this process. In Flavell’s experiments, control over 
these eliciting factors is operationally defined; subjects 
are given no instructions, a hint or explicit strategy
model to cue a desired behaviour. While it is clear that
instructions will have a powerful effect in determining 
behaviour, it is not obvious how an analysis of task 
might proceed in the absence of such obvious manipulations 
of instructions. Flavell does suggest that recall demands 
may have an effect of strategy selection, more subjects 
labelled items when they were told to remember their 
names, (Mroely et al) than when they merely had to point 
to them (Keeney etal), and a similar effect was noted 
in the Daehler et al study. Other relevant variables 
appear to be the presence or absence of the items more 
naming was observed in the Moely et al study when stimuli 
were present, than the Keeney et al study when they were 
not. Another way of conceptualising the effects of task 
or stimulus variables is to investigate the child's normal 
activities with such materials, for example, Ryan et al 
suggest that picture-object matching is a high probability 
response even when no memory goal is set, consequently 
such behaviours may need little experimental inducement 
to be evoked. While much of this account is plausible, it 
must be noted that we lack a theory of task analysis; and 
explanations of eliciting factors are either obvious
Ce.g. explicit instruction is more likely to evoke strat- 
e gies than implicit) or ad hoc (remembering sequences is 
more likely to elicit gestural rehearsal than is remember­
ing colour names. Another problem is that the weighting of
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the various factors, i.e. materials, task demands and 
instructions ,.may change with age, for example, Donaldson 
(1978) has suggested that pre-school children pay little 
attention to verbal instruction on certain tasks, and 
worse still, the various factors probably interact with
each other.
The problem of eliciting factors is further complicated 
by the fact that evocation of a given strategy is not 
independent of the child’s proficiency with that strategy. 
For example, a child may preferentially select a strategy 
which he can smoothly execute, rather than one which at 
first sight better fits the problem, but may be difficult 
to actually use.
1-3.3 ' Predicting sequences of strategies
One task of any developmental theory is to predict the 
order of emergence of various behaviours (Flavell, 1972, 
Fischer, 1980). This is made all the.more difficult in 
the case of memory strategies because of the constellation 
of processes subsumed under the general category of 
strategies, and also because of the effects of the various 
eliciting factors.
If we consider the case of a single strategy, prediction 
of ’the age’ at which it ’emerges’ is complicated by the 
various task and instruction factors. A strategy will 
emerge much earlier if it is elicited by close training or
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clever manipulation of materials. In addition, different 
strategies may well have had different amounts of practice, 
which we have just argued may be a powerful determinant 
of strategy selection. For example a behaviour like object 
naming may be overlearnt and hence more elicitable than, 
say, category clustering.
Leaving aside the problems of task factors and practice, 
and assuming we = ihave adequate criteria for assessing the 
contribution they make to strategy selection, if we hold 
these factors constant is there anything else we can say 
about the sequences in which memory strategies emerge? 
Flavell immediately rejects any notion of general struc­
tural change, because of the widely different sets of 
skills which make up each strategy. What he attempts 
to do is to explain the sequence obtained in his experi­
ments where he discovered that labelling/naming developed 
before rehearsal which itself preceded category-clustering 
in terms of a sort of measurement sequence, in which the 
set of skills required for an early developing strategy 
are included in and thus a pre-requisite for, the develop­
ment of later strategies. So for example, simple 
labelling, the ability to name an object is necessary 
for rehearsal, that is, naming it when it is no longer 
present.
The problem with the inclusion account is that it can 
only be systematically applied to closely related skill 
sets. How, for example, would we be able to predict
whether tying a knot in a handkerchief emerges before 
the self-testing strategy of the Moely et al study?
The theory implies that there exists some hierarchy for 
explaining the order of emergence of strategies and . 
although some of the sequences (e.g. rehearsal develops 
before category clustering because one involves temporal 
ordering and sequencing without reference to meaning and
the other involves the construction of relations, at a
conceptual level), do have intuitive plausibility, 
a theoretical explanation is nowhere given.
In conclusion, although Flavell is correct to stress 
the complexity of factors which determine the evocation 
of strategies, his failure to provide a detailed account 
of task factors and the strategy hierarchy means that 
prediction of ages of emergence of various strategies, 
and of the sequences and relations which hold between 
different strategies means that the theory makes very 
few specific predictions about development. Because of 
this, it is extremely difficult to refute.
■ Explaining strategy development
In addition, Flavell provided an explanation for the 
development of memory by reference to specific and general 
factors. The specific factors apply to the particular 
cognitive activities which underlie the use of particular 
mnemonic mediators. A strategy such as rehearsal, for
39
40
example is made up of a whole set of underlying skills, 
such as item-naming, sequencing, re-ordering and re- 
cycl ing, and it is clear that a factor such as speed 
of stimulus naming may constrain rehearsal efficiency, 
if for example naming is to show, then the user may only 
be able to rehearse items in sets of two. Development 
of such underlying skills may well make the strategy 
more efficient, and hence more likely to be elicited 
in a wide range of situations. A similar argument 
which Flavell doesn’t make, could extend across strategies; 
general cognitive development should leave the subject 
with a wider range of activities which can be subsumed 
to a memory goal. He is therefore more likely to have a 
strategy which better fits the task demands.
The general factor Flavell callsplanfulness. Consistent 
with his arguments that memory is a matter of generating 
mediators to achieve memory goals, he suggests that 
careful planning of activities to do now (encoding), 
which will have pay-offs later (recall), is not part of 
the general cognitive outlook of the young child. This
increased awareness of the means-ends structure of cer­
tain problems is not linked to any specific strategy, 
but it may account for the fact that older children 'are 
much less dependent on eliciting factors in selecting 
strategies, than are younger children. This is the
3 Chi (1978) has suggested that there are age differences 
in the skills which make up rehearsal. For example, 
children are slower to name a familiar stimulus (see 
Chapter 2).
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introduction of the concept of 'metamemory' or knowledge 
about memory which was later refined and invoked as a 
major explanatory factor in the emergence of strategies. 
(Flavell, 1971). Metamemory will be discussed and 
evaluated in Chapters 2 and 3.
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CHAPTER 2 MODIFICATIONS TO FLAVELL’S MODEL
2.1 Introduction
The modifications which have been made to Flavell’s (1970) 
model are not the result of it being falsified, but 
follow from its failure to provide an adequate account 
of several important phenomena including the development 
of involuntary memory, the production deficit and memory 
for meaning. The changes also represent attempts to 
integrate the field with other areas of research, in 
particular, information processing in adult cognition, 
Russian research and Piagetian cognitive development. Both
research findings and explanatory notions have been 
imported from all these fields.
This chapter will focus on two ways in which the model 
has been modified, the first following the integration 
of the notion of mediation with the literature on Levels 
of Processing (henceforth refere d to as LOP) and attempts 
to explain changes in mediation. The second followed 
the inadequacy of mediational theory in explaining 
memory for text, recognition memory and relative recency. 
This second difficulty led to the introduction of'struc­
tural explanations of memory imported from theories of 
information processing. Both modifications resulted 
in reconsiderations of developmental issues. A number
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of theorists speculated about changes in the child’s 
use of different mediational strategies (Brown, 1975; 
Flavell, 1971; Meacham, 1972; Paris, 1978a; 1978b) 
and Piaget and Inhelder (1973) present a case for struc­
tural change: .
2.2 Changes in mediational models
2.2.1 Mediational models and levels of processing
Meacham (1972) drew attention to the similarities
between the mediational model of Flavell and the levels
of processing literature (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Hyde 
and Jenkins, 1969). The research in both areas shared 
three basic assumptions: (a) memory is dependent upon 
the particular cognitive operations the subject applies 
to the stimulus materials; (b) operations differ in 
their implications for memory and these operations may 
be arranged in some sort of hierarchy; and (c) it is 
not important whether such operations are the result 
of intentional selection. The first of these propositions 
that memory is dependent on the particular operations 
the subject uses, is illustrated in a typical LOP experi­
ment in which subjects may be instructed to carry out 
operations focussing on the structure of words (e.g. 
cross out all the letter e’s), while others are induced 
to focus on the meaning of the stimulus (e.g. rate the 
meaning of the words along the dimension pleasant-
unpleasant) . Jenkins and his colleagues (e.g. Hyde and
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Jenkins, 1969; Jenkins, 1971; Johnston and Jenkins, 1971) 
have conducted a number of such studies. The generalis­
ation which emerged from this research was that the 
activity in which subjects engaged substantially affected 
their memory performance. In 1972, Craik and Lockhart 
suggested that such activities may be ordered in a hier­
archy from the 'perceptual’ to the 'semantic'. Thus, a 
subject required to assess whether a word contains a 
letter 'e' will remember less than the subject making 
semantic decisions. Finally as the experiments of 
Mandler (1967) had shown for organisation, it is the 
activity itself which determines memory, it does not 
matter whether such activity was selected by subject or 
experimenter. Meacham pointed to the parallels between 
these propositions and the suggestions of Flavell (1970). 
The notion of activities having different implications 
for memory performance and the concept of a strategy 
hierarchy has already been discussed in Chapter I.
The research on incidental memory also closely relates 
to the performance deficit, for what Flavell's experiments 
demonstrated was that experimenter-induced strategies 
were as effective as spontaneous strategies in mediating
memory.
This led to a series of experiments based on the paradigms 
of adult research Murphy and Brown (1975) and Geis and 
Hall (1976) , replicated the standard LOP result that 
instructions which lead to processing of meaning ("deeper"
levels) lead to better free- recall than instructions
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to process more superficial features such as colour o.r 
shape.
However there have been a number of recent criticisms
of the LOP approach and some of these have important impli 
cations for mediational models. It is important that 
these criticisms are examined not only because of the 
general insights they offer into mediational models 
but because a number of reviews have suggested that LOP 
theory be used as a framework for interpreting memory 
development (Brown, 1979? Naus , Ornstein and Moving-,
1978). Firstly, there have been criticisms of the 
notion of a hierarchy of levels. For example Craik 
and Tulving (1975) demonstrated large differences in 
recall for subjects processing to the same semantic 
level. This suggests that there are differences in 
processing within levels. Craik and Tulving , recognising 
that the notion of "levels" had relied on intuitive
definition, attempted to find an independent measure 
of depth of processing. They suggested that processing 
time may well offer such a measure, but their data indi­
cated that this was not so. Subjects required to make 
complex judgements about the formal features of words 
took much longer to carry out such tasks than subjects 
making semantic rating decisions. If time is an ade­
quate measure of processing depth than the group engaged 
in the formal orienting activity should perform better.-, 
than the group making semantic ratings. Craik and Tulving 
found that this was not the case. A further problem for
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the LOP approach was the finding that semantic ("deep") 
processing may not always lead to better recall than 
perceptual ("shallow") processing. Morris, Bransford 
and Franks (1977) demonstrated that memory performance 
was not determined by encoding activity alone, but by 
the compatibility of encoding activity with retrieval 
demands. Subjects who were required to remember percep­
tual features of the stimulus performed better when 
they had engaged in the perceptual rather than the seman­
tic orienting activity. Thus depth of processing alone 
does not determine performance, rather it is the 
appropriateness of the encoding ad.tivity for the demands
of the retrieval task.
In addition to these problems, which are internal to the 
LOP framework, there are a number of difficulties 
associated with using the model in the interpretation ; 
of developmental data. Firstly, there is the problem 
of mapping the sorts of encoding strategies studied 
by Flavell onto the levels described in the model.
Thus, while it is obvious that labelling involves 
shallower processing than categorisation, what is the depth 
of coding of a strategy such as self-test (.i.e. looking 
away from stimuli and attempting to name them all).• This 
brings us back to the previously mentioned problems 
with the model: that levels of processing were defined 
in an ostensive- and intuitive way. The account does not 
really explain the cognitive processes involved with
each type of processing, i.e. why it is that semantic
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processing is more efficient than perceptual processing.
A second problem with applying the framework to develop­
mental data is that it ignores the crucial problem of 
the production deficit. The LOP experiments typically 
involve the experimenter instructing subjects to engage 
in various orienting activities: they do not explain 
the relationships between these activities and the 
strategies subjects normally employ. In addition, the 
account cannot explain the fact that children become 
increasingly able to select strategies appropriate to
the task demands.
Given the problems associated with the framework itself 
and also with its application to developmental issues, 
it does not appear that the LOP framework in a develop­
mental context offers any great advances on the theory 
put forward by Flavell. However, it does illustrate 
some of the problems associated with the mediational 
account. In particular, there is the problem of explaining 
why it is that mediators differ in their efficiency for 
inducing memory What is absent from the mediational 
account is any discussion of internal mechanisms, because 
of the focus cn external activity. A model which includes 
such state variables may go some way towards accounting
for the differential effectivieness of different media­
tors. In addition the findings of Morris et al Cl977) 
imply that any such account must include some reference
to the retrieval environment.
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2.2.2 Explanations of mediational change
It has already been suggested (Chapter 1) that a major 
problem with the mediational account is explaining how 
mediation changes, and becomes increasingly effective 
with age. A number of different accounts have been 
offered attempting to explain this change.
Flavell’s metamemory account
In 1971 Flavell published an article in which he reaffirmed 
that memory is an intentional problem-solving activity, 
and then attempted to apply what is known about the 
development of problem solving in order to understand 
the development of memory. Although acknowledging that
an increase in the mediational behaviours in the child’s
repertoire may contribute to this development, he argues 
that the major reason for the increased efficiency of 
mediated memory is that it comes under increased inten­
tional control. This he attributes to children’s increased
knowledge of when and how to remember. Thus, if young 
children do not realise that they forget, they may 
make no special effort to try and remember. Alternat­
ively, children may realise that they should do something 
to remember, but they don't know enough about the cog­
nitive routines they have available to assess the 
correct one, Flavell attributes this to a general change 
in the child’s cognitive abilities.
As children grow older, we know that they
49
become more aware of the mental processes 
of other people (role-taking) and also more 
aware of their own mental processes (intro­
spection) . We think that they also become 
more aware of the what and the how of their 
own memory, simply as a special case of their 
increasing introspective ability. (1971/ p. 277).
A more detailed exposition and analysis of the position 
advanced by Flavell will be attempted in Chapter 3, 
the section was included here merely to contrast the 
theory with others which have been suggested.
The involuntary account
The set of suggestions discussed in this section has 
been advanced piecemeal by a number of writersras a 
model for." the development of memory. The most detailed 
discussion of this position is by Paris (1978a), but he 
does not offer any empirical support for it. Apart 
from this, both Brown and De Loache-- (19 78) , Meacham 
(1972) and Yendovitskaya (1971) offer some speculations 
which are consistent with the account offered here. 
According to Yendovitskaya (1971), Meacham (1972),'.".'. 
Paris (1978a) and Brown and De Loache.. (1978) , one very 
important means by which memory becomes more efficient 
is by involuntary routines coming under the increased 
control of deliberate memory. This is distinct from 
the account offered by Flavell (1971) in two respects.
In Flavell's account it is suggested that memory strat­
egies are problem-solving routines specifically gener­
ated to meet the goal of remembering. According to 
Yendovitskaya (1971) and Brown and De .Loache- (1978)
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strategies are the modification of routines already in 
the cognitive repertoire. The second difference lies 
in the generality of the mechanism proposed to explain how
routines come under the control of deliberate mechanism.
Whereas Flavell (1971) argues that the growth of deliberate 
memory is the result of a general increase in reflectivity, 
they seem to suggest that reflectivity acts at the level 
of the specific routine itself. Meacham (1972) speculates 
that practice of the routine may lead to reflection into 
its structure, but no really detailed explanation is 
offered to account for reflectivity. A number of experi­
ments and two major reviews (Lange, 19 78, Omstein and • 
C^rsale, 1979) offer some support for this position, 
although the data are suggestive rather than conclusive 
in many cases. If the account is to be supported, it 
seems that it is necessary to establish (a) that routines 
are originally involuntary, i.e. they are produced inde­
pendently of memory goals; (b) that routines are later 
under the control of deliberate memory; and (c) that some 
knowledge of the' structure of the routine emerges during 
this time. Condition (a) could be satisfied by giving 
the children a variety of non-memory instructions and 
establishing that the behaviour is produced in the absence 
of memory goals. Evidence that a routine is under delib­
erate control (condition (b)) might be supplied by the 
child modifying the earlier 'automatic* behaviour to meet 
the memory demands of the particular situation. Condition
(c) may be satisfied by some metamemory measure.
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Two major reviews of organisation in children's memory, 
by Lange (1978) and Ornstein and Corsale (1979) suggest 
that initially organisational factors are involuntary 
and only gradually come under the control of voluntary
memory.
...the subject is "struck" by the organisation 
he perceives, and he encodes and stores organi­
sation unites as a direct and automatic function 
of their perceived structure.... it is reasonable 
to posit further that the recall organisation 
we sometimes see in pre-school and elementary 
school children has an exogenous basis and occurs 
through a series of involuntary actions that can 
operate at both the perceptual-encoding and 
retrieval phases of processing. (Lange, 1978, 
p. 107).
It is clear that both these reviews would argue that organ­
isational factors in the memory of older children are 
under deliberate control, although neither seems to argue 
strongly for 'reflection on structure’ being responsible 
for this change.
Lange; advances two arguments to support his contention 
that early clustering is involuntary. The first is 
that such clustering only occurs with high-associate items 
(Haynes and Kulhavy, 1976). It could be argued that 
with low-associate items young children fail to detect 
the categories, but as Lange points out, this failure 
should be avoided when the experimenter labels items and 
categories. However, even when labels are provided no 
such clustering occurs. (Cole, Frankel and Sharp, 1971a, 
Moely et al, 1969) . In contrast, clustering does occur 
when items from the same category are presented in 
sequence (blocked presentation), because in this case
the experimenters is imposing an organisation rather than 
suggesting one to the children (Bjorklund and Ornstein,
1976).
In contrast, older children and adults appear to impose 
structure on lists, regardless of item-relatedness or 
item-order. They will even do so when there are no 
category relations between items (.Tulving , 1962) . In 
addition subjects will modify the positions of the stim­
uli or their order, so that the stimuli correspond to 
their own category organisation (Moely et al, 1969; •
Ornstein, Naus and 'Liberty, 1975).
There is thus evidence which satisfies Conditions (.a)
and (b) above, that routines are initially involuntary 
and only later come under deliberate control. ’Miat is 
the evidence for Condition (c) , that this change is 
due to reflecting on the structure of organisation?
Three studies have found that knowledge of the advantages 
of categorised stimuli emerges around the time of the 
first deliberate use of organisational strategies, (.Monroe 
and Lange, 1977; Moynahan, 1973; Salatas and Flavell,
1976a). However two of the studies found only weak 
evidence that knowledge of category structure was predic­
tive of strategy use, and Monroe and Lange (1977) report 
no relationship.
Brown and Smiley (1977) advance the argument that story 
recall is initially mediated by involuntary processes
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which come under intentional control and can thus be
employed as study strategies. They point out that all 
subjects in the age range they tested (3 - 17-year-olds) 
"extract the main theme and ignore the trivia" (Brown,
1979 , p. 239). Brown and De Loache (1978) argue that
this occurred "with or without conscious intent to do
so" (p. 19), although they give no empirical evidence
in support of this statement. While it is implausible 
that the youngest group were employing a deliberate 
strategy of ignoring trivia, this has not been demon­
strated. Brown, Smiley, Day, Townsend and Lawton (19 77a) 
do demonstrate that other processes of text memory, initially 
are mediated in an involuntary manner but they report no 
relevant study of the extraction of central themes.
The evidence that the routine is later under intentional
control is much stronger. Brown and -Smiley report two 
findings which support this contention. Firstly-they 
found that children of 14 years or older, if given a 
period of extra study time (.equal to three times their 
normal reading rate) would considerably improve their 
recall for the important elements of the text. Recall 
of less important details did not improve. Younger 
children shared no such improvement. In addition, 
older children were observed to make attempts to render 
important information more salient, either by under­
lining it, or by taking notes during study time.
These actions do not much resemble automatic or over­
learnt activities. Condition (b) is therefore met:
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there seems to be clear evidence of Intentional use
of the study strategy, although there are slight
problems with satisfying Condition (a) as the crucial 
experiment has not been conducted. There is also some 
difficulty with Condition (c); Brown and Smiley do 
report that subjects’ knowledge of the structure of text 
increases with age, but there is no obvious relation 
between this knowledge and the emergence of the study 
strategy.
The remaining evidence for this position is rather more 
anecdotal in nature. In a study of the development 
of cue use, Ryan, Hegi-Qn .and-Flavell (1970) observed 
that not all their subjects seemed to be employing cues 
in an intentional manner. Rather, it seemed that putting 
pictures at the locations of identical animals, was the 
result of some low-level matching behaviour. "Another 
(child) might idly bring the picture up next to their 
animal referents on one or more trials (a prepotent, 
high-probability response to these particular task 
materials for young children ... even without a recall 
set)" (Flavell, 1970, p. 206).
Other studies of cues also report similar behaviours-: 
Ritter (1978) found that young children would search 
under a marked cup even when they had observed an 
animal being hidden under a different (unmarked) cup.
It is almost as though the children believe the cued 
object moves with the cue. Gordon and Flavell (1977)
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also suggest that early cteing has stimulus-response 
characteristics. Young children had no awareness that 
the usefulness of a cue might depend on the knowledge 
of the searcher, or that low-associate objects may serve 
as useful cues. Although these studies are consistent 
with the general argument advanced here, in that appar­
ently involuntary early behaviours come to have increa­
singly deliberate characteristics, there is no attempt 
to explain these changes in terms of changes in knowl­
edge about cuing. Ritter Cl978) does include a number 
of questions which are designed to assess the extent 
of children's knowledge about cues, so it is possible 
to test the hypothesis. Ritter’s data would seem to 
weakly support the hypothesis: knowledge about the cueing
strategy appeared to increase during the pre-school 
and early school years, and this was followed by more 
systematic use of the strategy by older children.
However the expected relationship did not emerge•at 
the level of individual subjects. It is not possible 
to conduct a similar analysis on the Gordon and Flavell
data.
In conclusion, there is a body of experimental findings 
which support the contention that involuntary routines 
are later used in a deliberate, intentional manner 
in the service of memory. However there is little 
evidence to support the argument that this is the result 
of reflection on the structure of such routines. There 
is more to support the account than Flavell's Cl971)
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arguments. The fact that knowledge of the structure 
of different routines emerges at different ages depending 
on the nature of the routine, suggests that a general 
change in introspective ability cannot be responsible 
for the increased intentionality of memory. There is, 
however, one major problem with which the account leaves 
unexplained, and that involves the origins of ’insight’. 
The account offers no explanation as to how children 
might become aware of the structure of their routines.
The problems of trying to explain the origins of knowl­
edge about memory, and'the relationship of this knowledge 
to the use of deliberate strategies will be discussed 
in the next chapter.
Paris (1978a) suggests that reflectivity may not be the 
only means by which involuntary routines enter the reper­
toire of strategies:
Considerable practice and feedback may be' 
necessary before the child understands the 
functional utility of the skill as a memory 
operation” (p. 269)
Paris also suggests that another means by which routines 
may enter the repertoire is by instruction, i.e. under 
suggestion from the experimenter, an adult or a teacher. 
This is important, because it suggests an important means 
by which nvovel routines may enter the repertoire. 
Unfortunately Paris’ comments are largely speculative 
and he offers no data to support these arguments.
If we consider first the influence of practice on the
development of intentional strategyuse, there seems only
to be one relevant experiment, conducted by Butterfield 
and Belmont (1977). The experimenters compared a group 
who had extensive training in a particular strategy, 
with a naive control group on a series of memory tasks.
They found that the trained group showed much more effi­
cient use of the strategy. In particular, unlike the 
controls, they did not blindly apply the strategy to 
lists they had already overlearnt. In addition, Butterfield 
and Belmont found that the experimental group showed a 
greater tendency to generalise the strategy to new lists. 
While the results of this study are not inconsistent 
with the reflectivity account it seems that the data 
are more consistent with Paris’ (1978a) focus on instruc­
tional settings.
The second mechanism suggested by Paris, to explain how 
routines become intentional strategies is feedback.
Here we run into the problem of defining when a routine 
has become such a strategy. We may determine whether 
a routine already in the repertoire is initially invol­
untary, by the criteria offered above. Similarly, it 
is clear that a routine directly induced by the experi­
menter is involuntary, because it has not been inten-.. 
tionally accessed. After feedback, routines already in 
the repertoire must satisfy the criteria set out above, but 
what conditions must a trained behaviour meet, in order 
to be accorded intentionality? This problem has been 
raised by Kuhn (1974) in the context of inducing change 
cognitive development and Brown (1978) when training
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memory skills. They both conclude that the criterion 
of generalisation is too strict because naturally 
developing skills do not generalise in this way (witness 
the whole debate on context-specificity , e.g. Donaldson, 
1978). Brown has suggested that the criterion for 
inferring that change has occurred is that the routine 
follows the normal pattern of development. Though well- 
intentioned, this criterion is of little use, because 
we do not know the natural course of most developmental 
acquisitions, and secondly the amount which a given 
routine generalises during natural acquisition may 
depend on its state of development (Flavell, 1970).
Given these problems in defining change in cognition, 
and the unacceptability of the criterionfof generali­
sation, it would seem that use of the strategy when 
the experimenter no longer prompts is sufficient criterion 
for inferring the behaviour is under voluntary control.
What then, is the evidence to suggest that induced 
behaviours will be maintained without prompting, if 
feedback is given? Kennedy and Miller (1976) demonstrated
that feedback will lead to maintenance of a rehearsal
strategy. The initial part of their experiment was•a 
replication of Keeney et al (1967), in that they diag­
nose 6-7-year-old children as producers or non-producers 
and then trained the non-producers in the rehearsal 
strategy. As in the Keeney et al study they found 
that training elevated the performance of these children
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to the level of spontaneous strategy users. Kennedy 
and Miller then randomly assigned non-producers to two 
groups and gave half the trained' producers feedback 
about the influence of strategy use. These children 
were told that they were remembering much better and 
that this must be due to the fact that they were whisp­
ering the names of the stimuli to themselves. The 
spontaneous producers and the two groups of trained 
producers were then given a transfer test. They were 
told that they could whisper the names of the stimuli 
to themselves if they wished, but they need not do so. 
Both the spontaneous producers and the trained producers 
who were given feedback continued to use the strategy.
The trained producers who did not receive feedback failed 
to maintain the strategy. Feedback information would 
therefore seem to be crucial in determining the main­
tenance of induced strategies. It is possible that a 
similar mechanism could operate in natural learning 
settings. Other studies have also shown that feedback 
can influence strategy maintenance.(Bdrkowski, Levers 
and Gruenenfeldef, 1976 ; Cavanaugh and. Backowski,
1980;* Moely and Jeffrey, 1974) .
Although feedback seems to influence the maintenance 
of evoked strategies, it does not seem to be an absol­
utely necessary condition. A number of studies report 
maintenance in the absence of feedback. (Bjorklund , 
Ornstein, Naus and.Stone, 1977).and the position is 
further complicated by the fact that others find that
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feedback Is' sometimes,.but not always required. (Heisel 
andkRitter, 1981,-Ringel and Springer, 1980).
A study by Brown, Campione and Barclay (1979) suggests 
a possible resolution of these anomalies. In the 
initial part of the experiment they trained a group of 
educable retarded children on a suprasnan list. The 
children were taught both a strategy for dealing with the 
task, and a checking strategy to monitor the effectiveness 
of the strategy use. When these children were given 
a different task - the recall of prose passages - it 
was found that they retained the original strategy.
Another group of children who did not receive training 
in the monitoring strategy did not show transfer (Brown 
and Barclay, 1976). The findings here are exactly 
analagous to the Kennedy and Miller (1976) study except 
that feedback information is not provided by the experi­
menter, but is detected by the children themselves, in 
monitoring their performance. If children can detect 
the effectiveness of the strategies they have been 1. . 
induced to use, and if they realise that performance 
improvements are due to the use of strategies, then 
this should lead them to use the strategies in the service 
of memory. In the absence of such training in monitoring, 
transfer or maintenance will depend on the child’s 
spontaneous monitoring skills. Three studies have been 
conducted which show that even 5-year-olds are accurate
at judging their performance after they have carried 
out a memory task (.Berch and Evans, 1973; Bisanz,
Versander and Voss, 1978; Masur ., McIntyre and Flavell
61
1973) . However these suggestions of early competence 
in monitoring memory tasks are contradicted by findings 
in other cognitive domains suggesting that children’s 
moment-to-moment monitoring of their performance is 
poor (Flavell, Speer, Green and August, 1981; Harris, 
Kruithof, Meerum-Terwogt and Visser, 1981; Markman,
1977; 1979). Possible reasons for these differences 
are suggested in Chapter 3, in the review of metamemory. 
However, if we assume that the ability to monitor 
strategy effectiveness does increase with age, then the 
data on strategy transfer may be: explained.
If we consider first the Ornstein et al (1977) study, we 
find that maintenance of a rehearsal strategy seems to 
be a function of strategy effectiveness. The experi- .. 
menters trained 7- and 11-year-olds to produce ore of 
a number of different rehearsal strategies. Children 
were taught to rehearse in sets of one, two or many 
items. It was found that for the 7-year-olds, only 
those subjects who rehearsed many items were observed 
to maintain the strategy when not directly instructed 
to use it. Now, in general, the subjects using the 
many item strategy were much more effective in remembering 
the list,fof one and two item rehearsal produces 
little elevation of performance. It is possible that
the one and two item rehearsers did not monitor the
strategy because (a) their inability to monitor accurately 
left them unable to detect the improvements resulting 
from the use of the strategy; or (b) they could detect
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the effects of the strategy but decided that the advan­
tages of strategy use were so slight that there was 
little point in employing the strategy; or (c) they 
detected a small change in performance but attributed 
this to other factors likely to produce such a change, 
e.g. practice and not the strategy itself. Whichever 
of these explanations is applicable it is clear that 
transfer crucially depends on the detectability of the 
changes in performance following strategy use. This 
would seem to depend among other things upon the absolute 
size of these changes, and .the ability of the child to
detect them.
The other experiments in which maintenance occurs without 
feedback also suggest that such factors are important.
Thus bjorklund .et al (.1977) found strategy maintenance 
in 10- but not 8-year-olds. Closer analysis reveals 
that the strategy did not improve performance in the 
8-year-olds, there is therefore no real reason why 
this group should maintain it. The Heisel and Ritter 
(1981) and Ringel and Springer (.1980) studies provide 
evidence for explanations (b) or (c) offered above.
Both studies found three different sets of conditions
under which maintenance could occur: (1) when information 
was provided about changes in performance and the relation­
ship of these changes to strategy use; (2) when inform­
ation was provided only about the effectiveness of 
strategy use; and (3) when no information was provided.
It was found that the amount of feedback information and
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explanation necessary to Induce maintneance decreased 
with age, although the ages differed in the two studies 
because different strategies were involved.
It seems therefore that feedback is not the only means 
by which trained routines may come to serve as memory 
strategies. If children are able to detect the results 
of their activities this may produce maintenance when 
no feedback is given. This sort of mechanism may only 
operate, however, if strategy is detectable, i.e. if 
its effects are large and children are able to monitor
them.
Paris'(1978a) offered a number of speculations as to how 
routines may enter the memory repertoire. Although 
he reviewed no evidence for these suggestions, it appears 
that there is some validity in what he proposed. Both 
practice at a strategy and feedback about its effective­
ness seem to influence whether strategies are maintained. 
Change may also be brought about by a mechanism he 
did not specify • self-monitoring may well explain
maintenance in the absence of feedback. All of the evi­
dence reviewed here concerns induced strategies, it 
remains to be seen when feedback or self-monitoring influ­
ence voluntary' routines in the way Paris suggests. Des­
pite this, there is rather more evidence to support Paris’ 
speculations than there is for the account which attri­
butes developments in deliberate memory to reflections 
on the structure of involuntary actions.
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The motivational account
Another set of speculations about how mediated memory 
develops is offered by Russian theorists (e.g. Istomina,
1975; Leont’ev, 1975; Yendovitskaya, 1971) and endorsed by 
statements from Brown (1975), Meacham (1972) and Paris 
(1978a) . Although allowing that practice, feedback and 
instruction can and do influence memory development, 
these theorists suggest that major changes in the ecology 
of the young child may be the determinants of developmental 
change. In particular, they suggest that the goals 
which are motivating to the older child or adult are 
not motivating for the pre-schooler. They argue that 
deliberate memory (remembering for its own sake) is much 
less motivating for the younger child. The first emerg­
ence of skills occurs in those situations in which memory
is subordinated to some other activity which is meaningful 
' 4for the child.. '
the development of retention and recall as 
internal, purposeful acts takes place initially 
as part of a broader, articulated and meaningful 
activity (since it is only within the context 
of such activity that the specific acts of 
remembering and recall have any meaning for a 
child). (Istomina, 1975, p.8-9).
The theory therefore suggests that memory skills (presumably
equivalent to mature adult abilities) emerge first in a
restricted set of situations, and only later generalise to
4 These speculations parallel recent suggestions made
by Donaldson (1978) about general cognitive development. 
She suggests that young children do not perform well 
on tasks which are ’’abstract” or do not make "human 
sense".
65
the set of situations corresponding to adult usage. The 
restricted situations can be characterised by the fact 
that they are "embedded in a meaningful (to the child) 
activity" (Brown, 1979, p. 249), and they later occur 
in other situations in which memory itself is the goal 
of activity. However, if this account is to have explan­
atory value, it becomes necessary to appeal to some inde­
pendent criteria by which we can determine which context 
will be "meaningful" to the young child. We require a 
theory of the child’s goals and activities in order to 
provide this. The nearest that the account comes to 
specifying what might be meaningful contexts, is to suggest 
that young children perform well in "game-like" situations. 
Clearly the manipulation of embedding a memory task in 
a game-like setting does improve memory (Istomina, 1975), 
but it seems to be motivated by an intuitive rather than 
a theoretical analysis of what is "meaningful" for the 
'young child. Another problem lies in the claim that in 
deliberate memory tasks, remembering itself is the only 
goal. It is clear that any activity takes place in some 
context with its attendant motivations, such as a desire 
to please the experimenter or instructor. Memory is 
therefore not the only goal involved. This relates to 
the problem of defining meaningful contexts because a 
principled analysis of context would have indicated that 
deliberate memory tasks are different but not context-free
situations.
The theory also seems to contravene a commonly held
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assumption of developmental theories. Memory strategies 
first emerge when memory itself is subordinated to some 
higher-level activity, and are only later in evidence in 
the service of memory alone. Subordinating a strategy to 
achieve a memory goal in order to carry out some meaning­
ful activity would appear to a more complex activity than 
simply subordinating that strategy to memory. If this 
is the case, then memory becomes simpler with age, 
which would appear to contradict most theoretical state­
ments about development Ce.g. Atkinson, 1982? R. Brown, 
1973; Harris, 1957). Of course, the account could be 
rescued by arguing that deliberate memory tasks are part 
of some wider activity, but this would seem to contradict 
the fundamental tenets of the argument.
Finally, an account such as this must specify how chil­
dren become increasingly able to apply strategies in 
the absence of supportive contexts. Some theorists are 
clearly aware of this problem, and Kussman (1976) and 
Elkonin (1972) advance a set of "leading activities" which 
children at each age level fiind most motivating. In 
generating this description, the authors make some appeal 
to the conditions and ecology of the child at each of 
these ages. But such speculations in no way amount to an 
explanation of why leading activities change, nor how 
they are related to the everyday environment of the child.
Literacy
Another factor invoked to explain changes in mediated
67
memory has been formal education or literacy. Ce.g. Brown, 
1977; Meacham, 1972; Paris, 1978a) Cole and Scribner (1977) 
review a number of experiments which indicate that non­
literate peoples behave rather as do young children 
when confronted with a deliberate memory task. They 
characteristically show production deficits for categor­
isation and rehearsal strategies CScribner, 1974; Wagner, 
1974). In addition, Scribner and Cole (1973) suggest that 
unschooled populations do not transfer strategies.
There are two problems with this approach. Firstly, in 
some of the studies it is not clear that the onset of 
literacy or formal education is the only explanation 
for the results obtained, because in some of the studies 
the effect of schooling may be confounded by other varia­
bles such as conversion to a cash economy (Cole and Scribner, 
1977) or collective farming (.Luria, 1971). Additionally, 
one may have found differences between the two populations 
and the .relationshiprof these differences to a particular 
factor, but it is still not clear precisely how schooling 
or literacy influence memory mediation. It may well be 
that schooling and formal education include more of the 
sorts of instruction and feedback type activities which 
have been shown to influence memory. If this were the 
case, (and it is an empirical question whether schooling 
includes these processes) then this argument is reducible 
to the mechanisms suggested earlier in the chapter.
In the initial sections of this chapter I have discussed
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attempts to apply the LOP framework to mediational
models of memory and also attempts to explain how media­
tional processes develop. I concluded that there are a 
number of important deficits in the LOP model when applied 
to adult memory. The model is even more problematic 
when applied to developmental data, in particular because 
there has been no detailed analysis of encoding activities, 
and consequently it is difficult to see how the results 
of Flavell’s (1970) experiments could be interpreted 
within the model. Additionally, the model avoids the 
key question of how subjects access encoding activities 
which is of crucial importance in exploring production 
deficits. Because of these difficulties, it was con­
cluded that the LOP framework was of little use in
developmental theorising.
I then examined a number of reformulations of Flavell’s
(1970) model which attempt to explain the production 
deficit, and also the question of how memory mediation
becomes more efficient. A number of alternatives were
suggested one of which (.Flavell, 1971) will be assessed 
in the next chapter. A number of theorists have suggested 
that memory is initially involuntary in nature and only 
gradually comes under the control of intentional processes. 
The evidence would seem to support this view, but not 
the mechanism suggested by some accounts to explain 
the change. Of the studies so far conducted, none 
show that knowledge of the structure of routines induces 
intentional strategy use. In addition such accounts do
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not explain how such knowledge originates. Evidence 
for Paris’ (1978a) speculations about the influence 
of feedback in modifying involuntary routines into 
deliberate ones: was also reviewed. It was suggested that 
feedback may well induce such a change, but that evidence 
suggests other factors (such as self-monitoring) may 
also be responsible. Soviet theories' of memory develop­
ment were also reviewed and found to be problematic 
in a number of ways. In addition it was argued that 
cultural factors influence the development of mediated 
memory, but that such factors may well be integrated 
with the earlier studies on feedback, self-monitoring
and instruction.
2.3 Memory without mediation
Attempts to integrate the mediational model with the 
LOP framework, and the speculations about how mediation 
may change with age (Brown, 1975; Flavell, 1971; 
Istomina, 1975; Meacham, 1972, Paris, 1978a) were all 
modifications to the basic model, and all accepted the 
principle that memory is mediated by various strategies. 
A number of experimental results which emerged in the 
early 70’s suggested, however, that mediation may not 
be a sufficient explanation of memory, i.e. certain 
phenomena were detected which could not be explained 
within the mediational framework. These led to a mod­
ification of the basic model by Brown (1974, 1975)
to include the structural features of information
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processing models. Brown (.1974 , 1975) and Hagen,
Jongeward and Kail Cl975) review evidence for such struc­
tural effects, and Brown (1975) provides a .taxonomy 
of tasks and processes in an attempt to unify structural 
and mediational explanations.
2.3.1 Problems for the mediational model
One finding which suggests problems for the mediational
model has already been noted. In Flavell's (1970) review 
he points out that in most studies non-producers remember 
some (but often not many) items. This would suggest that 
mediation is sometimes not necessary for memory. To give 
an example, non-rehearsing 4- and 5-year-olds typically 
manage 23% correct responses, while rehearsing 10-year-olds 
obtain 45% correct (Hagen and Kingsley, 1968).
Chi (1978) reviews other data which suggest the inadequacy 
of the mediational account. In all these experiments, 
attempts have been made to control for strategy use in 
adults and children, and yet age differences still remain. 
Thus:,if an adult strategy is taught to children, recall 
is still generally better in adults (Butterfield, Wambold, 
and Belmont? 1973); if an adult strategy is taught to 
both children and adults, the initial difference in perfor­
mance between age groups is generally maintained (Huttenlocher 
and Burke, 1976); and if adults are prevented from using 
certain strategies, their performance remains superior 
to that of children (Chi, 1977).
In the above experiments, it is clear that mediational
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accounts cannot explain all of what is remembered. It 
could be argued, however, that the account is still 
adequate, because the "non-strategic" component is 
relatively small, and could be written into an explan­
ation as a sort of "error term". Brown (1974) argues 
that this ad hoc modification to the theory will.mot 
suffice, because there are phenomena in which memory 
performance occurs in the to ta1 absence of mediation. She 
claims that recognition memory and memory for relative 
recency are two such phenomena, and that strategies cannot 
explain any part of what is remembered in these cases.
In addition there are a number of tasks in which memory 
occurs, where it is not clear what mediational factors 
may be acting, although a mediational explanation looks 
possible in principle. Thus, adults recall lists of 
taxonomically related items by category, without any 
overt evidence of item sorting (.Tulving' and Pearlstone, 
1966). Such findings can be explained by extending the 
notion of mediated activity to something internal, and 
claiming that the recall observed in adults is the 
result of the internalisation of the externally mediated 
activities observed in children (e.g. Moelv et al, 1969). 
What, however, are the internalised activities which 
mediate the recall of text (Mandler and Johnson, 1977; 
Stein and Glenn, 1979) or sequences of story-like events 
(Brown and .Murphy, 1975)? Again the explanation in terms 
of internalised mediational processes looks possible in 
principle, but it is not clear what the form of these
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processes might be.
Brown’;s (1974? 1975) and Hagen et al’s (1975) solution
to these problems was to propose that mediation was
not the only explanation of memory. They argued that
the above anomalies could be explained if we invoked
the structural factors included in information processing.
models (e.g. Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968) and also theories
of cognitive development (e.g. Piaget and Inhelder,
1973) .
2.3.2 Structural effects in memory
Two types of structural models have been invoked in 
attempts to explain the various anomalies with the media­
tional model: these are the modal model Ce.g. Atkinson 
and Shiffrin, 1968? Waugh and Norman, 1965); and the 
semantic and structural models, (e.g. Collins and'
Quillian., 19 72; Piaget and Inhelder, 1973; Rummelhart 
and Ortohy , 1977; Schank and Abelson, 1977a, 1977b).
The modal model argues that information entering the 
memory system is held in three separate stores, it 
being transferred from a low-level sensory store, to 
an intermediate short-term store of limited capacity, 
and then to a long-term, permanent store. Each store 
was primarily defined in terms of three characteristics: 
capacity, coding type, and the length of time the
information could be retained in the store. Information
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in the sensory store was said to be a "copy” of the 
sensory input (hence the terms iccrnic or echoic store) , 
and could be held in this store for short periods. The 
duration of the sensory store ranged from half a second 
to several seconds, depending on the particular store 
studied, and the method of measurement. Its capacity 
was large, but there were problems in accessing inform­
ation from the store, so the capacity could not be directly 
estimated. The information from the sensory stores 
was transferred to a short-term store (STS) of limited 
capacity (7+2 "chunks” of information according to 
Miller, 1956), in which it was stored in the form of a 
speech based code. The amount of time information 
could be retained'.in STS depended on control processes 
such as rehearsal, by which this information can be 
refreshed. It was then transferred to a long-term store 
(LTS) of large capacity in which information is held 
for long periods (in the order-'of years) in a semantic
code.
The model came under attack by Craik and (Lockhart (.19 72) 
in their initial LOP paper. They point out that there 
are problems with capacity, coding and duration in each 
of the stores. For example, there are large disparities 
in the estimates of duration for the sensory stores 
mentioned above. Similarly there are problems with the 
notion of coding in STS and LTS. In particular, semantic 
effects have been found in STS^ and speech based coding 
in LTS, both of which--are obviously contradictions of the
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basic model. Craik and Lockhart also pointed to anomalies 
between different estimates of capacity for STS which 
vary,.once again,with the method of measurement used.
The solution that Craik and Lockhart proposed to all 
these problems was an attempt to explain many of the 
invariant structural features in terms of control processes 
such as rehearsal or chunking. This approach has also 
been advocated in the working memory theory of Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974).
If Craik and Lockhart are correct, then it would appear 
that there is little use in appealing to the modal 
model, because many of the features which were thought 
to be explicable in terms of structures now seem to be 
the results of processes similar to mediational activities.
This contention is supported by the recent work of Chi
(1976, 1977) and Huttenlocher and Burke (1976) who have 
investigated developmental changes in memory span.
The consensus is that the explanation for such changes 
lies mainly in adults’ and older children’s use of 
control processes such as rehearsal or re-ordering items. 
There was little evidence to suggest any changes in the 
underlying capacity of memory. This conclusion is • 
important because it challenges the contention of a 
number of recent Neo-Piagetian theories, that changes 
in cognitive skills follow directly from increases in 
the capacity of memory (Case, 1974; Pascual- Leone , 1970). 
At the very least, it suggests that ”capacity" is a
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problematic concept.
Chi (1978) does report some underlying differences 
between adults and children which are not readily explic­
able by control processes. In a carefully controlled 
set of experimentsshe attempted to prevent adults from 
using strategies in a face recognition test. She used 
faces which were equally familiar to child and adult 
groups, and prevented adults from modifying their order 
of recall. Additionally, the use of face stimuli should 
prevent organisational strategies, because groups of 
faces do not readily form units. Despite all these pre­
cautions, Chi still reports differences between adults and 
children. These differences were removed, however, by 
reduction of the time the stimuli were exposed to the 
adult subjects. By reducing the presentation time 
for adults to half their speed at naming the stimuli,
Chi managed to equalise performance in the two groups. 
Thus, there are underlying processes such as speed of 
naming, encoding time, which are not themselves control 
processes, but which change with age, and influence the 
use of such processes. As Chi Cl978) puts it:
One could speculate... that the inaccessibility 
of the (stimulus) names prevents the children 
from actively using any mnemonic strategies 
that required name manipulation. (p. 80)
Such changes go some way towards explaining some of the 
anomalies which first led us to question the utility of 
the mediational model. It may well be that they will
explain why children do not perform as well as adults
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when trained to use adult strategies (Butterfield et al, 
1973) or why adults are better than children when trained 
on a new strategy (Huttenlocher and Burke, 1976). They 
will not, however, explain all the anomalies. The results 
of Chi suggest that there are limitations in the component 
skills which make up control processes. They do not 
explain memory in the absence of such control processes , 
(e.g. Flavell, 1970) or when the use of strategies is 
blocked (Chi, 1978).
In conclusion, structural models of memory such as the mobal 
model seen problematic in their application to adult 
memory (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). Many of the properties 
associated with structural features seem to be the result
of control processes such as those described in the media­
tional model. If indeed the structural model is reducible
to such processes, it will not serve to explain the anomal- 
lies in the mediational model, because some these problems 
are common to any mddiational account. Research on the 
modal model, and in particular the notion of capacity, 
has, however led to the discovery .that the components of 
control processes (such as naming or encoding) may well 
vary with age, and hence explain the differences in perfor­
mance between adults and children when strategy use -is 
apparently matched.
The second set of structural models which influenced
developmental theorists, were those that included some 
component of meaning. Among these were the semantic
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memory models (Anderson and Bower, 1973; Collins and
Quillian, 1972), schema models (Piaget and Inhelder.,. 119 73; 
Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977), and story grammars (Mandler 
and Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1977; Stein and Glenn, 1979; 
Thorndyke, 1977). All these models are cognitive, i.e. they 
make the assumption that there are certain state variables 
(in most cases, these take the form of structures) to 
which incoming stimuli are assimilated. This results in 
some modification of the input (and in most models, a 
reciprocal change in state) and then some output. The 
output is not a replica of the input because of the infl­
uence of the modifying state variables, and it is possible 
to make inferences about the putative cognitive struct­
ures from the proceas^of distortion which resultsJ?hese-distortions' 
are not the result of deliberately invoked strategies, 
because in most cases the effects seem tdbe invoiuntary.
If we consider that the modifications to the input often 
result in reduced performance, because the criterion used 
for memory is verbatim reproduction^ ,this strongly suggests 
the effects cannot be prevented.
A large number of studies have investigated semantic 
effects at the level of individual words. Thus Esrov^
Hall and LaFaver (1974)rrarid Kail (1976) demonstrated'.the 
presence of category information in 3-5-year olds. Simila­
rly,, habituation (Faulkender, Wright and Waldron, 1974), 
choice reaction time (Morin, Having and Konick, 19 70) , and 
the Stroop effect (Rosinski, Golinkoff, and Kukish, 1975)
have all been employed to demonstrate the presence of
taxonomic encoding. A review by Kail and Siegel (1976) 
concludes that children are much better at encoding
the denotative than conbtative features of stimulus
words.
A series of studies on adults by Bransford and his coll­
eagues (Bransford, Barclay and Franks, 1972; Bransford 
and Franks, 1970 ; and''Bransford and Johnson, 19 73) suggested 
that the knowledge system may influence what is remembered 
at higher levels than the level of individual words.
These experiments suggested that under certain conditions, 
adult subjects did not remember individual sentences 
(Bransford and Franks, 1970), they also modified their 
memory for sentences'.in accord with their knowledge of 
spatial relationships (Bransford et al, 1972) or setting 
information such as a picture or story (Bransford and 
Johnson, 1973).
Corresponding studies have been conducted on children.
Thus Paris and Carter (1973) and .Paris and Mahoney (1974) 
have found that young children also integrate information 
across sentences or pictures to make spatial inferences. 
Harris, Mandias, .Meerum- Terwogt.and Tjintjelaar (1980) 
showed that children use the information provided by' a 
title to disambiguate a prose passage. Paris and Upton
(1976) also suggested that children may use information 
in their knowledge system to go beyond the information 
presented in the text.
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There are, however, a number of prohlems with these
studies. The results of Paris and Carter (1973) and Paris 
and Mahoney (1974) were obtained using a false recognition 
paradigm, which Paris (1975) and Trabasso and Nicholas 
(1980) point out may be subject to response bias. 
Additionally Liben and Posnansky (1977) show that part 
of the effect attributed to semantic inferences in the
Paris studies, can in fact be explained in terms of a 
syntactic matching strategy. The presence of this strat­
egy demonstrated that subjects did not abstract only the 
meaning of the stimuli, but did retain information about
the surface structure of text.
There are also problems with the results obtained by 
Paris and Upton (1976). They asked subjects questions 
which probed verbatim information and two types of 
inferences which could be drawn from the passage. These
were lexical inferences and contextual inferences: the
first assessed children's knowledge of word meanings; 
the second, their ability to infer the motivations of 
the characters, arid the consequences of their actions.
Paris and Upton found that the ability to make infer­
ences increased with age, and also that contextual infer­
ences correlated with free recall scores. From this,
Paris and Upton inferred that recall depends on the extent 
to which children integrate the story with their knowl­
edge of the world. Older children are better able to 
make such inferences, and hence better able to remem­
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ber.
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showed, however, that inferential skill as assessed by 
a questionnaire .(as in Paris and Upton) was' not related
In a similar study ( Qma.ni?.enr \Warren ahd Trahasso Cl978).
to recall. Three groups were respectively given positive, 
negative or no contextual information about a story.
The two groups given such information were better able 
to answer the questions about the characters’ motives 
or intentions, and the consequences of their actions.
These two groups-- did not, however outperform the no­
context group in the recall test. A second problem for 
structural theories of memory is that such inferences 
may be the result of deliberate strategies (Paris, 1978a; 
Harris et al, 1980). If this is the case, they may 
tell us little about the structure of children’s knowl­
edge bases, but more about how children operate them.
The major problem with the research of Bransford and 
Paris and their colleagues is that their research 
demonstrates that high level semantic factors do influ­
ence recall, but does not suggest what factors may cons- •
train the nature and context of semantic inferences.
Although some attempts have been made to provide a 
taxonomy of inferences (Nicholas and Trabasso, 1980; Paris, 
1978b), this could in no way be said to represent a 
theory of how knowledge factors interact with material
to be remembered.
Attempts have been made elsewhere in cognitive psychology 
to suggest structures ' which constrain the nature of
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inferencing, or constructive processes. Minsky (1977) 
and Schank and Abelson (1977a)f proposed the existence 
of internal structures corresponding to prototypical 
spatial arrangements (i.e. a room frame) or event 
sequences (a script). It is the involuntary operation 
of these structures which lead to the types of construc­
tive or ’normalising’ errors described by Bartlett (1932) 
and possibly contribute to the effects reported by 
Bransford and Paris. As Schank and Abelson put it:
In understanding a story that calls up a 
script, the script becomes part of the story 
even when it is not spelled out. The answer 
to the question, ‘Who served John the ham­
burger?’ seems obvious, because our world 
knowledge, as embodied in (restaurant) scripts 
answers it. (1977b, p. 425).
The occurrence of such script-relevant intrusions has 
been reported for adults by Bower, Black and Turner 
(1979) who asked adult subjects to recall short stories 
based on incidents such as visiting the doctor or eating 
in arrestaurant..Mandler and Parker (19 76) showed similar 
effects of 'normalisation' when adult subjects were 
presented with pictures containing objects normally 
found in rooms, but with the spatial positions of 
the objects randomised. Brown and Murphy (1975) also 
report ’normalisation’effects when pre-school chil-- 
dren attempt to.remember event sequences.
Nelson (1978) set out to address the question of the child's 
representational structures in more direct manner. She 
wished to establish how young children represented familiar
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event sequences such as playgroup routine or eating at 
home or at McDonalds. The procedure she employed was 
to ask children to describe or enact such sequences. She 
found that certain events (one of which was eating) seemed 
to be central and appeared in all accounts, whereas other 
events were of less importance as judged by their frequency 
of mention. More importantly there -were few instances of 
sequencing errors. A second study showed that knowledge 
of playgroup routines depends on familiarity or experience 
with the routines. In all cases, however, children seemed 
to show sophisticated knowledge of activities, actions, 
roles, instruments and their sequencing. In both studies 
probing methods were used. It was found that older 
children required fewer probes, and what probes they did 
require were less specific.
There are a number of theoretical and methodological probl­
ems with this study. First of all, it had a large lingui­
stic component, and young children are always going to 
be disadvantaged in both the comprehension and production 
of language. One of the indices of scriptal knowledge 
was the ability to produce long unprompted "chunks" of 
the script. This may well be a poor measure to use 
given young children's well documented inability to output 
prose (e.g. Brown and Murphy, 1975). Some of the develop­
mental trends may be explained by this factor alone..
Nelson also makes some capital of the fact that children's 
answers became more specific with age. In adults the 
specificity of the answer depends greatly upon a number
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of factors, such as context, and the inferred knowledge 
state of the questioner. The pragmatic skills of giving 
relevant answers may well develop with age. Changes in 
response specificity may therefore have resulted from 
a developing awareness of what the questioner requires.
The study requires another skill which young children seem 
to lack: the ability to introspect on the structure of 
their cognitive routines. Again developmental differences 
in this ability may have contributed to Nelson’s results. 
Finally, the finding that output follows temporal sequence 
is no guarantee that information is represented in this 
way. As Linde and LabdV' (1975) have shown, spatial 
organisations may well be described in a particular sequ­
ence, because that happens to correspond to a convenient 
retrieval strategy.
A second "prediction" of these structural models is that 
stimuli which are ’’"well.forradd'' with respect to the inter­
nal structures will be better remembered than poorly 
formed stimuli. This effect occurs over and above the 
sorts of normalisation effects reported above. Thus,
Carey and Diamond (.1977) showed that children’s recognition 
of upright faces was superior to this recognition of 
inverted faces at the ages of 8 and 10 years. This ‘ 
difference was not present in 6-year-olds. Similarly, 
Mandler and Robinson (.1978) report a superiority in 
recognition memory for organised over unorganised scenes, 
which increases with age. Both sets of authors explain 
their results in terms of the development of schemata 
for faces or scenes. This explanation seems a little
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problematic for faces, because one might have expected 
a schema for such an important stimulus as a face to 
have developed before the age of 8 years.
The concept of stereotypical sequences of indidents being 
represented internally led several researchers to propose 
that stories could be organised in this way. These resea­
rchers proposed hierarchical ’story grammars 1 from which 
they hoped it was possible to analyse the well-formedned.s 
of particular stories, and to predict where intrusions or 
modifications to story order might occur. (Mandler and 
Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1977; Stein and Glenn, 1979; 
Thorndyke, 1977). At first sight, story grammars do seem 
to provide ,an adequate structural account of story memory. 
Mandler (1978) and Stein and Glenn (1979) both report the 
sorts of 'normalisation’ errors described above, where 
intrusions were attempts to fill known, but missing story 
categories. Mandler and De Forest (1979) presented 
subjects with well-formed and poorly-formed stories. The 
well-formed stories consisted of two episodes presented 
in canonical fashion. In the poorly-formed stories 
incidents from the two episodes were intermixed. The 
not unsurprising finding was tha’t- subjects at ’ all age levels 
recalled more of the well-formed stories, and additionally 
they modified what they could remember of the poorly- 
formed stories to follow canonical study order. One
interesting developmental trend was that although 7- and 
9-year-olds were unable to prevent normalisation, 15-year- 
olds did show some modest abilities to follow the original
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intermixed story order.
By far the most systematic study of structural theories of 
memory development has been conducted by Piaget and Inhelder 
(1973) and other experiments which followed their research. 
The argument they advanced was that the same set of 
internal structures are responsible for both memory and 
cognition. Piaget and Inhelder investigated a number of 
different effects and attempted to explain them in terms 
of the structural systems they had proposed to explain 
related cognitive phenomena. These systems include those 
responsible for seriation, conservation ,' horizontality and 
verticality concepts.
It is possible to generate a number of predictions from 
the theory: (.a) the assimilative properties of structures 
will lead to the normalisation phenomena reported for 
other theories, i.e. intrusions or modifications of the 
stimulus will occur which bring it in line with these 
structures; (b). well-formed stimuli will be better remem­
bered than poorly-formed stimuli, with this being partly 
the result of normalisation. These predictions are common 
to the structural theories described earlier. However, 
because Piaget and Inhelder’s is a developmental theory,
5 Although there is much dispute about the status of 
’ these structural systems (Brainerd ., 1978a, 1978b;.
Brown and Desforges, 1979; Siegler, 1979) this research 
has an advantage over the other structural theories of 
memory, because there is at least some evidence for the 
independent existence of the proposed structures in 
domains other than memory.
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they also include predictions which take structural change
into account: (c) if a stimulus taps certain cognitive
structures, then it will be better remembered by subjects
in possession of those structures; and (d) if a stimulus
taps certain cognitive structures and the subjects level
of operativity increases (i.e. structures are acquired)
. td'uring test and retest, then subjects memory for the stimuli 
will improve» In her review of the Genevan literature 
Liben (1977a, 1977b) refers to predictions (c) and (d) as 
the cross-sectional and longitudinal hypotheses respectively.
Predictions (a) and (b) are supported by data from exper­
iments conducted by Altemeyery,Fulton and Berney (1969) 
and Liben (1974). Altemeyer et al presented 5-year-old 
subjects either with arrays of sticks which were seriated 
or in a random sequence ; . They found that after
post-presentation intervals of one week and 6 months, the 
children tended to normalise the random array, so- that 
their reproductions were more like the original seriated 
array. This resulted in higher memory performance for 
the group who received seriated arrays initially. The
data also provide some support for prediction (c) 
reconstructions became
because/increasingly seriated between test and retest. 
According to Piaget's theory, it is at this age that seri- 
ation- skills first emerge. Liben (1974) found essentially 
the same results, but for a different cognitive structure - 
horizontality.
Furth, Ross, and Youniss (1974) conducted a study to
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investigate hypothesis (c) above, that memory for stim­
uli should be influenced by subjects' operative level.
The cognitive skills tapped were horizontality, spatial 
transformation, number sequencing and verticality. The 
respective stimuli were pictures depicting: a glass 
tipped at an angle of 45°; a stick falling off a table, 
a sequence of 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 dots arranged as on the 
side of a die? and a house with a chimney with the smoke 
coming out of the chimney at the wrong angle. Children 
aged 6, 7, 8 and 10 years were tested on these stimuli 
at intervals of 2 hours, 2 weeks, 6 months and one year 
after presentation. In addition, half the subjects were 
asked to copy the stimuli while they were still visible, 
and the other half asked to reproduce the stimuli immed­
iately after presentation.
Collapsed over all sessions, the data support the Genevan 
position. Older children produced more correct and 
fewer irrelevant reproductions for the glass, stick and 
dot stimuli. For the house stimulus, there was an 
increase in the number of drawings which corrected the 
error in the original drawing by making the smoke come 
out of the chimney vertically. These findings substan­
tiate Piaget’s claim about the relationship of memory 
to operative level: according to his theory drawings 
should increasingly conform to high level operative con­
cepts. Thus, there was an increase with age in correct 
drawings for the operatively correct stimuli (stick, 
glass and dots), and when the stimulus was not correct,
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there was an increased tendency to modify it in the 
direction of correctness. Liben (1975a; 1975b) also 
investigated the cross-sectional hypothesis over a 
range of stimuli and with subjects greatly differing 
in operative level. She presented 5- and 9-year-old 
subjects with six pictures which were related to three 
operative concepts: seriation, horizontality, and vertic­
ality. After one week and five months the subjects were 
asked to complete pictures from which the operative 
components were ’omitted.
The predictions for the seriation stimuli were that 
these would initially be poorly reproduced by the 5-year- 
olds, but their reproduction would improve on retest 
because of developments in seriation skills. In contrast, 
the 9-year-olds should be adept at seriation and thus 
perform well at test and retest. The predictions for 
horizontality and verticality are rather different: 9- 
year-olds are transitional with respect to both of these 
concepts, and so initially reproductions should be mixed, 
with an increase in operative skills resulting in higher 
level reproductions at retest. Five-year-olds should 
perform poorly throughout because of their.' lack of knowl­
edge about these concepts.
In general the predictions were fulfilled. Reproductions 
of the seriation stimulus were mixed for the 5-year-olds, 
and at ceiling for the older group. For the horizontality 
and verticality stimuli, the only perfect reproductions
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were generated by the older children. Additionally, 
long term improvements were found on the seriation stim­
uli for the younger group, and on the horizontality 
and verticality stimuli for the older group.
In conclusion, both studies which have tested a wide 
operativity range over a variety of stimuli would seem 
to support the Piagetian position. However, most of the
studies conducted within the framework have focussed
on prediction (d): that changes in operative level should 
result in memory improvement for individual children.
It must be noted that the above two studies provide 
evidence at the group level.
Piaget and Inhelder’s original (1973) experiments 
investigated long term memory for a variety of stimuli 
requiring seriation and Euclidean spatial concepts. The 
seriation data offer strongest support for the hypothesis: 
Piaget and Inhelder report 74% of 5-year-old children 
improved their reproduction of a seriated stimulus between
an initial test after 1 week and retest after 8 months.
The remaining children’s performance was stable over 
this interval. Most other studies do not report such 
high levels of improvement, 30% is closer to the norm.
There have been at least ten attempts to replicate 
the finding of long-term improvement. Altemeyer et al 
(1969) in the study cited earlier, investigate this 
effect for seriated and unseriated arrays. The subjects
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were 5-year-old children and test and retest were one 
week and six months after presentation. Children predom-
g
inantly showed improvements in reproduction of both sets 
of stimuli. More importantly, most children showing 
improvements had produced very poor performance after 
one week, and so their reproductions had little to do 
with the original stimulus. This suggests that Altemeyer 
et al may not have tested memory, but some strategy for 
drawing sticks elicited by the command to remember. An 
additional problem was the presence of regressions, 
which were about half as frequent as improvements. Dahle^ 
<(1.1968) also tested 5-year-olds’ memory for seriated 
arrays. She found 50% improvement and 10% regression
between one week and six months.
Other studies report a rather larger proportion of
children showing regressions. Dahlem (1969) attempted 
a replication of her earlier experiment and found equal 
numbers of improvements and regressions. Liben (1974,
1975a) investigated Euclidean concepts, as well as seriation 
She found evidence for some long-term improvements, but 
these were not significantly more frequent than long­
term regressions.
A number of other studies report a large number of
regressions. Thus Crowley (1975) found 50% regressions
for seriated arrays, and Furth et al (1974) report
6 In this case, improvement is defined as increased 
operatively, thus subjects who saw unserldsed-arrays 
produced drawings which were more seriated,'and hence 
less like what they originally saw.
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’massive regressions’ for the seriation and spatial con­
cepts reported earlier. Murray and Bausell (.1970, 1971) 
also investigated long-term memory for seriation of 
liquid, length and number. They found very little evi­
dence for long-term improvements, and these are far 
exceeded in number by regressions. However, as Liben 
(1977b) points out, the criteria for improvement were 
unusually stringent: children had not only to reproduce 
those points of the drawing that were relevant to the 
operation under study, they were also required to reproduce 
irrelevant parts of the stimuli in order to achieve a 
’correct’ response.
A further set of problems for the hypothesis were
raised by the findings of Finkel and Crowley (1973).
They investigated whether long-term improvement depended 
on the initial stimulus, and also whether test-retest 
effects could account for part:>of -.the improvement.
They presented subjects with arrays of seriated, or 
partially seriated arrays. Test-retest effects were 
assessed by omitting some subjects from the early test 
sessions. Overall, Finkel and Crowley (1973) found 
approximately equal numbers of improvements and regressions 
In addition, improvements were dependent on the structure 
of the original stimulus, with poorly-seriated arrays 
showing much more improvement than well-formed ones. In 
addition, they report effects due to repeated testing, 
for example subjects improved performance between the
first test after one day to the second test after a week
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Clearly operativity is unlikely to have altered during
this interval.
Following these studies, a number of criticisms have 
been levelled against the hypothesis of long-term memory 
improvement. The first concerns the significance of 
the improvement. Piaget and Inhelder argued: (1) that 
ho other theory of memory makes predictions of improve­
ment with time; and (2) that improvements should be 
tested against a null hypothesis of no improvements.
If improvements are found, these are evidence for the 
operative account. However as Liben (1977b) notes, there 
are other theories which predict memory improvement 
under certain conditions, such as the encoding specifi­
city model of Tulving (.Tulving and Thomson, 19 73) . 
Improvement may not therefore offer support only for the 
operative account. The second problem concerns the method­
ological justification for the null hypothesis. Changes 
in performance may be the result of factors other than 
operativity, such as measurement error. Measurement 
error cannot be neglected because it has been invoked 
to account for regressions.
If we accept that measurement errors occur, then the 
hypothesis under:'test becomes whether there are more 
improvements than regressions. According to Maurer,
Siegel, Lewis, Kristofferson, Barnes and Levy (1979), 
who have re-analysed the existing data, if we accept 
the new hypothesis, none of the studies so far conducted
93
supports the improvement hypothesis. Even if this
were not the case, the very existence of regressions
represents a major problem for the theory. An appeal
to measurement error cannot be justified on theoretical
grounds because of their magnitude and pervasiveness and
also for the reasons described above, i.e. that such an
appeal would explain away improvements also. One solution
to the problem of regressions proposed by Furth et al
(1974) and Crowley (1975) is that these are the results
of the figurative memory function, which does not rely
on operations, but is a ’copy’ of the stimulus which
decays with time. Figurative memory produces the high
initial levels of performance, which are not sustained
in the long-term. Not only is this solution post hoc,
in that any and every regression could be explained in
this way, but it is also contrary to the principles of
Piaget and Inhelder’s whole model.
Memory does not conform to the perceptual- 
configuration of the model but rather.to 
the manner in which the model was assimilated 
to the ... schemes of the subject. (Inhelder, 
1969, p. 347)
It is clear, however, that memory must contain some 
of the figural aspects of the stimulus otherwise it 
would not be a memory of that particular stimulus.
In a sense, therefore, the appeal to figurative memory 
is justified in that such a notion must be incorporated 
into the account, but as formulated by Fu.rth et al and 
Crowley it cannot be independently specified and 
hence remains an ad hoc and theory-saving modification.
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The final attack on the notion of long-term memory improve 
ment has been the suggestion that there may be other, non­
operative explanations for improvement. I have already 
cited the results of Finkel and Crowley (1973) who 
report "improvements" as a result of retesting. The 
argument here is that increased familiarity with the 
test situation and stimuli, (if a recognition measure 
is used, subjects actually see the correct stimulus 
during test) may lead to an improvement in memory which 
does not result from changes in operativity. Dahlsn 
(1969) did not report any such effects for repeated 
testing, but Crowley (1975) did find that rep: eated 
testing influenced recall. As already reported, Finkel 
and Crowley (1973) found repeated- testing effects, 
but as they included a recognition measure in their tests, 
this may well have influenced memory.
An alternative non-operative explanation has been offered 
by Adams (1973) who suggested that "improvements" 
result from children’s increased understanding of the 
demands of the experimenter. In order to test this,
Adams gave subjects pretraining on either a seriation or 
geometric discrimination task. If repeated testing 
succeeds by making the children more aware of the 
relevant aspects of the stimulus, we might expect the 
group pretrained on seriation to show greater memory 
improvement over the test-retest period. Adams found 
no evidence for this hypothesis. Altmeyer et al (1969) 
attempted a similar manipulation by making explicit
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reference to the size of the sticks for one of their
groups. They found that this manipulation did not
influence patterns of memory change. Another suggestion 
is that improvements result from increased drawing skills.
A number of studies (e.g. Altemeyer ' et al, 1969; Liben, 
1975b) have shown, however, that children older than 5 
years can accurately copy a visible stimulus. In addition, 
long-term memory effects still occur when recognition
measures are used.
In conclusion, attempts to explain improvement in terms 
of non-operative factors have not generally been success­
ful. Two studies showed that repeated testing influences 
recall, but as one of them contained a recognition 
measure, this may well have produced the effect. In 
view of this, it is important to establish whether recog­
nition does influence memory in repeated testing para­
digms, because if it does, this would invalidate the 
results of several other studies.including those of Murray 
and Bausell (1970) and several of Piaget and Inhelder’s 
own experiments. While the hypotheses of Adams (1973) 
and .Altemeyer et al (.1969) have not been supported, 
this does not mean that non-operative factors do not 
influence memory change.-. It remains to be conclusively 
demonstrated, however, that such factors are important.
A final prediction derivable from Piaget and Inhelder’s 
position is that changes in memory should be directly
related to changes in underlying operative skills. To
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test this, it is necessary to independently assess both 
memory and operativity within subjects.
Piaget and Inhelder’s own research did not consistently 
include measures of operativity. In some cases oper­
ational .level was inferred by age, and in others by 
diagnostic questioning which was often not consistent 
across subjects. In one case, where the expected corres­
pondence was not found, Piaget and Inhelder explain it 
away by post hoc appeal to the specific experience of 
the particular group under study.
Dahlen (1969) measured children’s seriation skills after 
the six-month memory test, using a set of stimuli 
(triangles) which were visually quite different from the 
memory stimuli. The results suggested moderate support 
for the operativity theory, most of the children showed 
correspondence between memory and operativity although 
there were examples of operativity without memory, and 
memory without operativity. Murray and Bausell (1970) 
also measured operativity but made their assessments 
before the memory test. The particular stimuli they 
employed tested conservation^, seriation and Euclidean 
spatial concepts. Two of the three conservation tasks 
showed no relationship, and for the seriation stimuli 
correspondence only emerged for one of the memory measures. 
No clear evidence could be obtained for the spatial con­
cepts, because few children had any success on the
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operative assessment of seriation.
A better test of the hypothesis would be to employ two
measures of operativity conducted before and after the
memory test, to discover whether changes in operativity
predict memory changes. Liben (1974) used this procedure
for stimuli tapping knowledge of horizontality. She
found weak correlations between operative levels and
memory performance at the beginning and end of the study,
but little evidence to suggest changes in operativity are 
ty
paralleled by memory changes. A second study/Liben (1975b) 
found substantially the same results for the operations 
of horizontality, verticality and seriation. Crowley 
(1975) reports similar conclusions for seriated, and 
randomly ordered stick stimuli.
The studies which have attempted to demonstrate a close 
relationship between operative levels and memory have 
largely found weak but significant • correlations, although 
there have been some discontinuations ■ (Murray and Bausell, 
1970). The hypothesis that memory changes parallel 
changes in operative level is n&t supported by any evi­
dence. These results are not surprising when taken 
in the context of other developmental research. Experi­
ments on the context-specificity of both child (Donaldson, 
1978; Fischer, 1980) and adult cognition (Johnson-Laird, 
Legrenzi and Legrenzi., 19 72) indicate that varying the 
materials used in psychological tests, produces vast 
differences in performance, even though the tasks possess
investigate relations between different instances
of concrete- and formal-operational structures have
largely discovered weak but significant correlations
(Hamel, 19 74) and longitudinal studies have found little
evidence for concurrence in the emergence of related
operations (McShane and Morrison 1981). Another problem 
they
with such studies is that / may compound two measurement
errors.
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the same logical strucuture. A number of attempts to
What then is the status of the operative theory of memory 
proposed by Piaget and Inhelder? Overall, there does 
seem to be qualified support for the hypothesis from the 
cross-sectional data. The within-subject studies offer 
less convincing evidence of weak, but significant correl­
ations. The hypothesis of long-term memory improvement 
is much more questionable■, however, Piaget and Inhelder 
(1973) appear to have employed the wrong null hypothesis 
because they fail to take account of measurement error. 
When the data are re-analysed to allow for this, the 
effects of improvement are no longer significant (Maurer 
et al, 1979). In addition the theory has problems in 
explaining the presence of long-term regressions, and 
the modification proposed to explain these results 
severely reduces the predictive power of the theory.
A number of alternative explanations for improvement have 
been suggested, but so far evidence for only one of 
these has been obtained, that of repeated testing effects. 
However, even this effect does not seem to be reliable.
In conclusion, the operative theory seems to have some
explanatory value at the level of group explanations, 
but the within-subject designs do not offer the same 
support.
2.4 General problems, with structural theories
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The evidence reviewed in the latter half of this chapter 
suggests that there are a number of problems with the
structural models discussed here. The first of these
concerns the predictive power of structural explanations. 
The central problem here is that structural accounts u 
suggest that memory is the result of stimuli being 
assimilated to, and hence distorted by, cognitive struc­
tures. This does not always occur, however, for sometimes 
memory output seems to be an unmodified version of 
input. There are two issues here: how is this "unmodi­
fied" memory possible; and can we derive any model 
which will enable us to predict when memory will be
"unmodified" and when it will be the result of assimilation
If we examine each of the models discussed above, we 
find instances of the same problem. Thus, in the research 
on the phenomenon of semantic integration Paris and his 
colleagues found that subjects did not always integrate 
individual sentences into higher-order units of meaning.
As Liben and Posnansky (1977) and Hayes-Roth and Hayes- 
-Rpth (1977) have shown, subjects seem to have available 
large amounts of information about the surface structure 
of the text. This clearly indicates that subjects do
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riot process solely for meaning and discard syntactic 
information. A developmental study by Moeser (1976) 
suggests that semantic . integration is not a necessary 
feature of encoding but depends on the particular 
conditions of the experiment. Factors such as the 
provision of additional contextual information, the sequen­
cing of premises, the instructions, and the number of 
premises all influence the amount of integration.
The same difficulty of predicting the influence of
structural factors seems to occur also with the
research on scripts, frames and story grammars.
Although these studies report normalisation ’errors’,
or intrusions which are consistent with the assimilative
explanation, the instances of such 'errors’ seems to be 
highly context-dependent and in many cases relatively 
infrequent (e.g. Brown et al, 1977). The influence of 
structural factors can be clearly demonstrated if we 
destroy structural organisation Ce.g. Mandler and De Forest, 
1979; Thorndyke, 1977) but is it possible to predict 
when memory will be veridical and when normalisation 
errors occur ? The problem of veridical memory is also 
highlighted when stimuli contain material anomalous 
to the proposed assimilating structure. In some accounts 
(e.g. Bransford and Johnson, 1973) anomaly is ignored 
or overridden,in contrast, in the schema model of Mandler
(1979) and script theory (Schank and Abelson, 1977a) 
anomaly receives special processing:
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any event that occurred within them that was 
not predicted by them will be placed on a 
'weird list' to be specially remembered. (Schank 
and Abelson,• 1977b, p. 431)
This seems to be another example of material which resists 
the process of assimilation.
We have already seen the occurrence of the same phenomenon 
in the operative account of Piaget and Inhelder. Again 
it can be demonstrated that putative structures influence 
memory, but there still remains the problem of explaining 
figurative effects in memory. Some attempts have been 
made to provide constraints for the operation of struc­
tural effects. Thus, it is possible to predict with 
reasonable certainty that structures will not influence 
memory when they are absent from.'cognition. A 5-year- 
old is unlikely, for example, to show operative improve­
ment on a stimulus requiring knowledge of Euclidean 
spatial concepts. If children do possess the requisite 
operations, however, the theory cannot predict the precise 
extent to which they will modify the stimulus. One 
solution to this problem is to argue that veridical 
memory is itself the result of accessing cognitive struc­
tures. While this may be plausible for certain 'well- 
formed' stimuli such as a routine meal in a restaurant, 
it leads to massive proliferation of internal structures 
and one which completely weakens the explanatory power 
of the theory.
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Perhaps the solution to this problem is not to regard 
structural effects as a unitary phenomenon, but to look 
as Moeser (1976) has done, at the conditions under which 
such effects operate. As Clark and Clark (1977) argue 
for text, what we remember may very well depend on
how we wish to utilise the information.
This leads to a second problem with some of the data, 
the
Whereas/semantic memory data reviewed by Hagen et al (1975) 
and Brown (1975) are clearly the results of involuntary 
coding processes the same cannot be said for all the 
data. Thus, Moeser (1976), Trabasso and Nicholas (1979) 
and Paris (1978b) suggest thatsemantic integration may 
in some cases be a strategy evoked to deal with certain
situational demands. Mandler and De Forest (1979) and
Brown and Smiley (1977) also discuss the deliberate 
exploitation of story structure as a retrieval strategy. 
While the cross-cultural evidence (Mandler, Scribner, 
Cole and De Forest, 1980) does suggest that story grammars 
are not always strategic, some of the data on older 
children may reflect strategy use. It has been shown 
that deliberate strategy use can influence the structure 
of recall (Brown and Smiley, 1977). Now if we have not 
controlled for the presence of strategies in our investi­
gations of structure, we may well have inaccurate 
structural models. This suggests that structural 
theories which rely on structures inferred from experi­
ments outside the domain of memory may be more accurate,
because they avoid contamination by strategy factors.
A much more serious problem concerns the status of the 
structural entities proposed to explain the effects 
described above. In some cases it is not clear what, if 
any entities are posited to explain these effects. Are 
the encoding effects reviewed earlier the result of the 
operation of a semantic memory system (e.g. Collins and 
Quillian, 1972)? If this is the case, then such explan­
ations are problematic, because of the recent attacks 
which question the validity of the model. At present 
there seem to be three competing accounts of the struc­
ture of semantic memory. (Collins and Lo.ftus, 1975,- Smith, 
Shobin and Rips, 1974; Glass and Holybak, 1975).
No such problem arises with the semantic integration and 
inferencing phenomena investigated by Paris and his 
colleagues. I have already argued that one major 
weakness of this research is its failure to propose any 
underlying structural entities to constrain the types of
inferences made.
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This is clearly not the case for the research of Nelson 
(1978) or any of the studies of story grammar. There 
are some problems with the structures proposed here also. 
The concept of a script has recently come under attack 
on a number of theoretical accounts (Dresher and 
Hornstein, 1976), but its major weakness seems to lie in 
its lack of generality. Thus, while it does seem very 
likely that certain events such as visiting the doctor 
or going to a restaurant, or certain spatial organis .ations
such as rooms do have a stereotypical structure which 
can specified, it is clear that most events or spatial 
organisations are not so rigidly constrained. Schank 
and Abelson (1977a) pay this problem some attention, 
they build in to their system the notion of plans, which 
make it possible to process irregularities, and also 
lower level scripts which they call tracks which handle 
context specificity within scripts. As G. Bower (1978) 
argues, such structures may well be in operation, but 
until they can be incorporated into a principled account, 
they seem very much to explain away rather than explain
the data.
The theoretical validity of the story grammar has also 
recently been called into question. Not only are there 
debates about whether story comprehension and memory 
can be explained by a single 'grammar' (Anderson and 
Pichert, 1978; Baker, 1978; Thorndyke, 1979), there are 
also internal debates between those who do accept this 
proposition. Firstly, it is apparent that there are a 
number of alternative grammars suggested (Mandler and 
Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975, 1977; Stein and Glenn,
1979; Thorndyke, 1977). In particular there are disputes 
about the relationship between episodes (Johnson and 
Mandler, 1980), and the relationship between position in 
the story hierarchy and likelihood of recall (Mandler 
and Johnson, 1977; Thorndyke, 1977). Additionally,
Kintsch (Kintsch, 1977; Kintsch and Green, 1978) claims 
that the rules for characterising the structure of the
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predominantly European folktales which have mainly been 
analysed are inadequate to characterise American Indian 
stories. These disputes would seem to suggest there are 
major difficulties associated with the concept of a 
story grammar, and in consequence appeals to such struc­
tures in attempts to explain story memory may well be 
suspect.
The final set of cognitive structures to which appeals 
have been made are the structures of pre-operations, 
concrete-operations and formal-operations in the 
Genevan approach to memory. In recent years, Piaget's 
whole theory has come under increasing attack (Brainerd, 
1978b; Bryant, 1974; Flavell, 1977 ; Gelman, 1978). These 
attacks have concerned the generality of cognitive 
structures (Brainerd, 1978; Flavell, 1977.), the age of 
emergence of specific behaviours (Bryant, 1974; Gelman,
1978) and the problem of change (Brainerd, 1978b ) .• If 
we consider the more specific structures studied by 
Piaget and Inhelder, alternative explanations have been 
offered for seriation (Young, 1978), and conservation
(Kuhn, 1974). However, as the exact status of such 
explanations remains in doubt, we must reserve our criti­
cism of Piaget’s own speculations. •
In summary, there are a number of problems with cognitive 
structures proposed to underlie structural effects in 
memory. In all cases, there are problems with these 
entities. There are disputes about the psychological
105
106
status of semantic: memory models, scripts, frames, story 
grammars and operational structures. The Piagetian 
account seems to be slightly less problematic than the 
others, however, for cognitive operations do seem to 
have some validity outside the sphere of memory, and 
unlike some of .the other constructs they were not invoked 
purely to explain memory phenomena.
Finally we come to a problem which most of the theories 
make no attempt to tackle - the problem of change 
It is clear that as children grow older they encode 
words differently, or remember events or stories in 
different ways, or remember Piagetian stimuli differently.
It is clear that any purely structural theory must explain 
such changes in terms of structural reorganisation. Kail 
and Siegel (1977) discuss the problem of change in encoding, 
and speculate that a number of factors may be responsible. 
One of these , the trend towards selectivity is so vague 
as to be useless. The suggestion that there are changes 
in the rate of encoding information has experimental 
support (e.g. Chi, 1978) but won't explain structural 
change. One factor they do suggest which could lead 
to change is the addition of 'features' to the nodes 
in the child’ s semantic network, and appeal to Clark's
(1973) semantic feature theory for support. Unfortunately 
on theoretical (see Atkinson, 1982) or empirical
grounds (see Richards, 1979) this is hopelessly inadequate 
as a theory of semantic, development.
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The structural models derived from artificial intelli­
gence also run up against major problems in explaining 
change. The source of these problems lies in the fact 
that such theories are fundamentally assimilative. The 
process of memory, comprehension or perception is 
generally represented as the construction of a set of 
inferences or interpretations upon poor quality, poss­
ibly ambiguous, information. The environment has so 
little role to play in the behaviour of the organism, that 
the existence of change is something of a mystery, 
because there seems to be no reason why potentially
anomalous information should not be assimilated to fit
into the organism's structures (cf Abelson, 1973). Most
of these models do pay some attention to the problem
$of change, but the mechanisms of accommodation suggested 
are vague. Piaget’s theory does claim to offer a 
mechanism of change in the form of the assimilation-
accommodation model. However the account is circular
we can only infer the presence of accommodation when 
we find that change has occurred! A more promising 
approach would seem to be the study of the conditions 
in which change occurs. Thus Bower . (1974) and Bryant 
(1974) suggest that conflict may be a condition to 
induce structural change and Doise et al (1975) make'
similar claims for the influence of social interaction.
Although Piaget and Inhelder may provide an inadequate 
account of how change comes about, their theory at least 
attempts to describe changes in cognition structures
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and relate these to changes or differences in memory.
Thus, the superior recall of older children with stimuli 
requiring Euclidean spatial concepts, can be related to 
their different underlying cognitive structures. Most 
of the other theories make little attempt to describe 
differences in structures, much less attempt to provide
evidence for the existence of such structures from else­
where in cognition. Although there is little evidence 
that cognitive change is paralleled by memory change, 
the Piagetian studies do find weak correlations between 
cognitive level and memory.
In conclusion, the studies reviewed here have conclu­
sively demonstrated the influence of structural factors 
and knowledge on memory. Encoding studies haves, indicated 
that children have extremely sophisticated semantic- knowl­
edge. Additionally research on stories and scripts 
has shown it is possible to make a number of predictions 
about a limited range of stimuli, e.g. subjects ’normalise' 
towards good forms, and they remember good forms better 
than bad forms. Such accounts only allow us to weakly 
predict the actual structure of the output. The Piagetian 
account of memory fares rather better in this respect, 
because it suggests some constraints on the structures 
operating at different ages. In addition to the normal­
isation and well-formedness, predictions, this account 
attempts to relate memory to cognitive change. There 
is supportive evidence for these predictions from group 
data, but the predictions about long-term memory
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improvement have not been validated.
I suggested earlier a number of reasons why mediational 
theories are inadequate to explain memory development, 
but can the structural theories reviewed above provide 
answers to these problems? Some of the problems raised 
by Chi (1978) can be solved by the model she proposes.
The failure of children to perform at adult levels 
after training in adult strategies and the superiority 
of adults on novel strategies can be explained in terms 
of differences in encoding or naming speed. Clearly, 
structure, in the sense of these basic processes, does 
influence memory.
The major problem for the mediational account was, however, 
memory in the absence of mediation, for example, non­
rehearsers (Flavell, 1970), adults who are prevented 
from using strategies (Chi, 1978).,, and adults and children 
on recognition and relative recency tasks,all remember 
without the use of strategies. It is not clear that 
appeal to structural theories provides us with any better 
explanation, for none of the theories reviewed above 
touches on these phenomena.
Research on structural factors in memory, with the possible 
exception of the work on .Genevan theory does not seem to 
have enriched an understanding of memory. In addition to 
their failure to adequately explain phenomena within their
domain of application, structural theories do not solve
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the problems they were originally invoked to explain.
Ill
CHAPTER 3 METAMEMORY
3.1 Introduction
In his review, Flavell (.1970) documents several examples 
of a paradoxical feature of young children’s memory 
behaviour: the production deficit. He demonstrated that 
young children fail to use spontaneously, cognitive 
routines which are in their repertoire and which benefit 
memory. The routines can be elicited with minimal training, 
indicating they are ’in’ the repertoire^ but will not be 
used in the absence of strong prompting from the experi­
menter. (Keeney et al, 1967) . Flavell then goes on to 
provide a tentative explanation for this phenomenon, 
and suggests what changes may lead to the deficit being
overcome:
The general change might consist of an increasing 
propensity, both in recall tasks and in many 
others which have a similar means-to-ends 
structure, to search the repertoire for activ­
ities to perform now, the performance of which 
has no immediate relevance but will facilitate 
some other activity subsequently (in this 
case recall). (1970, p. 205)
Flavell goes on to refine this explanation. He suggests 
that memory be regarded as a problem-solving task,- 
requiring the representation of some memory goal, the 
generation of a plan to meet the goal, and the efficient 
execution of that plan. He argues that young children 
may not only lack the means-ends problem-solving approach
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to memory problems, but they may not know what or how
to remember.
the human mind knows more and thinks better 
as it grows older, and these changes in what 
it knows and how it thinks have powerful effects 
on what it learns and remembers, how it learns 
and remembers, and even perhaps when it learns 
and remembers. (p. 273).
He then goes on to suggest the ways in which young
children’s lack of knowledge about memory could influence 
their memory performance. They may not be sensitive 
to situations which require deliberate efforts to remem­
ber (e.g. Appel et al, 1972). This may be the result 
of overestimating their memory ability (e.g. Flavell et 
al, 1970). They may also not accurately monitor the
extent to which items are remembered and hence fail to
execute strategies efficiently (Flavell, Friedrichs, 
and HQyt, 1970). Finally they may not understand the 
implications of stimulus structure for memory (Moynahan, 
1973) and hence not study critical parts of the stimulus 
(Masur et al, 1973). Flavell also speculates about the 
origins of this knowledge. As noted in Chapter 2, 
he regards it as part of the child's growing introspective 
ability.
In summary, Flavell (.1970, 1971) offers a characterisation 
of memory as a mediated activity. The accessing of 
strategies is the result of intentional problem-solving 
behaviour. This is limited in the young child by a 
lack of strategies potentially servicable for memory,
but more importantly by the absence of knowledge about
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situations, variables and strategies influencing memory. 
This knowledge is acquired as a result of general 
changes in the child's cognitive system, and the emer­
gence of the ability to reflect on the nature of one's 
own thoughts. In addition, Flavell (1971) suggests a 
series of techniques by which we might assess this 
developing knowledge of memory.
This chapter will review three aspects of the theory.
I shall firstly examine the techniques used to assess 
metamemory, and suggest there are problems in that 
different measures yield different results. There may
also be inaccuracies in Flavell's characterisation of
young children's metamemory, and an alternative explanation 
for some of the phenomena which have been attributed to 
metamemory development.. Secondly, I shall review a 
number of experiments which have examined the relation— 
ship between memory and metamemory. It emerges that 
such experiments provide little support for the contention 
that metamemory determines memory abilities. The studies 
investigating how metamemory might develop, suggest that 
the opposite may well be the case: that metamemory 
depdnds crucially on strategic skills. These experiments 
combined with the context-specificity of metamemory • 
already mentioned, argue strongly against Flavell's 
explanation of metamemory development. Far from being 
the result of general developments in introspective skill, 
metamemory seems to be the outcome of the piecemeal
acquisition of different memory strategies.
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3.2 Assessments of metamexnory
A number of different techniques have been utilised 
in the assessment of metamemoryr and these are broadly 
categorisable into two types: questionnaire studies, 
and studies which make inferences about metamemory,by 
directly observing performance. I shall refer to 
these as declarative arid procedural measures respectively. 
A third type of assessment technique involves the child 
making verbal assessments while carrying out a particular 
task. This will be discussed along with the procedural
measures.
3.2.1 Deciarative measures
Most of the major studies of metamemory have relied 
on declarative measures of memory (Brown, 1978; Cavanaugh 
and Borkowski, 1980; Kreutzer, Leonard and Flaveil, 1975) 
and several reviews of this literature have been published 
(Brown, 1978; Flavell, 1978; Flavell and Wellman, 1977). 
The technique involves asking children questions about 
memory situations: sometimes with the relevant memory 
material present: 'Which set of cards will be easier to 
remember, this set or this set?’; on other occasions 
children are required to answer probe questions about 
hypothetical situations, e.g. 'If you were told a 
friend’s 'phone number, would you prefer to 'phone right 
away, or get a drink of water first?'. Alternatively,
children may be asked more open-ended questions, such as
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how they might ensure they remembered an invitation 
to a birthday party. The majority of the research has 
focussed on the early school years although there 
have been limited investigations of metamemory in pre­
schoolers (Gordon and Flavell, 1977; Wellman, 1977b.
1978) and adolescents (.Brown and Smiley, 19 77) . The 
major developmental differences reported in the studies 
occur between the ages of 5 and 8 years. Five-year-olds 
are a little less sensitive to situations which require 
deliberate memory strategies, but seem to know much 
less than 8-year-olds about the variables influencing 
memory performance, and the memory capabilities of 
others. In addition, they have much less knowledge about 
potential memory strategies, and what strategies they 
do have rely on external storage rather than internal, 
in-the-head memorising (Kreutzer et al, 1975; Yussen 
and Levy, 1977).
A number of other studies have assessed children's knowl­
edge of text structure (Brown and Smiley, 1977; Danner, 
1976; Yussen, Levin, Berman and Palm, 1979). These 
studies indicate that this knowledge does not emerge 
until early adolescence, and in some cases may never 
fully develop.. These results are important when compared 
with other research into children’s knowledge of the 
structure of memory stimuli. Kreutzer et al found that 
5-year-old children know that the number and familiarity 
of stimuli influenced memory. In contrast, children
may not be aware of the effects of relations among stimuli
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(e.g. categorisable lists) until the age of 9 years
(Moynahan, 19 73) . Similarly, it is not until this age 
that they realise that a story is easier to remember than 
a list (Kreutzer.et al, 1975). Taken together, the 
results suggest that there is no 'one age’ at which 
children are able to judge the influence of stimulus 
structure on memory. The emergence of such knowledge 
depends cruci ally on the type of stimulus material pro­
vided, so that the ability to make accurate judgements 
will not emerge at the same age when the stimulus is text 
as when it is categorised lists. Indeed, :’>Brown (1978) 
argues that even for the same materials (e.g. text) the 
ability to make accurate judgements about structure may 
depend on the content of the text itself. ?• !
The results of two other studies relying on verbal crit­
eria have important implications for issues discussed 
later in this chapter. Markman (1973) found that 5-year- 
olds believe that older children' recall more than younger 
ones. Kreutzer et al (1975) report that not until the 
age of 9 or 11 years do children realise that this is 
the result of older children’s different study behaviour. 
These studies suggest that young children may not clearly 
understand the relationship between strategies and 
memory. Further evidence for young children’s impoverished 
concept of memory is provided by two studies of the com-, 
prehension of the verbs ’remember’ and ’forget’ (Johnson 
and Wellman, 1980; Wellman and Johnson, 1979). Wellman 
and Johnson asked children to make judgements about a
model attempting to locate a hidden object. The 3- and 
4-year-r51d subjects in the study tended to employ a 
behavioural theory of memory in making their judgements.
The model was judged to have ’remembered’ if he gave 
the correct response to the problem, regardless of 
whether he had previous knowledge of the location 
(i.e. he had seen the object being hidden). He was 
judged to have ’forgotten’ whenever he gave an incorrect 
response, even if he had not seen the object being 
hidden. At the very least, these studies suggest young 
children have much to learn about memory. It seems that 
young children focus on the act of recall itself, rather 
than upon the study behaviour or 'cognitive activity 
which makes memory possible.
There are, however, a number of problems with the studies, 
which have employed verbal means to assess children’s 
knowledge of their own memory processes. One criticism 
made by Wellman (1978) is that such studies underestimate 
the complexity of memory processes. A study will often 
investigate the child’s knowledge of only one variable 
influencing performance on the memory task. Wellman 
argues that decisions about strategy selection and exec­
ution are made on the basis of subjects' knowledge of 
the interaction of a number of variables. Thus, the 
particular strategy evoked may depend on the structure 
of the materials used, the familiarity of those materials 
and the memoriser’s own facility with the strategy. When 
metamemory questions were designed to assess such interactive
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effects, Wellman found that children’s abilities to make 
principled judgements was considerably reduced. It may 
well be that the majority of the questionnaire studies 
have overestimated metamemory skills.
The above criticism could be answered by modifying the 
questions used in metamemory tasks. There are however a 
more serious set of objections, which can be raised against 
the use of verbal measures to assess cognitions. This 
problem has been a matter of some controversy in develop­
mental psychology for a number of years. (Brainerd, 1973, 
Kuhn, 1974; Miller, 1976). The major issue concerns the 
young child’s poor verbal skills and the implication that 
in such subjects, verbal measures may very well under­
estimate the child’s knowledge. If we are to avoid such 
false negative errors by simplifying response require­
ments, we run the risk of overestimating the young child’s
abilities. •
In addition, recent reviews of adult cognitive research
employing introspective and verbal protocols has suggested
that certain cognitive processes may very well not be
introspectible or that information about such processes
may not be veridical (G. Bower, 1978; Nisbett and Wilson,
"7 A number of recent studies (e.g. Wellman, 1978, Yussen 
a:.. and Bird, 1979) suggest that these problems may be
overcome if sufficient care is taken with the design of 
non-verbal measures. Both these studies showed children 
pictures of children inJ.different learning situations 
and required them to indicate the easiest or most diff­
icult memory task.
1977). The studies cited by Bower suggest that the
processes subjects report during decision-making tasks, 
may be unrelated to the criteria they actually use in 
making such decisions, and ^unrelated to their reasons for 
acting as they do.
There are more specific problems involved in the use of 
metamemory measures concurrently with memory activity.
One difficulty concerns the timing of the verbal measure 
i.e. whether to probe knowledge before, after or during 
the memory task. For example, Moynahan (1973) and Salatas 
and Flavell (1976a) found that children’s knowledge about 
categorisation was influenced by task experience. Moynahan 
tested 7-, 9- and 10-year-old child’s knowledge of the 
benefits of categorical organisation on memory. She 
found that metamemory scores were superior for the group 
tested after memory atteirpts/ocnparedwiththe group tested before 
memory. Salatas and Flavell Cl976a) also found effects 
of task experience on subject s' knowledge of stimuli 
and their categorisability. It is not only subjects' know­
ledge of ’facts’ about memory (e.g. that category-structure 
aids recall) that may be influenced by the exact time 
of test. Wason and Evans (1978) report that subject s' 
accounts of the decision processes they executed in-reas­
oning tasks were dependent on the solutions they gave to 
the probe. Subjects often gave incorrect solution 
procedures when the experimenters arranged for their
solution to be correct. Protocols in this task appeared
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to be rationalisations of whatever solution had been
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arrived at. We should not conclude that subjects never 
have access to cognitive processes, but it is clear that 
protocols taken after solution are not trustworthy under 
certain test conditions. It might be the case that such 
rationalisation only occurs for particular tasks espec­
ially those which demand reasoning, where the protocol 
is really a form of justification.
One alternative to the problem of post-hoc rationalisation 
is to take protocols during the task. There are two diffi­
culties with this approach: (a) attempts to verbalise 
may actually reduce performance efficiency or even change 
the processes evalued; and (b) the actual protocols may 
be less accurate because of the difficulties involved 
in engaging in concurrent problem solution.
A final problem with some of the items in the question­
naire studies concerns the cognitive demands they place 
upon young children. Such items often require the chil­
dren to imagine themselves in a particular situation, 
a demand which may well be beyond the abstractive skills 
of the younger group. In this respect at least, proced­
ural measures may be more reliable than declarative ones.
In summary, the results of studies using questionnaire 
type are made problematic by a number of factors. Firstly, 
knowledge about memory is apparently highly context- 
specific: five-year-olds can make judgements about stimulus 
structure on the basis of item number or familiarity,
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but knowledge of the structure of text may not appear 
until adolescence. This would seem to argue against the 
emergence of a ’general introspective ability’ which 
Flavell (1971) suggested. A number of other criticisms
have been levelled at the use of verbal measures as a
means of assessing cognitive processes. Such measures 
may seriously underestimate metamemory in very young 
children, because linguistic comprehension and production 
are not proficient in this age group. In addition, a 
number of objections have been raised to the use of verbal 
measures in adult cognition experiments, both as to when 
and what subjects should be asked to verbalise. Finally 
Wellman (1978) has argued that questionnaire studies may 
present oversimplified and hence unrepresentative problems 
for children’s judgements. Strategy selection seldom 
involves assessment of one memory-relevant factor, it 
is usually the result of a complex judgement about the
interaction of a number of factors. '
3.2.2 ' Procedural measures
Two features of memory behaviour in adults which are often 
attributed to the development of metamemory are the 
ability of older subjects to spontaneously make appro­
priate strategies and to modify such strategies to. meet 
the demands of the particular task.
The evocation data have already been reviewed in Chapter 1. 
Flavell (1970) argued that a number of factors such as
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stimulus structure, experimenter prompts and initial 
instructions do serve to influence strategy evocation. A 
generalisation which emerges from these and other exper­
iments, which manipulate such factors, is that older chil­
dren require less environmental support (i.e. prompts, 
stimulus structure or instruction) in order to produce 
strategies. One explanation for this increased indepen-^. 
dency from environmental elicitation is that developments 
in metamemory allow children to select appropriate strat­
egies in the absence of explicit elicitation.
A number of < ’Other experiments have investigated changes 
in children’s abilities to modify the stimulus or their 
own strategies in order to achieve memory goals. Thus, 
Rogo.ff Newcombe and Kagan (1974) investigated how 4-,
6- and 8-year-old children modified their study strategy 
in response to differing response demands. Children were 
given explicit experience of recall over a time interval 
of either a few minutes, a day or a week. After this 
the children were given a series of pictures and told 
they could study them for as long as they wished, but 
to make sure they would recognise them after a time inter- 
valoof the same duration as the first part of the study. 
Only the oldest group studied the pictures for longer 
when they had to ^remember them for greater time intervals. 
Younger children did not alter their study strategy 
in response to different memory demands. Another demon­
stration of the ability to modify a strategy to meet parti­
cular situational demands has been demonstrated by
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Salatas and Flavell (,1976b) . They found increasing flex­
ibility in strategy use with age. Thus 21-year-olds 
were able to use a retrieval strategy as an indirect means 
to solving another memory problem. Although all subjects 
overlearnt a strategy of retrieval by taxonomic category 
only the oldest groups were able to utilise this strategy 
to answer different memory questions.
Another feature of mature memory behaviour which is taken 
to be the result of metamemory development, is the skill 
of selective study. A number of experiments have investi­
gated this particular skill Ce.g. Brown and Smiley, 1977; 
Cuvo, 1974; Hagen and Hale, 1973; Masuret al, 1973). In 
these experiments, it is of interest whether children 
study the elements of the stimulus which are crucial for 
recall. Thus, Brown and Smiley report that older children 
show strategies such as underlining key parts of a story 
they are required to remember. If given additional study 
time, older children also seem to improve their memory 
for the important elements of text, whereas younger ones 
show no such discrimination in study. In the Masur et al 
(1973) study, children were required to remember ail of a 
list of words. After each recall test, they were allowed 
to select half the original'items for study. An optimal 
strategy under such conditions, would seem to be to select 
those items which were not remembered. Masur et al report 
that 9-year-olds and college students did largely use this 
strategy, but that it was not employed by 6-year-olds.
In other experiments (Cuvo, 1974; Hagen and Hale 1973)
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the experimenter arbitrarily decides which information is 
to be remembered and which is incidental to the memory 
task. Despite the arbitrariness of such selection, the 
results largely support the other experiments. Older 
children are better able to study 'central’ parts of the 
stimulus and ignore ’incidental' components.
A final piece of evidence for the flexibility of older 
children’s strategies, is the ability to modify the stim­
ulus in order to employ overlearnt strategies. Ornstein, 
Naus, and Liberty (1975) presented 8- and 13-year-old 
subjects with lists of items which were taxonomically 
related. In one condition, items from the same category 
were presented together, and in the other condition 
presentation order was random. Both age groups utilised 
category information in recall in the blocked presentation 
condition, but in the random condition only the older 
group did so. They achieved this by re-ordering the orig­
inal stimulus material, and rehearsing related items 
together.
There is therefore considerable evidence for the increased 
flexibility of strategy use with age. Older children 
require less prompting to produce a strategy, they modify 
it in accordance with task demands, and in addition they 
can apply study strategies selectively to important parts 
of the stimulus. There are, however, a number of problems 
with some of these studies, in particular those investi­
gating selective study. In addition, such developments
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may be attributable to factors other than the development 
of metamemory.
The selective study experiments of Brown and Smiley
(1977), Masur-et al (.1973) all found an increased tendency 
to study crucial parts of the text. In the Brown and 
Smiley study, however, one reason why subjects may not 
study these crucial parts is because they cannot distinguish 
the importance of different parts of text. In a later 
part of the same study, Brown and Smiley found that this 
indeed was the case: younger children knew nothing about 
the structure of text. In the light of this, it is not 
surprising that their study behaviour was unsystematic.
A rather different problem arises with the Masur et al 
study. The experimenters did establish that children 
could distinguish between items they had remembered and 
those they had forgotten. Hence, it cannot be argued that 
children do not select items they have forgotten,‘because 
they cannot identify those items. Brown (1978) suggests, 
however, that one reason why young children continue to 
select remembered items for study is because they would 
forget them otherwise. This can be tested by giving the 
children the items they have forgotten. If Brown is 
correct, younger children should perform no better with 
the ’optimal* strategy because they will forget items 
when they are not able to ’keep them alive' by continuous
study. In study with educable retarded children, Brown 
and Campione (1977) found support for this prediction.
Young children may therefore select remembered items for
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further study, because they will forget them otherwise. 
The studies of Cuvo (1974) and Hagen and Hale (1973) rely 
on the assumption that what the experimenter selects 
as important in the stimulus is treated as such by the
child.
A more crucial problem for the metamemory hypothesis is 
that such increases in evocation or strategy flexibility 
may be explained without appeal to changes in knowledge 
about memory. The standard explanation of flexibility or 
evocation is that developments in the cognitive executive 
system allow the child to modify a limited range of 
strategies in order to meet specific memory demands. An 
alternative explanation which has been proposed by Baron 
(1978) is that we regard such developments as the result 
of changes in the strategies themselves. As the child’s 
cognitive system develops, the number of routines avail­
able as potential memory strategies increases, and hence 
children are better able to generate some appropriate 
strategy simply because they have more strategies avail­
able. While it is unlikely that' all changes in strategy 
efficiency and flexibility can be explained in terms of 
the development of the strategies themselves, it is 
important to note that some of those changesmay be explai­
ned without recourse to the concept of metamemory.
The research on the differentiation hypothesis (Appel et 
al, 1973) also illustrates the dangers of inferring know­
ledge about memory from strategy use, without taking into 
account the development of strategies. This hypothesis
was first advanced in the Russian literature Ce.g.
Yendovitskaya, 1971), and the claim is that memory is 
entirely involuntary in young children,i.e. they realise 
that certain situations require them to remember, but 
they never produce strategic behaviour to achieve this 
end. They should therefore never use deliberate memory 
strategies, and hence behave no differently in situations 
which require deliberate memory than in situations where 
strategies are not required. Appel et al tested this 
hypothesis by presenting 4-, 7- and 11-year-old subjects 
with two sets of pictures. Each set of pictures was 
accompanied by a different instruction. In one condition 
children were told they would have to remember the 
pictures at some later time. In the other condition they 
were told to look at the pictures on the pretext that this 
would help them on the subsequent task. The results 
suggested support for the differentiation hypothesis: the 
oldest group clearly modified their behaviour to meet 
memory demands, while the 4-year-olds responded in essent­
ially the same way following both sets of instructions.
The behaviour of the 7-year-olds seemed to be transitional: 
although they showed considerably different behaviours in
the two situations these differences were not reflected
in their recall.
There are, howeverf a number of reasons whyythe youngest 
children may not behave differently in the two situations. 
They may realise that the two sets of instructions
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demand different behaviours, but be unable either to decide
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which behaviours will aid memory, or to execute the nece­
ssary behaviours. Thus, rehearsal is a strategy which 
clearly benefits memory, but young children may not 
realise this and may be unable to produce thenstrategy.
A series of later studies suggest that strategy complexity 
may well prevent this group from demonstrating that
they can distinguish the two sets of demands. Yussen 
(1974) examined children’ s behaviour when they were shown a 
film of an adult model and told (a) they would play aogame 
with .the model,,-or (b) they would have to remember what
items the model indicated. Yussen found differences
in looking behaviour and subsequent recall in the two 
conditions.. Thus, the strategy children are required 
to produce in order to indicate differentiation seems 
to crucially influence whether such differentiation 
is observed. Studies by Wellman, Ritter and Flavell 
(1975) and Yussen, Gagne, Gargiolo and Kunen (.1974) 
support these conclusions.
As Flavell G1978) and Wellman C1977) note, all ..that research 
on the differentiation hypothesis demonstrates is that 
strategies develop,:- a fact we already know. Indeed, 
it may be impossible to establish that there is a stage 
at which children realise they will have to remember, but 
are unaware that this has any implications for present 
behaviour. This is because very young children lack 
the strategies to indicate differentiation, and also 
because they may not understand the demands of the
129
situation and that they will be required to remember.
The ‘hypothesis may therefore be untestable in the 
crucial age range, because we cannot establish that the 
children have actually set themselves a goal of remem­
bering. Indeed, Istomina (1975) provides some anecdotal 
evidence that pre-schoolers have some difficulty in 
recognising that a particular task has a goal of memory.
It is clear, however, that the ability to recognise 
memory demands will be highly situation specific. Chil­
dren as you^ng as 2 or 3 years will respond to certain 
retrieval ;demands (e.g. 'Where's your coat?') which 
clearly require some form of search strategy.
In conclusion, there are several problems with the
studies which have employed strategy use and flexibility 
as criteria for inferring metamemory. Many such studies 
have not taken into account the fact that changes in 
strategy flexibility and use may be partially attributable 
to the development of the strategies themselves.
3.2.3 ' Monitoring studies
A different type of procedural measure assesses children's 
abilities to monitor and interpret their immediate • 
mnemonic experiences. Such judgements can take the form 
of predicting performance or of assessing the accuracy 
of performance after recall.
Studies of prediction have used two different methods
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of assessment: span estimation and recall readiness. In 
the span estimation procedure (Flavell et al, 1970;
Yussen and Levy, 1975) children are shown a single item 
such as a picture and asked whether they will be able 
to recall the name of the picture, if it is removed 
from view. Items are added one at a time, until the 
children no longer claim they will be able to recall all
the items on immediate test. The results of the above
studies consistently demonstrate that children below 
the age of 9 years overestimate their ability in such 
a task. Fifty per cent of 5- and 6-year-old children 
claim they can remember 10 items (the maximum number 
presented in the above studies). Such unrealistic esti­
mates are offered by only 5% of 9-year-olds. Replication 
attempts by Markman (19 73) and Brown, Campione and Murphy 
(1977) suggest that the procedures used above may even 
have overestimated young children’s monitoring skills. 
Both studies report that minor procedural modifications 
such as asking for several assessments indicate that 
judgements are less accurate than Flavell et al and 
Yussen and Levy claim.
The recall readiness procedure is similar to the span 
estimation task. Children are given a set of items • 
equal to their short-term span to learn and told they 
may study the items for as long as they wish. The 
children are told to inform the experimenter when they 
are sure they can recall all of the items. Flavell et
al (19 70) and Markman (.19 73) both report that 5-year-olds
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are insensitive to their readiness to recall. In contrast, 
when older children claimed they were ready to recall, 
they usually remembered all tie items correctly.
A different procedure has been used by Wellman (1977c).
He investigated the development of children’s feeling- 
of-knowing judgements. Children are shown a set of 
objects and asked to name them. For those they cannot 
name, they are required to judge whether they would 
recognise the objectsname if it were presented. Wellman 
found that children’s ability to make such judgements 
showed large increases between the ages of 5 and 8 years.
In a second experiment, he investigated possible reasons 
for this and concluded that younger children do not 
utilise other available information, such as whether 
they have seen the object before, in order to help make 
such judgements.
There are, however, a number of problems with the 
prediction experiments, Kelly, Scholnick, Travers and 
Johnson (1976) attempted to replicate the span estimation
■ • results using a spatial memory task with subjects acred 
between 3 and 10 years.- In addition to asking the children 
whether they could recall all the items, Kelly et al 
requested them to point to those items they believed 
they would recall. There were no developmental differences 
for either of these estimates. Kelly et al suggest that 
a crucial difference between their study and theses 
cited above may be the nature of the material to be
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remembered, and the response criteria used. The other 
span estimation experiments required children to judge 
the likelihood of recall of' picture names, whereas in 
the Kelly et al study the judgement concerned the ability 
to place cue cards in their appropriate spatial locations. 
It may be that monitoring skills crucially depend on 
experience in similar task situations, and as Wellman 
(1977a) has noted, preschool children generally perform 
better on spatial tasks. This argument gains further 
plausibility if we consider the results of Chi (1978).
She found that prediction skill for the task of remem­
bering chess positions generally depended on chess 
knowledge not on age. In addition, predictive skill 
depended on the nature of the stimulus. Chess experts 
were not always superior at monitoring to novices, 
because experts often' oVe re s tima te their ability to remem­
ber highly structural stimuli. A similar finding 
is reported by Monroe and Lange (1976) for list learning. 
These studies of monitoring suggest that prediction 
skill may well depend upon subjects' knowledge of the 
task used and upon the exact configuration of the 
stimuli employed. Under certain conditions, monitoring 
skill may not increase with age.
The Kelly et al study did replicate the findings of
Flavell et al and Markman for recall-readiness. One
problem with this measure of monitoring ability is that 
it is confounded by motivational and strategic factors. 
Thus younger children might be uninterested in correct
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recall, or unable to maintain their attention on study 
until a state of readiness is achieved. The problem 
of strategy development is that older children have 
more efficient strategies for rectifying matters if 
learning is not complete.
Finally, research on adults suggests that feeling-of- 
knowing judgements may not be assessing moment-to-moment 
monitoring of memory states. Gruneberg, Morris and 
Sykes (1977) suggest that subjects respond to the demand 
characteristics of the experiment in making such judge­
ments. They present evidence that subjects' assessments 
are based on what the subjects think they ought to know, 
and not on direct monitoring.
A number of studies have also investigated children's 
abilities to make judgements about their performance 
after retrieval has been carried out. In contrast to
the findings of Flavell et al and Yussen and Levy, for 
prediction, young children seem fairly accurate at 
assessing their performance after retrieval. Studies 
by Berch and Evans (1973) for recognition, Moynahan 
(1976) for free recall, and Bisanz, Versander, and Voss 
(1978) for paired-associate learning all report that 
"post-diction" judgements are accurate in 5-year-olds. 
Although all these studies report developments in this 
ability, performance does not change as much as in the 
above studies of prediction. Young children may also 
be competent at other sorts of judgements about retrieval.
134
They seem aware that they have or have not completed 
recall of all items (Neimark, Slotnick and Ulrich,
1971; Geis and Lange, 1976) and can distinguish between 
the items they have recalled and items they have not 
recalled (Masur et al, 1973).
These results would seem to contradict a number of studies
of strategy maintenance which were reviewed in Chapter 
2 (Bdrkowski et al, 1976; Kennedy and Miller, 1976).
Such studies indicate that children will only maintain 
strategies when they are given direct feedback as to 
the effectiveness of strategy use. From this it could 
be argued that such feedback is necessary because chil­
dren either cannot, or do not monitor the influence 
of strategies on their performance. However, the arguments 
advanced in Chapter 2 suggest that failure to monitor
Imay be the result of defici'ts in processes other than 
monitoring. In addition, a number of studies have
shown that maintenance can occur in the absence of feed­
back (. Bjorklund et al, 1977; Heisel and Ritter, 1981; 
Ornstein et al, 1977; Ringel and Springer, 1980). The 
failure to maintain a trained strategy cannot therefore 
be advanced as evidence of deficits in monitoring skill.
A large number of studies have been conducted to investi­
gate the development of children’s abilities to assess 
the state of items in memory before retrieval, and to 
make judgements about retrieval completeness and accuracy. 
It was argued that the ability to make post-diction
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judgements is present in children as 5 years. The inter­
pretation of the data on prediction is much more prob­
lematic; evidence from other studies suggests that 
monitoring skills depend on the task and stimulus 
configuration employed. Under certain conditions young 
children may be as accurate as adults in their predictions. 
Criticisms were also made of the use of the feeling-of-
—knowing judgement as a means of assessing direct • • '
monitoring.
3.2.4 Conclusions about assessments of metamemory
The- research reviewed above suggests that there are 
large changes in children’s knowledge of facts about 
memory, in the case of evocation and flexibility of 
the strategies they employ, and in their ability to 
make judgements about their performance before or after 
retrieval. However, as the earlier sections have 
argued there are a number of problems associated with the 
assessment of metamemory. In the case of questionnaire 
studies there is the general problem of using verbal 
methods with younger children. The procedural measures 
did not avoid such problems either. It is possible to 
explain accessibility and flexibility of strategies 
without appeal to metamemory. In addition there are 
problems with several of the studies of monitoring
reviewed above.
A second major difficulty in assessing metamemory
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concerns differences between measures purportedly 
assessing ’the same’ knowledge. Measures of prediction 
ability appear to depend greatly upon the task (Chi,
1978; Kelly et al, 1976), and Brown (1978) argues that 
even within a task domain, metamemory ability may 
depend upon the content and complexity of the stimulus 
under study. As I have already noted, these results 
seem to argue against the general development of a 
metamemory function as described by Flavell (1971).
3.3 ' Metamemory as an explanation of memory performance
The previous sections provided some discussion of the 
different criteria which have been employed in the 
assessment of metamemory. In the accounts of Flavell 
(1971), Brown (1978) and Cavanaugh and Perimutter (.1982) 
metamemory is intended to be more than an object of 
study, it is meant to serve an explanatory function in 
theories of memory. Thus, Flavell (1971) suggests 
that young children’s failure to realise that certain 
memory situations require strategies, their inability 
to monitor the state of items in memory, and their lack 
of knowledge about what variables affect memory all con­
tribute to inefficient performance. The present section 
examines the evidence for these different hypotheses 
in the light of recent experiments. Before embarking 
on a detailed examination of this evidence, however, it 
is worth returning to the conclusions of the previous
section. The above review of techniques for metamemory
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assessment, and recent publications (e.g. Cavanaugh 
and Perimutter, 1982), suggest that there are a number 
of problems with the measurement of metamemory. If this 
is the case, then it may be difficult to draw reliable 
conclusions about the explanatory value of metamemory when 
the methods used for its assessment are problematic. For 
this reason, it is important that each test of the 
metamemory-memory relationship takes into account the 
reliability of the metamemory measures employed.
One technique of metamemory assessment can give us no 
adequate explanation of memory development. This tech­
nique involves the use of procedural measures such as 
ease of evocation and flexibility of strategy use. Since 
our measure of metamemory is directly derived from 
strategy use in this case, any appeal to metamemory 
involves a viciously circular argument. Metamemory is 
inferred in this case from strategy deployment , and 
cannot therefore be called upon to explain deployment.
The differentiation hypothesis also runs into similar 
difficulties. Flavell (.1971) and Appel et al C1972) 
argued that one reason why preschool children may fail 
to prepare for retrieval is because their memory is 
entirely involuntary, i.^e. .they do not realise that certain 
memory goals can only be achieved if action is taken now 
to prepare for later retrieval. As the previous section 
argues, a number of false inferences were made about 
preschoolers' inability to identify such situations.
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This was because experiments did not allow that strategies 
are poorly developed in this age group, and it was 
from preschoolers’, lack of strategies that they could 
not identify deliberate memory situations. However 
when tasks were employed which required simple strategies 
(e.g. touching or looking at stimuli),it became clear 
that young children are capable of preparation for 
retrieval. There is no conclusive evidence that young 
children ever perceive that a certain task requires 
them to recall at some later time and yet they fail 
to realise they should engage in some appropriate mnemonic 
preparation for this eventuality. The differentiation 
hypothesis cannot therefore explain any of the deficits 
observed in young children’s strategic behaviours.
Flavell (1978) and Flavell and Wellman (.1977) have 
argued that one source of difficulty for young children 
may lie in identifying situations which possess implicit 
demands for memory. In support of this Flavell (1978) 
cites a number of experiments showing that older chil­
dren are more likely to keep physical records of previous 
solution attempts (Siegler and Lieberfe, 19 75) and also 
of the need to study further items they have just 
forgotten in a memory test (Masur et al, 1973). However, 
this interpretation of the evidence may be problematic. 
The Siegler and Liebert study requires children to take 
notes of previous solution attempts, a strategy which 
may be more practiced in older children. As I have 
already argued children may well not select forgotten
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items for study in the Masur' et al study, because they 
are unable to keep remembered items ’alive’ in memory if 
they do so. In addition a study by IstQmina (1975) 
suggests that under certain conditions, 5-year-olds may 
well respond to implicit demands to prepare-for-retrieval. 
Despite this, the hypothesis remains plausible, it is just 
that the present experimental evidence is insufficient
to evaluate it.
A different type of argument has been advanced by
Flavell (1971) and Brown (.1977, 1978) to explain the 
relationship between monitoring skills and strategy 
use. The Flavell et al (.19 70) and Yussen and Levy (1975) 
studies both seemed to show that young children vastly 
overestimate their ability for immediate recall. In 
addition, the Flavell et al and Kelly et al (1976) studies 
indicated that they are also unable to assess when they 
have fully mastered the material to be remembered.
This may well explain their failure to employ strategies, 
if children do indeed overestimate their ability for 
correct recall, it is not surprising that they fail to 
employ strategies when these are necessary. The argument 
is suspect, however, because it assumes that children 
spontaneously make assessments of their likely perform­
ance and on the basis of these, decide upon whether or 
not to use a strategy. Two studies have subjected 
this hypothesis to experimental test (Flavell et al, 1970; 
Kelly et al, 1976), and neither has found any evidence 
for a relationship between monitoring assessments and
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subsequent recall.
A number of studies have investigated the relationship 
between post-test assessment and the level of memory 
performance (Bisanz et al, 1978; Kelly et al, 1976). It 
is argued that those subjects who most accurately post- 
diet will be those who maintain their performance during 
test most closely and hence determine when material has 
been mastered sufficiently for recall. This argument is 
also suspect, because the ability to make post-diction 
judgements may not be related to children’s spontaneous 
self-assessment. In any case, the Kelly et al study 
reports no relation between post-diction and recall, and 
the Bisanz et al experiment found evidence for the rela­
tion only in their oldest group who were college students.
Experiments which offer feedback as to the level of
performance are sometimes cited in the context of' monitor­
ing influencing strategy maintenance. The argument is 
made that feedback provides children with information 
about their level of performance when they use trained 
strategies and this leads them to maintain such strategies. 
However, feedback typically involves much more than infor­
mation about performance levels. In the Borkowski et al 
(1976) and Kennedy and Miller (1976) experiments (see 
Chapter 2) subjects were not given information about the 
absolute level of their performance using the ’trained’ 
strategy. Instead they were provided with information 
about the level of their performance when they used the
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strategy and this is compared with performance without the 
strategy. The superiority in the instructed condition 
is then attributed to strategy use. We cannot therefore 
use such experiments to make inferences about the relation­
ships between maintenance and monitoring, because other 
metamemory information is supplied by feedback in addition 
to monitoring. Other studies (Heisel and Ritter, 1981; 
Ringel and Springer, 1980) have separated the different 
processes of monitoring, comparing strategy and no­
strategy performances, and interpreting this difference 
as being attributable to the use of strategies. These 
studies showed that deficits in each of these processes 
do influence children’s strategy selections.
Thus of the research on the relationship between monitoring 
and strategy maintenance, only the feedback experiments 
suggest any real evidence for the hypothesised relation­
ship. Experiments on the relationship between prediction 
and post-diction have not found evidence for a clear 
influence of metamemory or memory behaviour. It seems 
that feedback experiments provide information in addition 
to monitoring and that such information also influences 
strategy maintenance.
The above experiments have evaluated evidence for two 
ways in which metamemory can influence memory performance. 
The differentiation hypothesis suggests that children's 
different conceptualisation of memory is responsible for 
their generalised production deficit, and later studies
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argue that direct monitoring skills may influence strategy 
deployment. Flavell (.19 71) suggests a further means by 
which knowledge influences memory processes. He argues 
that young children may not know certain facts about the 
variables which influence memory and strategy use. Thus, 
children who do not know that certain parts of a story are 
more important for memory than others will not structure 
their study behaviour accordingly.
Several studies have demonstrated that such lack of 
knowledge does influence memory (Brown and Smiley, 1978; 
Ritter, 1978; Wellman, Drozdal, Flavell, Salatas, and 
Ritter, 1975; Yussen et al, 1979). Brown and Smiley (1978) 
established that recall of prose at all ages character­
istically shows the omission of information irrelevant 
to the theme of the story, and highlighting of this central 
information. Recall of the different parts of the story 
is therefore determined by their level of importance.
Older school children and adults typically exploited 
this by using strategies such as underlining crucial 
portions of text, or using periods of extra study time 
to focus on these portions. Younger children, in contrast; 
did not do this. Brown and Smiley therefore asked subjects 
of all ages to rate the importance of the different parts 
of the text. They found that younger children were unable 
to make such judgements. More importantly, the study 
strategies described above did not emerge until several 
years after the ability to rate the importance of te< t 
units. Thus knowledge about the structure of text recall
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would appear to be a prerequisite for systematic study 
strategies. Similar results have been reported by Yussen 
et al (1979) and Danner (.1976), for text, and by Wellman 
et al (1975) and Wimmer and Tornquist (1980) , for different 
sorts of knowledge about memory.
One problem with these sorts of demonstrations lies in 
the precise criteria employed to establish that subjects 
possess certain knowledge about memory. As Brown (1978) 
points out, if we modify our criteria we may not find 
evidence of knowledge about certain aspects of text until 
late adolescence. Despite the apparent support for the 
hypothesis, there are a number of problems with the 
conclusions which have been drawn. The major difficulty 
concerns the failure to adequately specify what 'facts’ 
about memory are necessary for strategy use. This has 
led to disputes in the literature about exactly what 
knowledge is necessary for particular tasks. Thus 
Cavanaugh and Perimutter (.1982) claim that Tornquist and 
Wimmer (1980) have used too stringent criteria for asses­
sing metamemory. If the criteria are relaxed, the seque­
nce of metamemory appearing before strategies is not 
always found. In the experiments on text study there is 
a similar failure to specify what exactly must be known 
about text structure before strategies can be employed. 
Thus, the studies find different time intervals between 
the ability to make such judgements and the onset of 
systematic strategies.
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The vagueness of the hypothesis is further illustrated 
by the inconsistencies in the classification of various 
metamemory acquisitions. Thus, Brown (1978) interprets 
experiments on short-term span estimation as indications 
of children’s knowledge of the fact that they have limi­
ted short-term memory capacity. In contrast, Flavell 
(1978) and Flavell and Wellman (1977), suggest the results 
reveal children’s ability to monitor their memory state.
The degree of disagreement between the Brown and Flavell 
classification systems is illustrated by the fact that 
other metamemory items are categorised in the opposite 
manner, with Brown classifying as process what Flavell 
classifies as factual knowledge.
These disagreements about the classifications of different 
metamemory items, and also the problems of determining what 
knowledge is required for a given task suggest severe 
problems for the use of metamemory in explaining memory 
behaviour. A far more serious problem arises when chil­
dren’s knowledge about memory does not relate to their 
strategy choice. Thus, Kreutzer et al (1975) report that 
children who predicted that increased study time benefits 
recall, did not necessarily study longer than other chil­
dren. Brown, CampiOne, Barclay, Lawton and Jones (cited 
in Brown, 1978) also found that predictions about the 
relative effectiveness of various strategies bore no 
relation to strategy choice in educable retarded children
(MA 6 and 8). Thus, children who possess greater know­
ledge about memory may not always utilise this knowledge
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in remembering.
Studies by Salatas and' Flavell (1976a) and M°ynahan (1973) 
support this conclusion but additionally they suggest 
that metamemory is itself highly dependent on memory 
experience. Both experiments investigated the relation­
ship between knowledge about categorisation and recall 
and its relation to category-sorting strategies with 
taxonomically organised lists. MQynahan tested 7-, 9- 
and 10-year-olds knowledge about categorisation either 
before or after experience with taxonomic lists. She 
found that children with superior metamemory did not 
necessarily make more use of category-sorting strategies. 
In addition, experience with the memory task influenced 
metamemory judgements. The group who were tested after 
the memory test recorded higher metamemory scores.
Salatas and Flavell (1976a) employed two experimental 
conditions: in the first, children were given instructions 
to remember the items in a list, and in the second, they 
were told simply to look at the stimuli. Following this, 
their knowledge of category effects on memory was probed. 
As in the Moynahan study, metamemory was significantly 
affected by memory experience. The group given memory 
instructions performed better than the incidental instruc­
ting groups. Both groups were given a further test some 
weeks later, and it was found that metamemory scores did 
not predict strategy use on retest. However Salatas and 
Flavell did identify a group of subjects who demonstrated 
an interesting set of responses. These subjects showed
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no evidence for strategy use on early trials, but demon­
strated high levels of clustering in recall. They showed 
high metamemory scores, and later used category-sorting 
strategies in the retest. Salatas and Flavell argue that 
these subjects monitor their initial recall patterns, 
perceive the influence of categories in recall and intro­
duce the behaviour of clustering at encoding as a delib­
erate strategy. These speculations are consistent with 
the theories (reviewed in Chapter 2) which suggest that 
the origins of strategies may lie in involuntary behaviour. 
There still remain however, a number of problems of explan­
ation for metamemory theories. Despite the predictive 
value of the metamemory measure for the group described 
by Salatas and Flavell, metamemory is not a'.strong deter­
minant of strategic behaviour for the remainder of the 
subjects in that study, or the other studies mentioned 
above (Brown et al, 1978; Kreutzer et al, 1975; Moynahan,' 
1973). In addition, the knowledge hypothesis suggests 
that knowledge about memory is a prerequisite for various 
strategies. The Moynahan and Salatas and Flavell studies 
suggest the opposite is the case: metamemory seems to be 
strongly influenced by specific experience of the memory
task. This conclusion is consistent with the earlier
review of prediction skills, which suggested that such 
skills depend on memory experience. (Chi, 1978; Kelly et 
al, 1976).
A different approach to the evaluation of the knowledge 
hypothesis has been taken by Cavanaugh and Bo.rkowski
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(.1980) . They employed a questionnaire to assess a wide 
variety of different types of metamemory, and investigated 
how these measures related to strategy use on three 
related tasks. These tasks were: (a) a free sort task 
in which children could sort a categorisable list in any 
manner they wished; (b) a cueing task in which the experi­
menter provided pictures which could be used as encoding 
and retrieval cues; and Cc) an alphabet search task in 
which children were given an unanticipated recall test 
for a set of alphabet letters which had just been presen­
ted. Cavanaugh and Berkowski predicted that metamemory 
measures relating to the skills required by the three tasks 
should correlate more highly with strategy use than 
unrelated metamemory items. This prediction was not 
supported: metamemory items which seemed to be peripheral 
to the tasks seemed to correlate as highly with strategy 
use asidid apparently more relevant items. Although 
76% of metamemory-memory correlations were significant 
when the data was collapsed over age groups, this figure 
dropped drastically when the data were examined for devel­
opmental differences, and only 18% were significant.
Neither were there any developmental trends in the number 
of significant correlations. Cavanaugh and Bor.kowski also 
conducted contingency analyses on an item-by-item basis to 
establish whether high metamemory subjects were more 
likely to use strategies. They found no evidence for 
this hypothesis on any of the metamemory measures. They 
then tested whether subjects who showed higher overall 
metamemory scores performed better than low-metamemory
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subjects. This was found not to be the case. Finally 
they attempted to isolate a set of 'core* metamemory 
items which would predict memory performance. No such 
factors could be found. Cavanaugh andBorkowski therefore
conclude:
No reliable evidence for the contention that 
verbalizable metamemory is necessary for success­
ful memory was found. A causal hypothesis linking 
metamemory to memory is not supported by the 
present data. Op. 451)
This conclusion seems to apply to most other studies 
which have tested the knowledge hypothesis.
Evidence has been evaluated for a number of different 
hypotheses about the relationship between metamemory and 
memory. Very little support was found for any of these 
hypotheses. The evidence for the differentiation 
hypothesis first advanced by Appel et al (1972) is extrem­
ely problematic; when sufficient care is taken to ensure 
that young children have the strategic means available, 
there is every indication that they can distinguish 
situations which require deliberate encoding strategies.
The reliance on strategic competence can be avoided by 
using monitoring measures. However, no evidence was found 
to support the contention that prediction or post­
diction assessments bear any relation to strategy selection, 
and recall. Most research has focussed on the knowledge 
hypothesis i.e. that certain facts about memory are pre­
requisites for the use of certain strategies. Some text 
studies support this contention, but problems about the 
criteria used for metamemory assessment should lead us to
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reserve judgement about thei.r conclusions.. A number of 
other studies have failed to find such a relationship.
The results of several of these studies also suggest 
that metamemory may not determine strategy selection, rather 
that experience in particular memory tasks influences 
metamemory. While it may be argued (e.g. Salatas and 
Flavell, 1976a) that this explains the origins of meta­
memory, there is little to suggest that even when meta­
memory does emerge, that it can significantly influence 
performance. Some accounts attribute the failure to find 
the predicted relationship to inadequacies in our methods 
of strategy assessment, (e.g. Cavanaugh and Perimutter,
1982). However, such arguments cannot be employed to save 
metamemory theory: unless more sensitive means of assess­
ment can be devised, metamemory can serve no function as 
an explanatory concept.
In contrast to the above, a number of studies conducted 
within the framework of metamemory have succeeded in 
showing some influence of information about memory.
The studies in which children are given feedback of various 
forms (e.g. Kennedy and Miller, 1976; Borkowski et al, . 
1976) do show that such information affects strategy 
maintenance. Some accounts e.g'.. Flavell (19 78) suggest 
that these experiments provide children with metamemory 
information which they do not possess, (e.g. Rehearsal 
improves recall). Other experiments (e.g. Heisel and 
Ritter, 1981; Ringel and Springer, 1980) indicate however 
that strategy maintenance may be the result of a complex
set of decision making processes. It may well be that if 
we can model such processes we may understand how strat­
egies are selected. Such a model may include processes 
already mentioned such as monitoring, but they would form 
part of a more complex multifactor explanation than has been 
advanced by metamemory theorists.
3.4 Explanations of metamemory
Regardless of the status of metamemory as a construct which 
explains changes in memory strategies, it still remains 
that metamemory itself develops, and any adequate theory 
must provide some account of how this occurs. In the 
previous chapter I discussed a number of accounts of 
memory development which also included speculations about 
the origins of changes in metamemory. The majority of 
theories of metamemory change suggest it results from 
particular experiences in memory tasks (e.g. Brown and 
De Loache, 1978; Meacham, 1972; Paris, 1978a). These 
accounts stress that metamemory evolves in a highly 
context-specific manner, in contrast to the speculations 
of Flavell (1971) who argued that metamemory was the 
result of a generally emerging introspective ability.
The experimental evidence would seem to weigh heavily in 
favour of the piecemeal acquisition account. The data 
reviewed in the previous sections indicates that 
monitoring skills are highly domain-specific (Chi, 1978;
Kelly et al, 1976), that knowledge about text depends on
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the content and structure of text (Brown, 1978) and that 
knowledge about the structure of materials in memory 
tasks depends crucially on the nature of those materials 
(Brown and Smiley, 1978; Moynahan, 1973). A number of 
experiments have attempted to train metamemory skills 
(Brown, 1978; Brown, Campione and Barclay, 1979; Brown, 
Campione, 1977b). All of these studies established the 
maintenance of trained strategies, but only the Brown et 
al (1979) study showed any evidence of metamemory general­
isation. Although we cannot directly infer the structure 
of natural acquisition processes from training studies, 
these studies do support the view that metamemory is 
acquired in a domain-specific rather than a generalised
manner.
Having established that metamemory is a context-specific 
acquisition',, precisely what mechanisms are responsible for 
its emergence ? One position (advocated by Brown and 
De Loache, 1978) is that metamemory follows from some form 
of reflection on the structure of a previously overlearnt 
behaviour. Meacham (.1972) and the Russian theorists (e.g. 
Leont'ev, 1975) explain this slightly differently. They 
argue that it is only when a behaviour has been highly 
practised that it becomes servicable as a routine capable 
of being subordinated to memory goals. These accounts are 
problematic in three respects. They do not state precisely 
how much an involuntary behaviour must be exercised before 
it becomes a potential strategy. The account of knowledge 
of the structure of involuntary behaviours somehow emerging
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through use begs the very question it is meant to
explain: how is this sudden insight< made possible? Even 
if we accept the above, the account is inadequate in 
another respect: it can only explain a limited range 
of the phenomena of metamemory. It might therefore 
explain the acquisition of strategy knowledge, but not 
for example,the process of monitoring.
Neither of the above accounts makes appeal to the
studies which have attempted to train metamemory. The 
studies do not show that the procedures employed in train­
ing are the mechanisms which necessarily operate in the 
natural acquisition of the cognitive skill in question; 
they may, hbwever, suggest the possible mechanisms of 
change . The evidence from the studies suggests that 
feedback is one such mechanism which leads to changes 
in metamemory , but that changes may occur when feedback 
is not provided. One possible explanation for metamemory 
change in the absence of feedback may be that children 
are able to monitor their metamemory judgements and 
modify them. Monitoring may therefore influence both 
strategy and metamemory change.
The previous sections have described experiments suggesting 
that' strategy ma in tenanc e can be influenced by feedback, 
but a number of other experiments show that feedback 
may also influence metamemory acquisition. These studies 
have attempted to train children to accurately predict 
their performance in an immediate memory test (Brown et
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al, 1977b; Markman, 1973; Yussen and Levy, 1975). The
results are consistent for older children: all three
studies showed that feedback induced children older than
5 years to estimate their performance accurately. Feed­
back may not modify predictions at all ages, however, for 
the Yussen and Levy experiment included a group of 
preschool children who seemed to be impervious to such 
information. Finally Cavanaugh and Borkowski (1979) 
showed that feedback can influence children’s knowledge 
of what variables influence memory performance. Thus 
feedback seems to be a possible mechanism by which we 
can modify metamemory as evidenced by these induced 
changes in maintenance, prediction and knowledge about
memory.
As was noted above, feedback is not always necessary to 
induce changes in metamemory, and a number of experiments 
show that changes may occur in its absence. If we employ 
strategy maintenance as a criterion for metamemory
then several studies reviewed elsewhere in this thesis 
indicate metamemory change without feedback (Bjorklund et 
al, 1976; Heisel and Ritter, 1981; Ornstein et al, 1977; 
Ringel and Springer, 1980). These studies suggest that 
feedback may not be necessary in older children (Heisel 
and Ritter, 1981; Ringel and Springer, 1980), or if 
strategies are highly effective (Ornstein et al, 1977). 
Brown et al (l'977b.) found that age may also influence 
whether feedback is necessary to modify metamemory.
They employed a different measure of metamemory, that of
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span estimation, in educable retarded chilren (MA 6 and 
8 years). Both groups were given 10 trials in which 
they had to predict recall performance, and then actually 
recall. Half the subjects at each age level were 
given feedback. The older subjects became more accurate 
at prediction whether or not feedback was provided, 
whereas feedback was necessary to induce more accurate 
monitoring in the younger group. The studies of 
MQynahan (1973) and Salatas and Flavell (1976a) also show 
that verbal knowledge about memory can be modified 
by task experience, without feedback. . Moynahan found 
that subjects who made their metamemory judgements after 
performing the task were substantially more accurate 
than those making them before the memory test. Salatcis 
and Flavell (1976a) found that metamemory judgements 
were better in subjects who had been instructed to 
•'remember1 than in subjects asked to rlook at1 the same 
stimulus materials. Experience in the particular memory 
task, it seems, can influence metamemory, even in the
absence of feedback. This is consistent with the results
of Chi (1976) and Kreutzer et al (.1975) who all found 
that metamemory was superior in task settings in which 
the child is familiar. This still does not provide a 
mechanism for metamemory change in the absence of feedback,
but the above ^results are consistent with the view that
spontaneous monitoring leads to changes in metamemory.
Thus, older children, with their superior monitoring
8 This analysis only includes children who were initially 
inaccurate in their predictions.
skill are more likely to modify judgements in the absence 
of external feedback. If we return to the speculations 
of Brown and De Loache Cl978) and Meacham Cl972), it 
is possible to square their account with the one offered 
above. Monitoring and feedback may provide the mecha­
nisms by which metamemory evolves from strategy use.
In conclusion, there has been little theorising or
research conducted into the origins of metamemory, and the 
mechanisms responsible for its change. The available 
data do, however, suggest that Flavell's C1971) specul­
ations about there being a general increase in intro­
spection ability are incorrect. Brown and De Loache 
(1978) and Meacham (1972) offer an account in which meta­
memory is dependent on developments in particular strat­
egies. While their account is little more than a 
redescription of the data on strategy change, evidence 
from a number of training experiments ' suggests that 
feedback and monitoring may be mechanisms which induce 
change.
3.5 General Conclusions
The present chapter discussed a number of issues relating 
to metamemory, including methods of assessment, its 
relationship to memory and explanations of change in meta­
memory. In the section on methods of assessment I 
suggested there were a number of difficulties with the 
procedures used in assessing the construct. In the case
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of questionnaire methods, this was related to the poor 
verbal skills of very young children, and the consequent 
problem of them understanding questions and producing 
answers about memory. Other methods which rely on 
strategy changes as indicators of metamemory development, 
fail to take into account developments in the strategies 
themselves, which may contribute to the observed 
increases in evocation and efficiency. A special case 
of procedural measurement, is the differentiation para­
digm, and this is subject to the objections voiced 
above. Leaving aside the problems of measurement, as 
Brown (1978) and Cavanaugh andIPerlmutter (1982) point 
out, research on metamemory has generated little more 
than a mass of data showing that aspects of knowledge 
about memory increase with age. No explanation is 
offered as to the relations between the different aspects 
nor is there any attempt to suggest why certain elements 
emerge before others. •
The second problem with, metamemory is that it does not 
explain memory phenomena as early accounts (e.g. Flavell, 
1971? Hagen, 1971) argued it would. Explanations of 
memory development which rely on metamemory measures 
derived’ from strategy use,cannot be accepted, as they 
are circular. This is not the case with the overestimation
and post-diction hypotheses about monitoring. In these 
experiments it is possible to generate independent 
measures of metamemory, and it is clear how these measures
should influence behaviour. The limited available
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evidence does not, however, provide support for the 
hypothesis. A third major hypothesis advanced by 
Flavell (1971) was that young children’s lack of knowl­
edge about certain metamemory variables may be responsible 
for their failure to use strategies. Some of these 
experiments have found experimental support for the 
hypothesis-(Brown and Smiley, 1978; Danner, 1976; Yussen 
et al, 1979). However several other experiments have 
arrived at the opposite conclusion, i.e. that knowledge 
has no effect on strategy choice [Brown et al, 1978; 
Mandler and De Forest, 1979; Moynahan, 1973; Salatas 
and Flavell, 1976a). Furthermore, a large-scale correl­
ational study by Cavanaugh and Borkowski (1980) tested 
variants of the knowledge hypothesis and found little 
evidence for any of them. The available evidence suggests 
that rather than metamemory providing an explanation 
for the development of memory, metamemory itself 
depends on experience in particular memory tasks [cf. the 
suggestions of Salatas and Flavell, 1976a). Modifications 
have been made to the original 'theriry (e.g. Flavell, 1978 
Flavell and Wellman, 1977), arguing that metamemory 
and memory may only be closely linked in older children 
and adults. These suggestions are problematic in two 
respects: firstly they are motivated by research 
findings contradicting the theory; and secondly, no 
attempt is made to specify when close metamemory-memory 
links might emerge. Analogous arguments have been made 
by Cavanaugh and Perimutter [1982) who claim that meta­
memory knowledge may not be used in all appropriate
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situations. A cleat difficulty he.re is that Cavanaugh 
and Perlmutter are silent on what might determine the 
use or non-use of metamemory ’facts’.
Finally, the different accounts of metamemory develop­
ment were individually examined. The available data 
suggest that Flavell*s (1971) characterisation of the 
process as general in scope is incorrect, and the explan­
ations in terms of a Vygotskyan model (e.g. Brown and 
De Loache , 1978; Meacham, 1972) were found to be little 
more than a description of the available data. A number
of studies have looked into the conditions in which
metamemory changes occur. It is possible that mecha­
nisms such as monitoring and feedback may be responsible 
for the changes which Brown and De Loache and Meacham
describe.
The overall evidence seems to favour the interpretation 
that in the early stages of development at least, meta­
memory development is largely dependent on specific 
memory experiences. Although this is contrary to the 
position advocated by Flavell (.1971) and Brown (.1978) , 
it may offer some clues as to which ’bits’ of raetamemory 
may develop first. Flavell (1978) may be correct in 
asserting that metamemory may only be influential in 
determining memory behaviour in older children < and adults, 
but this has yet to be demonstrated.
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CHAPTER 4 USE OF INFERENCING STRATEGIES AND THE ROLE
OF SELF-ASSESSMENT IN CUE USE
4.1 Introduction
As we noted in Chapters 1 and 2, a large.amount of exper­
imental evidence has been accumulated to demonstrate that
young children have a production deficit for many memory 
strategies. The finding that dhildren fail to employ a 
routine which is in their repertoire bears some relation 
to the recent demonstrations of context-specific thought 
in preschoolers. The latter have largely shown that 
cognitive skills which are not demonstrated in Piagetian 
tasks can be elicited under other conditions (Donaldson, 
1978; Gelman, 1978, Siegler, 1978). A major differendd 
between this coonitive research and recent research on the produc-" 
tion deficit has been the emphasis in cognitive research, 
on finding the reasons underlying this context-specificity, 
and numerous factors have been suggested to explain why 
children may fail to manifest particular skills. The 
picture is somewhat different for memory developmental 
research. Although there has been some theoretical spec­
ulation (e.g. Meacham, 1972; Wellman, 1977a) and some 
research on differentiation (Appel et al, 1972), there 
has been little attempt to provide explanations for very 
young children’s strategic deficiencies. One aim of 
this chapter is therefore to investigate the reasons
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underlying these deficiencies.
A second, and related point, concerns the young child's 
ability to use cognitive routines in an intentional manner 
to benefit memory. Early research into this issue sugg­
ested that preschoolers did not use intentional strategies 
(Appel et al, 1972), but there is now a considerable body 
of evidence showing that this is not the case (Acredolo 
et al, 1975; Wellman et al, 1975; Yussen, 1974; Yussen et 
al, 1975) . These experiments undoubtedly indicate that 
intentional strategies are sometimes used by preschoolers, 
but they do not demonstrate that such strategies are 
always used. In fact, evidence from other studies suggests 
that memory may sometimes be the incidental byproduct 
of the child's activities when they are directed towards 
a goal other than remembering (Ryan et al, 1970). In 
addition, preschoolers may not always fully understand 
the implications that their activities have on remembering
((»crd(pn and Flavell, 1977; Ritter, 1978; Ritter et al, 
1973). A second focus of this chapter will therefore 
be on the intentional nature of the young child's memory
behaviours.
The present chapter describes a series of experiments 
which investigate the development of a particular retr­
ieval strategy: inferencing. There are a number of 
reasons for the choice of this particular strategy: 
firstly, there is a long tradition in developmental psycho­
logy of studying inferences, originating with Piaget,
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Inhelder, and Szeminska (1960); secondly, the development 
of the ability to 'go beyond the information given’ is 
claimed to be of crucial importance in education; and 
thirdly, adult models of memory have stressed that 
remembering often involves generating information from 
an incomplete knowledge base and that inferencing is 
the mechanism by which this is achieved (Collins, Warnock, 
Aiello, and Miller, 1975; Lindsay and Norman, 1972).
4.2 Experiment I: Do children make inferences in spatial
location tasks?
Introduction
This experiment investigated preschool children’s ability 
to use an inferential strategy to supplement what they 
could directly remember in a spatial location task . The 
task required subjects to remember the identity of four 
toy animals hidden at four different locations .
Previous research on indirect retrieval strategies (e.g. 
Salatas and Flavell, 1976b; Keniston arid Flavell, 1979) 
suggests that the skill of accessing one memory in order 
to cue another does not emerge until adolescence. Simili- 
larly, experiments investigating the role of inferential 
skills in spatial memory tasks also suggest these are 
acquired during the school years (Drozdal and Flavell, 
1975; Wellman, Somerville, and Haake, 1979).
If an inferential strategy is used, however, it may operate
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in the following way: if the subjects cannot directly
remember all the necessary information, they may use what 
they can remember to infer likely solutions to the memory 
problem. Thus, subjects who can recall which of the
animals are at three of the locations can infer the iden­
tity of the fourth by elimination, provided they can 
remember the identity of the four animals originally 
hidden. Other variants of the same strategy are possible; 
children remembering the locations of two of the animals 
may guess the locations of the final two animals, with 
a 50% chance of getting both correct. A complete analysis 
of the expected distributions is presented in Footnote 1.
The analysis leads to a specific prediction: if children 
are using an inferential strategy more children should 
score • >four than three items correct. This prediction is 
independent of what the children directly remember.
Pilot studies of older children and adults suggested
that this strategy may well be employed. The present study 
was designed to investigate whether such processes occur­
red in preschool children.
Method '•
Subjects: The subjects were 51 children from a number of
different playgroups in the St. Andrews area, who ranged
in age from 3; 0-5; 2. The children were dividend into
three age groups: 3;0-3;9 (n=14, mean age=3;5); 3;10-
4;6(.n=22, mean age=4;3); and 4; 7-5; 2 (n=15, mean age=4;10).
Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls were present
in each age sample, two children in the youngest group failed 
to complete the experiment and are excluded from the above 
description and the analysis.
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Procedure: The children were tested individually and
were shown four toy farm animals, a toy policeman and
*
four plastic cups. The animals, a pig, a sheep, a dog, 
and a duck, ranged in height from 0.5 cm to 2.5 cm and 
could all be hidden under the cups. The children were 
first asked to name the animals, which they were all 
able to do, although some of the names were idiosyn­
cratic. They were then told that the animals were 
going to play hide-and-seek with the policeman. The 
children were told: 'The policeman's going to close 
his eyes while the animals hide in these houses (gest­
ures to four cups). I want you to keep your eyes open 
and watch where the animals all hide so you can help 
the policeman to find them all.’ At this point the 
policeman doll was moved away from the array, so he 
"couldn’t see" where the animals were hiding. On 
one of the two trials the child hid the animals, and 
on the other they were hidden by the experimenter.
Once the animals were hidden, one under each cup,- 
the policeman declared that he was coming to look for 
them. The policeman approached the first cup and knocked 
on the top of it , saying "Who’s hiding in this little 
house?". After two such attempts without getting any 
response, the policeman asked the children if they 
knew who was hiding in the "house". When the children
had given a response or said they did not know which 
animal was under the cup, the experimenter "opendd the 
door of the house" by lifting the cup and briefly
exposing the hidden animal. The policeman continued
*The cues were arranged in a semicircle in front of the 
child, and care was taken to ensure that obvious spatial 
cues such as one cup being nearer, were avoided. The 
apparatus is shown in Appendix V, Fig. 1.
164
his search until each house had been probed. The 
houses were probed in a random order, and all the 
children received two trials with four animals hiding.
These were counterbalanced as to whether the child
or the experimenter hid the animals on the first trial.
Results
Preliminary analyses indicated that there were no differ­
ences due to sex, and so the— data were collapsed across 
sex. The distribution of scores for the three groups
is shown in Table 1 and Table 2. It is clear that a
large percentage of children did obtain scores of three
correct (20% on the first and 16% on the second trial).
Mxsvt Celt
A 3 (Age) X 2(Identity of hider)^analysis of variance 
was conducted on the data. The effect of age was signifi­
cant (F (2,48)=3.84, p<0,03), but the identity of the hider 
made no difference to recall (F (1,48)=2.86, p>0.05).
Discussion
The distribution analysis generated a prediction about 
the probability of various scores if the children were 
using the strategy. This prediction was not supported by 
the data. Many children obtained scores of three correct 
(21%, 14% and 20% of the respective age groups). Also 
the prediction that there should be more scores of. four 
than three items correct was only verified for one of 
the three groups on one trial only. Although these results 
are suggestive, they do not conclusively demonstrate that 
inferential strategies are not employed. It is just
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possible that many of the children who obtained scores 
of 0, 1 or 2 items do employ the strategy. This specu­
lation cannot be verified without a measure of direct
memory, which is not possible using this procedure.
Evidence from a different source suggest that some of 
the children were using such a strategy. They either 
requested information from the experimenter which would 
enable them to make the inference e.g. ’Which ones 
haven’t I said yet?'. Alternatively they directed such 
enquiries to themselves e.g. ’I’ve said X, Y, and Z, 
now let me see, what does that leave me?’ (without appeal 
to the experimenter).
The second experiment attempted to establish whether 
inferencing would take place, when the information proc­
essing load was reduced, by giving children cues about 
which animals are at previously probed locations, and 
which animals made up the original array.
4.3 Experiment II: Do cues facilitate inferencing?
The first experiment offered weak, evidence that preschool
children are unable to use an elimination-based infer­
ential strategy to increase what they directly remember on 
a spatial location task. There are a number of possible 
reasons why this may be the case: (I) they may be unable 
to remember the animals which constitute the original
array; (2) they may be unable to keep track of the animals
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at previous locations and hence eliminate them as possible 
solutions; and (3) they may be in possession <bf all this 
memory information, but be unable to make the elimination
inference.
Other research in cognitive development suggest inde­
pendent evidence that all these factors may be responsible 
for the absence of strategy use. There is some controversy
in the literature on transitive inferences as to whether
memory for premise information or an inability to combine 
this information,is responsible for developmental trends 
in such tasks (Bresl.ow, 1981; Bryant and Trabasso, 1971; 
Trabasso, 1977). Alternatively experiments on problem 
solving (e.g. Eimas, 1970), suggest difficulties in keeping 
track of previous solution attempts/ and Flavell et al_ 
(1981) and Markman (1977, 1979) document children’s 
inability to monitor their own performance.
The present experiment allowed the children to avoid the
necessity of remembering the original array and monitoring
previous solutions, by providing two types of cues: (1)
Array cues, which consisted of a set of four animals
identical to the animals of the original array: These
cues remained visible throughout the experiment; and’ 
which(2) Monitoring cues,/avoided the nedessity of remembering 
previous solutions by leaving each animal outside the 
cup after that location has been probed.
Thus, children who utilise the cues should possess
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sufficient information to make the inference by the time 
the fourth location is probed. The array cues give 
information about which animals constituted the original
set. The children should also be able to eliminate as
possible solutions those animals which are visible at the 
previously probed locations.
The experiment addressed a number of questions concerning 
the development of cuing and inferential skills:-
(1) Do preschool children spontaneously make use of 
indirect retrieval cues? A number of recent studies have 
shown that whereas young children may be proficient at 
employing high associative cues (Gordon and Flavell, 1977; 
Ritter et al, 1973, Expt. I; Ryan et al, 1970),. they are 
poor when the associative relationship is less direct 
^Gordon an<^ Flavell, 1977; Kobasigawaa, 1974). Measures 
of cue use were obtained by direct observation of chil­
dren's eye-movements. The array cues were arranged 
slightly out of the children's line of vision, and moni­
toring cues were placed just behind their cups so they
.. v Appendix V
were partially obscured (see Fig.. In both cases it 
was apparent when either set of cues was used.
(2) If children do look at array and monitoring cues
are they able to use this information to make inferences? 
Again the available data on indirect cue use (Gordon and 
Flavell, 1977; Kobasigawa , 1974) and the research on 
transitive inferences (Breslow, 1981) suggests this may 
not be the case. It should be possible to detect use 
of the inferential strategy by the distribution of memory
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scores. Use. of the strategy should lead to enhanced 
recall at the fourth location to be probed, because at 
this location, children should have sufficient information
to make the inference.
(3) Are children who do not spontaneously utilise the 
cues able to employ the strategy, if their attention is 
drawn to the cues by the experimenter?
It should therefore be possible to detect whether poor 
performance is due to a failure to utilise information 
relevant to the task, or to an inability to make infer­
ences. The experiment also investigates the development 
of indirect cuing skills.
Method
Subjects: The subjects were 128 children who ranged in 
age from 3;0-5;3. They were divided into the same age 
groups as in Experiment I. They were further divided into 
an experimental and a control group consisting of' 67 and 
61 subjects respectively. For the experimental group 
there were 16, 24 and 27 children in each age group, and 
the mean ages were 3;5, 4;1, 4;9 respectively. There 
were 18, 23 and 20 children in the control group with 
mean ages 3?6, 4;2, 4;9 respectively. None of these 
children had participated in the previous experiment'. *
Procedure: The control group of subjects received 
four trials, and the procedure was identical to that 
employed in Experiment I.
* Two subjects in the youngest experimental, and one 
in the youngest„control group,, failed to complete.the 
procedure,- and atre'“excluded "from this description. •'
• The experimental group had two pretrials with the same ' 
procedure, but were given the monitoring and array 
cues on both the third and fourth trials. • The array 
cues were introduced by the experimenter who claimed
that the four cues were "friends” of the animals who
were hiding under the cups, and that the friends 
wanted to watch the game.- The four original animals 
were placed alongside their "friends" and the experi­
menter asked the children whether they noticed anything 
about the animals and their friends. A series of
hints was given, until the children agreed that the 
two sets were the same. The hiding animals were then 
put alongside the cups and the game commenced and 
no further reference was made to the array cues.
After probing eachlocation the experimenter simply did 
not replace the cup over the exposed animal, but 
alongside it, so that the animal was partially obscured 
in the manner'already described. No mention was made 
of the fact that this procedure differed from that 
employed in the first two trials. If a child failed to 
respond at the fourth position to be probed the experi­
menter silently pointed to both array and monitoring 
cues. This was to ensure that inferencing was not due ,
to a lack of information. The experimental-set-up is 
shown in Figure 1 . (Appendix V).
‘ Results
The results of the experiments will be reported as three 
separate sections. The first concerns the direct obser­
vations of cue use, the second the analysis of the memory 
scores, and the final section will examine children’s
failures and errors at the fourth location to be probed.
This final section also includes analysis of the effect 
of the experimenter's prompts.
Cue use
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Cue use was scored in a categorical manner, either chil­
dren used a particular type of cue , or they did not. The 
criterion for use of the monitoring cues was that the 
child scrutinised all the exposed animals after any one 
of the four probes . Array cue use was inferred when the 
children shifted their gaze to the array following the 
probe question. The number of children using the monitoring 
cues on neither, one or both of the trials is shown in 
Table 3. Overall cue use was high, 81% of children 
made use of monitoring cues. Only two of the youngest
group did not use the cues at all, although there was an 
2increase in cue use with age. A x analysis comparing
the number of children employing cues reveals that the
two older groups are more likely to use cues than the 
2youngest group (X (1) = 6.05, p<0.015). Table 4 shows 
the
array cue use for'three age groups. Fewer children made
use of the array cues than monitoring cues (McEQmar's 
2X =8.93, p<0.01) and there were no developmental differ­
ences in array cue use when the youngest group was com­
2pared with the two older groups (X Cl) = 1.81, p>0.05).
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Distribution of memory scores
The influence of cues on memory performance was- investi­
gated by a 2( cue v. no-cue) x 3(age) x 4(serial position)
for unequal numbers of subjects 
analysis of variance/for the two experimental trials.* 
Children were taken as "remembering" the item, if they 
generated a correct response without prompting by the 
experimenter.
The data are shown in Table 5. There were a number of
significant main effects :age F (2,-122) = 9.44, p<0.00l ; 
in addition, cues significantly influenced performance
F(l, 122) = 28.05, p<0.001 ? and there was a serial 
position effect F(3, 366) = 16.76, p<0.001 . In addition, 
the data suggest that the advantage of cues is limited 
to the last two locations to be probed. This is mani­
fested by an interaction between the presence or absence 
of cues and serial position F(3, 366) = 21.18, p<0.001 . 
Planned comparisons using the Tukey statistic
showed significant differences between cue and no-cue 
groups at third and fourth locations to be probed.**
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
children are using the information afforded by the cues
to make eliminative inferences.
There was no age x cue/no cue or age x serial position 
effect F (2,122) = 1.02, p<0.05, F (6, 366) = 1.33, 
p<0. 05 . Both of these results might have been expected 
if older children make more use of cues, but as Table 5
/** See over (p. 172 .) for FNs.
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* The analysis was conducted on a computer using the 
unequal cell numbers analysis of variance (UNEN) from 
the ALICE statistical package. This programme computes 
within group means and then pools these for the between 
groups analysis. tGrubin, Baner & Walker, 1976).
**The middle and older groups both outperformed the 
youngest group (Neuman-Keuls = 9.47, 13.48; both sig­
nificant at the 0.01 level). The planned Tukey test 
showed that groups with cues performed significantly 
better at the third and fourth locations (CR^ = 29.82, 
p<0.01; CRt = 69.88, p<0.01).
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indicates, there is a ceiling effect for the older 
groups at the final two locations.
Failures at the fourth location
Despite the presence of array and monitoring cues, a
number of children made errors or failed to respond
when the fourth location was probed.. Such failures
accounted for 13% of the responses in the experimental
group. The number of children who always responded
correctly at this location did show a developmental 
2increase. A x analysis comparing the youngest group swith 
2the older children demonstrated this, (x (1) = 10.14, 
p<0.0015). This change is not necessarily the result 
of increased inferencing ability, however, as the measure 
confounds this with changes in cue use and direct mem­
ory. There were a number of reasons why children failed 
to respond correctly at the final location. There were 
seven incorrect responses, four of these followed the 
failure to use the cues, which is likely to be an error 
in direct memory. The other three which followed the 
use of cues, may have resulted from some error in .
inferencing, or may have been a direct memory response.
If children did not respond, or they made an error, 
the experimenter indicated the cues and repeated the 
question. It is clear that failure to use cues is not 
sufficient to explain inference failure; seven of the 
responses came when children had spontaneously looked 
at the cues. So, although the children possessed
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sufficient information to make the inference, they did 
not do so. On ten occasions children failed to respond 
correctly, without using cues, and on five of these 
occasions they did not make the inference even when 
given assistance by the experimenter. It was not poss­
ible to subject these different response patterns to 
statistical analysis, as the number of responses in each 
category were small.
Conclusions
This experiment was designed to investigate children’s 
ability to use indirect retrieval cues in order to employ 
an inferential strategy in spatial memory. The results 
indicated that preschool children do show an increasing 
ability to make use of externally provided information. 
This information enables them to bypass the problems 
of internally storing the information necessary for the 
inferential strategy. It is clear from the serial 
position data that such a strategy is being employed by 
the experimental group. The failure of the control 
group to show the same serial position effect suggests 
that deficits in monitoring and memory skills are two 
reasons why the strategy is not always employed. In 
this respect, the results are consistent with the work 
of Trabasso and his colleagues who argue that one reason 
for young children’s failure on Piagetian transitive 
inference problems results from an inability to retain 
premise information.
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Other data from this experiment suggest there may be 
a number of additional reasons why young children fail 
to use the strategy. Some children were in possession 
of sufficient information to make the inference and yet 
did not do so. This immediately suggests an inability to 
make the inference. However, an alternative possibility 
exists: very young children may well interpret the task 
instructions to remember, as an indication that their 
responses should be generated by direct memory alone, 
and not by other means such as inferencing. This could 
also explain error responses at the final location.
Young children may attempt direct memory solutions even 
when simplen; more certain, means are available. While 
this experiment indicates that premise information alone 
is not sufficient for the inference, it does not differ­
entiate between an inability to inference and a failure 
to evoke the inference in appropriate situations. 
Experiment IV tests these alternative explanations.
A number of conclusions may be drawn about why young 
children fail to manifest this particular strategy. The 
advantage of the cued over the experimental group suggests 
that deficits in auxiliary skills such as memory for 
the original array, or monitoring previous solutions, 
may leave the child with insufficient information to 
employ the strategy. Interestingly, the data on cue 
use indicate that older children are better able to bypass 
such monitoring and memory deficits by their more 
active use of external cuing aids. Other reasons for
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failure may be more directly related to the inferencing 
skill itself. The failure to respond correctly when 
given sufficient information may be due to an inability
to make inferences or result from the failure to access
the relevant skill. This failure to evoke the appropriate 
strategy could be due to a belief that only direct 
memory solutions are appropriate to the task.
4.4 Experiment III: What type of cues facilitate
inferencing?
The previous experiment suggested that preschool chil­
dren failed to employ inferential strategies
'because of deficits in memory for the original array 
and monitoring of previous solutions. However, as the 
experiment provided both forms of information in the cued 
condition, it was not clear which deficit was the more 
crucial. The present experiment employed the same 
procedure, and provided either array or monitoring cues, 
but not both. It should therefore be possible to deter­
mine which.is the more important for the inferencing : 
strategy.
Method
■ Subjects: The subjects were 68 children in the age 
range 3;2 - 5;1. They were divided into the same age 
groups as in the previous experiments. Thirty-five 
children received only monitoring cues. There were 
9, 14 and 12 children in each age group respectively, and
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their mean ages were 3;5, 4;2 and 4;8 respectively.
The remaining 33 children were given only array cues. 
There were 9, 9 and 15 in each age group respectively
and their mean ages were 3;5, 4;2 and 4;9 respectively.
Ibne of these children had participated in any previous 
experiment. *
Procedure: The procedure was similar to that used 
in the previous experiments. The children were given
two trials without cues and then received two more
trials with either array or monitoring cues. The 
' instructions varied slightly for the two groups, as
the set of instructions used to draw attention to 
the array cues was, of course, omitted in the mon­
itoring condition. The experimental set up is ident­
ical to Fig. 1.* * except that each group only received 
one cue type.
Results
The results are reported in the same format as the last 
experiment, i.e. cue use, memory scores and failures at 
the fourth location are analysed separately.
Cue use;
Cue use was measured exactly as in Experiment II, and 
the results largely replicate that experiment. Tables 
6 and 7 show the number of children who employed moni­
toring and array cues on the two trials. As Table 6 
indicates,use of monitoring cues was again frequent with 
80% of subjects using the cues on both trials. There 
were more children using monitoring cues in the two
‘ One child in the middle age group failed to complete 
the procedure and was excluded from the analysis.
** See Appendix V.
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2older groups than in the younger group X (i) = 4.52, 
p<0.03.
As in Experiment II, more children made use of monitoring 
2than array cues (x (2)=17.31, p<0.001). The overall 
percentage of children using array cues on both trials 
was 30%, and there were no age differences for cue use 
X2(l)=0.03, p>0.05.
Cue use was also directly compared with that in Experiment
II. There was no difference between the experiments for 
2 'monitoring cues, x (2)=0.000l, p>0.05. However a differ- 
2ence was found for array cues:x (2)=8.00, p<0.01. This 
was due largely to the oldest groups showing a reduced 
tendency to use cues in Experiment III.
Distribution of memory scores
The percentage of correct responses at each location is 
shown in Table 8. As can be seen, monitoring and array 
cues seem to have very different effects. Elevation of
recall occurred at the third and fourth locations to
be probed only with monitoring cues.
The data were subjected to a 3 (age) x 2 (cue type) 
unequal cell numbers J
x 4 (serial position)/analysis of variance.* Although 
changes in performance with age did not reach signifi­
cance there was the distinct suggestion of a developmental 
trend. (F(2, 62)=2.72, p=0.07). There were also
* Again the UNEN programme from the ALICE package was 
' used.
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significant main effects of cue type (F(l, 62) = 12.77, 
p<0.001) and serial position (F (3, 186)= 5.71, p<0.001) 
and a cue type x serial position interaction (F(3,186) =
3.24, p=0.02), which were due to the superiority of 
monitoring cues, and their effect in elevating recall 
at the third and fourth serial positions. Planned Tukey 
tests showed both these locations were significantly better 
recalled with monitoring cues (CRT=14.79, p<0.05, CRT=
27.03, p<0.01). The results of the present experiment 
were also compared with those of Experiment II. Performance
on these trials is illustrated in Table 9. This table
shows a clear differentiation in the usefulness of the
different cue types. Performance is comparable for the 
no-cue and array-cue conditions, which show no elevation at 
the fourth location. In contrast, performance is elevated 
at these locations for the other two cue conditions, when 
monitoring cues are present. The data were analysed in a 
3 (age groups) x 4 (cue types) x 4 (serial position) unequal 
cell numbers ANOVA and the results are shown in Table 10.
As can be seen from this table, the two groups who received 
monitoring and array and monitoring cues, performed better 
than the array and control groups. The effect of cue type 
was significant (F (3,184)=12.37, p<0.0001). More importantly 
cue type interacted with serial position (F 9, 552) =6.31, 
p<0.0001) which -resulted from enhanced recall at the third 
and fourth locations. Planned comparisons using Tukey*s test 
indicated that both groups who received monitoring cues
showed significant elevation of recall at the third and fourth
♦location. This was not true of the group who were
* The respective Tukey values for the third location were 27.75 
and 22.83, and for the fourth location 46.06 and 53.51 for 
the monitoring and monitoring and array cue groups. All 
these are significant (p<0.01)
provided with array cues only, due to the use of the 
inferential strategy. Strategy use in the two monitoring 
conditions was sufficient to produce an overall serial 
position effect (F(3, 552)=18.74, p<0.0001). Overall
performance did increase with age (F(.2, 184) =4.42 ,
*p<0.02). ' There was a suggestion that older children may 
make more active use of cues, although this effect was 
not significant F(6, 552)=1.80, p=0.09.
Failures at the fourth location
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Of the children who received monitoring cues, 23% made 
errors. Half the errors followed a failure to use the
cues. Following spontaneous or experimenter-induced cue 
use 75% of the children were able to give correct 
responses. Comparison with monitoring and array group 
in the previous experiment suggests that although the 
error rate is slightly higher due to the absence of array 
cues in the monitoring condition, there is no significant 
difference in the types of errors made (Fisher Exact 
p=0.30.) Error rates were much higher in the array only 
group, and few children (6%) benefitted from the experi­
menter drawing attention to the cues.. Chi squared 
analysis demonstrated that there were more children making
errors in the array than monitoring condition^both.before 
2 'the experimenter indicated the cues (x (l)=40.00, p<0.001). 
The data suggest that experimenter assistance may well 
benefit subjects when monitoring cues are available but 
be of little use for the array cues.
* A post-hoc Neuman-Ke.uls test showed the two older groups 
outperforming the youngest (CRM_K =23.16,p<0.05, CRN..K =25.30
p<0.05).
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Discussion
The results of the present experiment replicate and 
extend the findings of the previous study. The memory 
data strongly suggest that array and monitoring cues 
differ in their usefulness for the inferential strategy. 
Both the higher performance, and the presence of enhanced 
recall at the later locations onlyr with the monitoring 
cues, indicates that monitoring cues are mainly responsible 
for the strategy use detected in the previous experiment. 
Providing array cues alone does not elevate performance 
above the control, or give serial position effects, which 
suggests that array cues alone are of little benefit. In 
addition, there is weak evidence from the memory data 
that older children may make more efficient use of monit­
oring cues. A more extended discussion of this finding 
will be presented later.
These conclusions are supported by the analysis of errors. 
Errors occurred much more frequently with array cues, 
and the experimenter drawing attention to the array cues 
did not seem to assist inferencing as it did with the 
monitoring group. It is interesting that only 6% of the 
array only group improved performance when the cues were 
indicated, when a random guess at one member of the array 
would have improved it by 25%. This would seem to suggest 
the problem for young children lies in realising how 
the array cues might be used. The opposite holds for
monitoring cues. An animal cannot be in two places at
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once - if it has already been exposed it clearly cannot 
be under the remaining cups. The use of monitoring cues
is therefore much more obvious. The error data are
consistent with Experiment II, in that all the same types 
of errors are detected. Thus, some children fail to make 
the inference,but when provided with monitoring infor­
mation are able to do so. A small proportion of the 
subjects were unable to give the correct solution even 
when such information was provided. Other children res­
ponded incorrectly, but gave a correct solution when 
the monitoring cues were indicated, suggesting they may 
have attempted to solve the problem by memory. The 
differential usefulness of the two cue types is .also 
reflected in the direct measurements of cue use. The 
monitoring cue data are almost identical to the previous 
experiment, with the majority of subjects making use 
of them. In addition, fewer children use array than 
monitoring cues in this experiment. One result does 
differ from the previous experiment. Array cue use 
is less frequent than in that experiment. It is the 
oldest group who are responsible for the reduced use of 
array cues in Experiment III, which seems to indicate 
that some children at this age level are sensitive to 
the fact that array cues do not aid memory. It cannot 
be argued, however, that this reduction in array cue use 
is responsible for the absence of array cues effects on 
memory, because over 60% of subjects were using array 
cues in this experiment, and also because array cues do 
not assist performance when they are presented along with
183
monitoring cues.
The major finding of this study is that the presence of 
monitoring rather than array cues assist memory. This 
suggests that young children have distinct difficulties 
in monitoring previous solutions in memory problems. This 
monitoring deficit may, however, be more general? for 
the younger children’s persistence in using array cues 
which do not benefit memory, indicates they are not 
evaluating the effects of their memory activities.
4.5 Experiment IV: Are there deficits in underlying
inferential skills?
The previous set of experiments suggest a number of 
reasons for the failure to employ an inferential strat­
egy in memory. Children may lack auxiliary skills such 
as monitoring which means they have insufficient informs 
ation to make the inference. Even when such information 
is provided in the form of cues, children may sometimes 
fail to utilise it. Further, even when cue use is 
spontaneous or when it is experimenter induced, a number 
of children fail to make the inference despite the fact 
that they have sufficient information to do so. In 
the previous experiments I have argued there are two 
possible explanations for this failure. Children may simply 
be unable to execute the necessary operations, i.e. they 
are hnab1e to inference. Alternatively, they may be
influenced by the perceived demand characteristics of
• 184
the task. They may obey the instruction to remember
too literally, and rely on direct memory, to the
exclusion of inferential strategies.
The present experiment attempted to establish whether
children failed to make inferences when there were no
memory instructions, but the children were all in
possession of sufficient information to make the infer­
ence. Failure under such circumstances cannot be due
to attempts to solve the problem by means of direct
memory, and would seem to result from an inability to
inference.
If it were discovered that children in possession of
sufficient information failed to make inferences, this 
would have interesting implications for the debate on 
transitive inferences. While Bryant (1974) and Trabasso 
(1977) argue that being in possession of premise inform­
ation is necessary and sufficient for inferencing, this 
position has been opposed by Breslow (1981), who argues 
for changes in ability to inference.
The task employed in the present experiment was a modif­
ication of that used in earlier experiments. It differed 
from those experiments because the children did not 
observe the animals being hidden, and were given no 
instructions to remember. All children had previously 
overlearnt the set of animals in the array, and were 
given monitoring information explicitly by the experimenter.
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They were thus in possession of information sufficient 
to make the inference, and were simply asked if they 
knew the identity of the animal at the final location.
No direct memory solution was possible, because the 
children had not observed the animal being hidden, and 
so inferencing was the only means available for solu­
tion. None of the children had taken part in any of 
the previous studies.
Method
Subjects: The subjects were 59 children in the age 
range 3;0 - 5;3. They were divided into the same age 
groups as the previous experiments. There were 11, 26 
and 22 children in each group and the mean ages were 
3;6, 4;3 and 4;11 respectively.
Procedure: The procedure was a modified version of 
that employed in the previous experiments. Before 
the start of the experiment itself, the children 
were given a series of pretrials until they could 
correctly name all the animals in the array on two 
consecutive trials. They were then told to close 
their eyes while the animals were hiding. Each 
location was probed, and at the final location the 
experimenter supplied monitoring information by 
pointing to the exposed animals .and saying, 'There's 
the (named the three animals), now who's hiding 
under here? (indicating to the final location)*. If 
children gave a response, the experimenter expressed
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his amazement and asked them how they knew the 
identity of the concealed animal although they had 
not seen it being hidden. It was possible by this 
means to elicit justifications of inferencing from
the children. All children received one trial.
Results
The percentage of children at each age level who made 
the inference is shown in Table 11. There was a sig­
nificant increase in performance with age, with the 
two older groups performing significantly better than 
the younger (Fisher exact p = 0.037). The figure also 
shows what percentage of children giving correct 
responses to the inference question were also able
to give justifications. The ability to give justi- 
2fications also increased with age (x (2) =5.97, 
p<0.05) with the older outperforming the youngest
group (x 2(1) = 5.21, p<0.03).
Discussion
The present experiment eliminated the possibility 
that strategy failure resulted from lack of informa­
tion or from the misunderstanding that the task required 
direct memory solutions only. The results therefore 
suggest that one reason why some children fail to 
demonstrate the inferential strategy is because they
cannot make inferences. Children who are unable to
demonstrate the strategy in the simplified procedure
of this experiment are unlikely to exhibit inferencing 
on the memory task. We cannot conclude from this, 
however, that an inability to access the correct strategy 
plays no role in the memory task. Failures of this 
type may well occur? what the present experiment 
demonstrates is that failure to access is not the only 
explanation of strategy failure when the child has
sufficient information to make the inference. The
results would also seem to support the position of
Breslow (1981) on transitive in ferences. He mentions 
that premise information is necessary but not sufficient 
for inferencing - a claim which is consistent with the 
findings of this experiment, for a different type of
inference.
None of the 59 children made errors in inferencing.
This suggests that the errors made on the memory task 
were the result of erroneous direct memory solutions.
If this is the case, then the errors on the memory 
task are themselves evidence for the use of memory 
when inferential strategies are possible.
The finding that the ability to give justifications 
of strategy use increases with age has important theor­
etical and methodological implications. The theoretical 
implication is that there may be a number of different 
ways in which a cognitive skill can be in the repertoire.
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In this case, younger children may be able to use a
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strategy some time before they are able to describe it. 
The methodological point is that verbal protocols are 
not suitable as a means to tapping strategy use, 
particularly in this age group. Young children may 
well be employing a strategy but be unable to describe 
their activity.
4.6 Inferences as memory strategies and the failure to
employ strategies
The group of experiments just described had three
main aims:
(1) To investigate when inferences are employed to 
supplement direct memory, and to provide explanations 
as to why young children do not employ such a strategy;
(2) To assess whether young children are able to make 
use of indirect cues to aid recall;
(3) To assess the intentional character of the young 
child’s memory behaviours.
Inferences
The exact level of inferencing is impossible to assess 
directly in these experiments, because of the possibility 
of direct memory solutions. The fact still remains, 
however, that the groups with monitoring cues generally 
performed twice as well as control groups, despite 
the presence of ceiling effects. These results are 
interesting because they apparently contradict two
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generalisations often made about preschoolers, that 
they do not often make use of memory strategies (Brown, 
1975; Flavell, 1970) and that they lack logical 
abilities (Piaget, 1946).
If we deal first with the use of strategies, a number 
of recent studies have convincingly demonstrated the 
use of simple strategies by this age group (e.g. Wellman 
et al, 1975; Yussen, 1974; Yussen et al, 1975). The 
eliminative inference may in reality be simpler than 
its complexity in logical terms would have us believe. 
This is especially true if the environment provides 
cues which avoid the necessity of monitoring previous 
solutions , as in the case of these experiments. The 
formal logical account might describe the process as 
the internal search of the original array, eliminating 
previous solutions. However, the process may be more 
accurately described in the present experiments as a 
realisation that the animals exposed at previously 
searched locations cannot possibly also be concealed 
at-the final location. This suggests that the findings 
of the present experiment may not in reality contradict 
the research of Piaget, because in the present experi­
ment the presence of external cues simplifies the 
making of the inferences in two ways: (a) it reduces 
the information processing demands on the child by 
avoiding the necessity for internal storage of premise 
information; (b) the presence of the cues' suggests the
use of the inferential routine to the child.
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Explanations of strategy failure
The experiments also suggest a number of reasons why 
children may not employ the strategy.
(a) Auxiliary skills Experiment II indicated that
the
inferencing was vastly increased when/problems of
monitoring and memory for the original array were
bypassed. Experiment III established that deficits 
in monitoring of previous solutions was the more crucial 
of these deficits in explaining strategy failure. These
results are consistent with the literature on transitive
inferences, in which performance is massively improved 
by pretraining on premi.se information Ce.g. Trabasso, 
1977). The research of Eimas (1970) also shows thatI
7-year-old children have difficulty in keeping track 
of previously rejected incorrect hypotheses in problem 
solving tasks. Thus, deficits in skills other than 
those directly under test may explain why inferences are 
not employed.
(b) ' Failure to seek out relevant information Experiments 
II and III suggest that a small number of children
may fail to demonstrate inferencing even when cues are 
provided, not because they cannot make inferences, but 
because they fail to make use of the information 
provided. We might expect this type of deficit to 
have decreased with age, given that older children 
made more use of the monitoring cues. However, the num­
ber of children showing this type of deficit was small, 
and so it was impossible to test the hypothesis directly.
In general, the likelihood of this type of failure
will depend very much on the way in which cue inform­
ation is provided. It has already been argued that 
the way in which monitoring cue information is to be 
used is almost self-evident. Array cues offer a less
obvious source of information. In addition it seems
that the information afforded by array cues is not
useful to children of this age. More will be said about 
this type of failure in the discussion of cue use.
(c) Failure to select the appropriate routine Another 
reason why inferencing may not be employed is that
an alternative means of solution is available. It
is highly likely, given the task instructions, that
some children selected a direct memory solution.
Experiment IV found that no children who made inferences
produced errors. Children do make errors, however, in
Experiments II and III. This may well be because they 
direct memory
are attempting such/solutions. One problem, with the 
error based measure is that it ignores those children 
who rely on the direct memory solution, but who are 
correct, and are thus indistinguishable from children 
who use the inferential solution. Again, selection 
errors may well be highly task-dependent. The monitoring 
cues in these experiments make the strategy obvious, but 
the memory development literature is full of demon­
strations of production deficits, when children fail to 
spontaneously manifest a strategy and yet can be 
induced to use it with minimal training.
(d) Inability to use the strategy It has just been argued
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that children may fail to use the strategy because 
they attempt alternative means of solution, e.g. direct 
memory. Experiment IV eliminated this possibility, 
and also pretrained children to give them the informa­
tion necessary for the inference. Despite this, some 
children still failed the task, which suggests that 
they may be unable to make inferences. If this is the
case, it is hardly surprising that they fail to manifest 
9the strategy.
Cues
In many ways, the conclusions concerning cue use con­
verge on those made about inferencing. Firstly, there 
is an apparent anomaly with related research; other 
studies have suggested that young children’s cue use 
is highly limited in nature. Preschoolers may be 
capable of utilising identical or highly-associated 
objects as cues at encoding (Geis and Lange f 1976; .
Gordon and Flavell, 1977; Ryan et al, 1970) but their 
performance is massively reduced when cues are indirect 
or esoteric (Gordon and Flavell, 1977; Ritter , 1978) 
or if cued retrieval must be exhaustive (Kobasigawa, 1974, 
1977). • •
9 It is possible that the inability to produce a strategy 
is not as distinct from the failure to access it, 
as this analysis suggests. It may be that the 
children who failed to inference in Experiment IV 
could be induced to do so if explicit enough instruc­
tions were provided. The distinction between 
inability— and-access-may—not therefore be as sharp 
as has been argued.
At first glance, the results obtained with the moni­
toring cues would appear to contradict these findings.
Very young children are apparently bypassing defici'ts 
in their monitoring ability by utilising information 
about previous solutions provided by the experimenter.
A priori, both monitoring and array cues must be charac­
terised as indirect, because both require combination 
with some other information for solution. However, 
as I have argued.in the section on inference failures, 
the nature of the task makes it extremely obvious to 
see how monitoring cues might be used. This may 
explain why even very young children have little diffi­
culty in seeing how the monitoring cues are to be used, 
and in actually using them. '
The data on array cue use support the claim that pre­
schoolers’ cue use is limited in nature. In the array 
condition children at all ages made use of the cues, 
despite the fact that array cue use had no effect on
memory. It is as though the children realise that in 
some way the cues ought to be useful, but cannot quite 
see how th$ymight be used. Cue use may very well be 
induced by the fact that the experimenter has directly 
referred to the array cues and stressed their relation 
to the concealed animals! Similar results were found 
in the monitoring and array condition where again there 
is a high level of array cue use, without memory pay­
* An additional factor may be the direction of the
experimenter’s eye gaze. It may be that the children look 
at the cues because the experimenter does so. This could 
be examined by conducting the experiment with the 
experimenter behind a screen.
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offs.10 Interestingly the use of array cues seemed to 
be context-dependent. Array cue use was significantly 
increased by the presence of monitoring cues. In contrast, 
monitoring cue use was independent of the presence of 
array cues. We may therefore conclude that although 
preschool children may make increasing use of indirect 
cuing strategies, such as using the monitoring cues, 
the exact nature of the cues used means that the results
are not inconsistent with other recent research. The
data on array cue use suggests that young children have 
difficulty in making use of more indirect forms of cues. 
Even at this age, children do show some sensitivity to 
cue usefulness, with the two older groups looking substan­
tially more at monitoring than array cues.
The finding that young children may engage in "strategic” 
behaviour without memory pay-offs may suggest an important 
mechanism in the development of strategies. Particular 
situations may elicit certain behaviours in children.
Some of these behaviours may well be inappropriate (e.g. 
array cue use), but it is only by engaging in a number
of such behaviours that a child can discover or be instr­
ucted which of these have memory pay-offs and should be
10 A similar argument has been advanced by Ryan et 
al (1970) in their study of preschoolers’ use of 
pictures to cue hidden animals. They suggested that 
young children may place pictures of animals.out­
side their hiding places because such matching 
behaviour isa"high-frequency behavioural response". 
The difference between the Ryan et al study and 
the present ones, is that in their study the eli­
cited behaviour always had memory payoffs.
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retained in the repertoire of strategies.
4.7 Experiment V: Does self-assessment relate to cue
use?
The experiments on cue use suggested a number of inter­
esting results:
(a) Some children make very little use of cues;
(b) There is an increase with age in the use of the 
monitoring cues which do benefit memory;
(c) Some children make use of the array cues, which 
apparently do not aid memory.
One possible explanation for some of these deficits may 
lie in children’s inability to assess the accuracy of 
their own performance. A number of studies have found 
massive overestimations in 7-year-old children's ability 
to assess their own performance on memory tasks (Brown, 
1978; Flavell et al, 1970; Kelly et al, 1976; Yussen and 
Levy, 1975). If children genuinely believe their per­
formance will be excellent, it is not surprising that 
they fail to employ strategies, because there seems little 
need to do so. Unfortunately, the two studies which 
have attempted to find the predicted relationship between 
prediction and strategy use (Flavell et al, 1970; Kelly 
et al, 1976) have failed to do so.
Pilot studies attempting to obtain predictions from 
preschoolers encountered severe difficulties, so children
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were asked to assess performance after rather than before 
completing the task. The same argument holds for post­
diction and prediction, for if children believe they 
have performed well without using strategies, there is 
no necessity for employing them. Other studies have 
not investigated this possible relationship, because they 
have studied older children, who are usually remarkably 
good at postdiction (Berch and Evans, 1973? Masur et 
al, 1973). The lack of post-diction data available for 
this age group also offered a further reason for conduc­
ting the study.
The first study therefore had a number of aims:
(1) To assess preschool children’s ability to assess 
their own memory performance (post-diction )?
(2) To investigate whether self-assessment was related 
to cue use, in particular, whether young children's 
failure to employ strategies can be traced to overestim­
ation of their own performance;
(3) To assess whether post-diction was related to the
type of strategy used. In particular we might expect
children who are better at self-assessment to use only 
• can
monitoring cues, because they/detect that array cues do 
not influence memory.
‘ Subjects: The subjects were 67 children in the age 
range 3;0-5;3. They were divided into the usual age
groups with 16, 24, and 27 children in each age group
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respectively. The mean ages were 3;5, 4;1, and 4; 9 re­
spectively. All children had participated in Experiments II 
or III some two or three months previously. *
Procedure: The experimental procedure was essentially the same
as Experiments II and III. The children were given a number
of pre-trials in which the experimenter demonstrated what was
required/ by giving post-diction responses himself. The
children were then given two memory trials in which no cues
were presented. After recall was completed on each trial/
the experimenter exposed all the hidden animals and asked the
children to make post-diction judgements ("Show me which ones
you remembered in the right places"). There then followed
two trials with both monitoring and array cues as in
Experiment II. No post-diction judgements were requested for
these trials: The.experimental set-up is depicted in Fig. 1, 
Appendix V
Results
Table 12 indicates the extent to which young children over­
estimate their own performance. On average children over­
estimated what they had remembered correctly by 70%. Errors 
were almost exclusively over-estimations, and on 51 out of a 
possible 134 occasions the children incorrectlyclaimed to 
have remembered all the items on a trial correctly (an ‘all 
right' response). Only one child underestimated his memory, 
although five other children failed to correctly identify 
individual items they had correctly remembered.
* One child in the youngest group failed to complete the 
experiment and is not included in the above statement or 
the analysis.
Children were scored by item according to whether they
correctly stated whether they had remembered the item
or not. The scores were subjected to a 3 (Age) x 2 
unequal cells
(Trial)/ANOVA.* There was a main effect of age (F (.2 , 64) 
=4.01, p=0.02) and no other effects were significant. **
In order to investigate whether children who overestimate 
the efficiency of their memories fail to employ strat­
egies, children were classified as cue users if they 
utilised cues on both possible trials. The children 
were also classified for their monitoring ability: if 
they gave two incorrect ’all right' responses, they 
were deemed overestimators; if they gave no incorrect
'all right' responses they were classified as realistic 
The two
estimators./ Children who did not fall into either of 
these categories were discarded for the purpose of this 
analysis. The relationship between monitoring ability
and cue use is indicated in Table 13. A Fisher Exact
analysis was conducted to see whether post-diction skill 
was related to tendency to use cues. The cue.use data
were dichotomised as to whether cues were or were not
used. Children who were bad at post-dieting were signi­
ficantly less likely to make use of cues (Fisher exact 
p=0.03). It was also predicted that children who were
better at post-dieting should also be more likely to use
2 * 'only monitoring cues. A x analysis was conducted on
all those children who used cues, but post-diction skill
was’ not predictive of efficiency of cue selection 
2X (l)=1.08, p>0.05. However, it is possible that by
* Again the ALICE UNEN statistical package was used.
** Post-hoc comparisons by Neuman-Keuls showed the oldest group 
performed better than the youngest (CR =51.14, p4_o. 05)
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dichotomising children into good or bad post-dictors we 
lose some of the data. One initial prediction was that 
children who made use of monitoring cues alone, should 
be better at post-diction than those who used array 
cues. It was found that children who used monitoring 
cues on two trials formed 84% of the sample, and these 
were divided according to whether they used array cues 
on 0, 1, or 2 trials. The mean post-diction scores 
(compiled as for the ANOVA described above) for the 
three groups were 5.82, 6.09, and 5.20. ”T"tests did 
not support the prediction that children who use monito­
ring and array cues should be better at post-dieting 
than children who use monitoring and array cues on both 
trials Ct (^^O. 73, p=0.47). In fact, children using 
array cues on one trial were actually superior at 
assessing their own performance although this difference 
was not significant (t =0.41, p=0.68).
Conclusions -
One major result of this experiment is to document young 
children's inability to assess the accuracy of their 
performance on this type of task. Their errors consis­
ted almost exclusively of overestimations, which averaged 
70% above their actual level of performance. Although 
other studies such as those of Berch and Evans (1973) and 
Masur et al (1973) report that self-assessment is almost 
at ceiling, they in fact tested children 2-3 years older 
than those in the present sample. Indeed it is not
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difficult to see why performance should be so poor. In 
order to respond to the experimenters request to "tell 
me how many you remembered in the right places" the 
children must retain their own pattern of responses 
throughout the trial, and then compare them with the 
’correct solutions’ on questioning. Alternatively they 
may remember each location and tag it with information 
as to whether their response was correct. In either 
case, it is clear that information processing demands 
are high, because of the demands on memory and comparative 
skills. It was also proposed that the ability to assess 
one's own performance might be related to cuing strate­
gies. There was weak support for the prediction that 
children who vastly overestimate their own memory (as 
many of this sample did) should see no need to employ 
cuing strategies. However the strong version of the 
hypothesis does not hold, because almost all the chil­
dren who claimed to have perfect memories did make some 
use of cues. This should not be the case if they are 
influenced by their estimates. The results of the 
study are thus consistent with those of Flavell et al
(1970) and Kelly et al (1976) who found little or no 
relation between prediction measures and strategy use.
There was also little evidence that self-assessment skills
related in any way to the type of cue selected. Children 
who showed optimal cue use, i.e. they used monitoring 
cues only, did not perform better on the self-assessment
tests, than other groups. Before rejecting any type
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of relationship between cue selection and self-assessment, 
it is important to consider two other possibilities. 
Children may well realise that performance is improved 
when using monitoring and array cues but be unable to 
isolate which cue type is responsible. They may therefore 
persist with both types. Alternatively, we may argue 
that insufficient measures of self-assessment have been
taken because there is no reason why assessment scores 
on the previous two memory trials should directly relate 
to performance on the trials with cues. Tiny relationship 
between cue use and self-assessment may critically 
depend on judgements made on' cued trials, because any 
decision about strategy efficiency is going to require 
a comparison of performance on memory trials with 
performance on cued trials.
4.8 Experiment VI: Does self-assessment relate to
type of cues used?
The present experiment attempts to eliminate the con- 
monitoringfounding of / and array cues, by presenting the 
cue types separately. It was argued that cue selection 
may depend critically on comparisons on trials with 
and without cues, and so four self-assessment measures
were taken i.e. one on each of the trials.
If self-assessment does affect strategy selection we 
should expect a number of relationships to hold: first, 
children who vastly overestimate their own performance
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should see no need for strategies, and consequently not 
use them. Also we might expect cue use to relate to 
self-assessment. Thus, children who accurately check 
their own performance should realise the usefulness of 
monitoring cues and hence make maximum use of them. Con­
versely, they should detect that array cues do not 
increase performance and therefore hot use them. We 
should consequently predict that children making use of 
monitoring cues should be accurate at self-assessment, 
whereas the opposite should be the case for those using 
array cues. Finally, cue selection should be related 
to perceived changes in performance when cues are used. 
Thus, we might expect children who use cues and accurately 
check their performance to realise that the improvement 
is due to cue use. They should therefore retain the 
strategy. If, of course, perceived performance drops 
when cues are used then we should expect use of the strat­
egy to be discontinued. ' ,
There are thus three separate hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between post-diction and cue use:
(a) Children who overestimate memory on the two initial
trials when no cues are present should not use cues 
when they are provided. •
(b) Children who are good at monitoring should use 
monitoring cues and not use array cues. No such diff­
erentiation should occur for the group who are poor at 
monitoring.
(c) Changes in performance should be related to monitoring.
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If children perceive that their performance is improved 
they should persist with their current strategy. If 
performance is not improved by cue use, they should not 
maintain that strategy.
It is important that hypothesis (a) is subjected to 
test, because the results of the last experiment suggest 
some evidence for this claim. In contrast, other experi­
ments have found no such relationship (Flavell et al,
1970? Kelly et al, 1970). The rationale for hypothesis 
(c) is derived from experiments which suggest that infor­
mation about performance change can influence strategy 
maintenance (e.g. Borkowski et al, 1976; Kennedy and 
Miller, 1976). In those experiments such information 
was provided by the experimenter: the present study 
investigates whether children use information they them­
selves have generated.
Method
' Subjects: The subjects were 68 children divided into 
the usual age groups. Thirty five children received mon­
itoring cues and 33 received array cues. There were 
9, 14, and 12 children in the monitoring group (mean 
ages 3;5, 4;2, and 4;8) and 9, 9, and 15 children in
the array group (mean ages 3;5, 4;2, 4;9). All children had 
participated in Experiments II or III some 6 months previously.
Procedure: The procedure was identical to that employed 
in Experiment V except that after every trial the 
children were asked to assess the accuracy of their
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performance, and children were given either array or 
monitoring cues, not both.
Results
The self-assessment data for the three age groups under 
the different cueing conditions are illustrated in Table 
14. The results for the no cue condition replicate 
the data reported in the previous experiment, and for
all three conditions children overestimate their actual 
memory scores by 71% . Again a large proportion of the 
overestimations are contributed by those children who 
claimed erroneously to have remembered every item corr­
ectly on all of the trials. Altogether 24/68 children
incorrectly claimed to be completely correct on all 
completely
trials, and a further 8 claimed to be/correct on three 
of the trials. Again, there were few failures to identify 
items correctly remembered, and only two children under­
estimated their memory aggregates. It is interesting 
to note that despite the inaccuracy of children’s 
absolute estimates of memory performance, they were to 
some extent sensitive to the changes in performance 
resulting from monitoring cue use. Thus in all three 
age groups, performance assessments were higher in the 
monitoring cue condition.
The data were analysed separately for the groups who
received monitoring and array cues, and analysis took ,the 
for unequal cell numbers*
form of two 2 (Cue/Mo-Cue) x / (Age) ANOVA'^i The data
* Again UNEN from the ALICE package was used.
205
were scored in the manner described in the previous 
experiment, with one point being given for a correct 
response as to whether or' not the item had been remem­
bered. Both analyses found main effects of age, but 
there were no other effects. Thus, there were develop­
mental trends for the group who received monitoring 
cues (F(2, 64)=3.97, p<0.02),*but there was no differ­
ence in assessment accuracy between the cue and no cue 
conditions. A developmental trend was also evident in 
the array cue analyses (F(2, 62)=3.32, p<0.05)J but again 
there was no effect of creing Thus, although children’s 
assessments of memory increase in accuracy with age, they - 
are not influenced by whether or not they \ are employ­
ing cues.
The data are again amenable to the investigation of the 
overestimation hypothesis (see Experiment V). The hy­
pothesis that gross overestimators were less likely to 
make use of cues than children who were accurate at self­
assessment was not verified (X (l)=0.44, p>0.05). In 
addition, 14 of the 24 overestimators used cues on both 
trials. Finally, it was found that overestimators were 
indistinguishable from accurate self-assessors in their 
use of both types of cues.
Children were also classified according to whether they 
used cues on neither one or both trials. The two separate 
3-way (cue use) ANOVA's for both monitoring and array cues 
indicated there was no difference in monitoring
* Post-hoc comparisons using a Neuman-Keuls test showed 
the two older groups were superior in both conditions. 
CRN__K=22.99 , p< 0.05, CRN_K=24.15, p<0.05).
scores between the three groups, for either of the cue 
types analysed.
The relationship between strategy maintenance and per­
ceived effectiveness of the strategy was also analysed.
All children who incorrectly claimed to have remembered 
all items were rejected from the analysis. Children 
were categorised according to whether their self­
assessment scores indicated they perceived that available 
cues improved, reduced or did not influence memory. It 
was argued that children who used cues, and perceived 
their performance as improving with cues, should maintain 
that strategy over both cued trials. Table 15 shows 
strategy maintenance in the three groups. Two features 
of the table are worth noting: ten children continued to 
employ the strategy despite the fact that they perceived 
it as reducing performance and secondly few children did 
not maintain a strategy they felt did improve performance. 
Thus while fifteen children behaved in accordance with 
initial predictions, sixteen did not.
Conclusions
The majority of the results obtained in the present' 
study are consistent with those of Experiment V. Again 
there is strong evidence for gross overestimation of 
performance by younger children, although this has 
improved somewhat by the age of five. However, although 
children of this age may not be able to estimate absolute
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levels of performance, their estimates do change when 
the level of performance changes, indicating they are 
in some way sensitive to performance. Thus, children’s 
estimates of their performance reflect the fact that 
their actual performance is better when monitoring cues 
are present, i.e. when such cues are present, their 
estimates are higher.
The experiment was also designed to investigate how 
children's estimations of their own performance influence 
their strategy use. There was no evidence that children 
who grossly overestimate memory, and claim to perform 
perfectly, actually make less use of cues than more 
accurate estimators. It was also predicted that chil­
dren who assess accurately should make maximal use of 
monitoring cues, and minimal use of array cues. It 
was found that children following either of these optim­
al strategy paths did not demonstrate greater ability 
to assess their own memory.
However, this may not be conclusive proof that no relat­
ionship holds between self-assessment and strategy use.
The above hypothesis need not be correct that optimal 
strategy users should be best at monitoring their own 
performance. As the assessment data indicate, children 
may not be able to judge their absolute level of perfor­
mance but be able crudely to detect when performance 
changes. It is this skill, rather than absolute judge­
ments, which may be crucial in determining strategy
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maintenance. A more sensitive test of the relationship 
between self-assessment and strategy use follows from 
this. Children should maintain a strategy if it is 
detected as improving memory, and to this end, it is 
not crucial that absolute levels of performance are 
detected, rather than they can isolate a relative change 
in performance. The experiment attempted to assess 
whether strategy maintenance was influenced by children’s 
detection of such relative changes. Again no relationship 
was found, although there may be other post-hoc explana­
tions for this. It may be that children find it difficult 
to remember assessments of performance when they have 
to retain this information across trials. In addition, 
relative changes may be small Ce.g. one or two items) 
and therefore difficult to detect. If ' • '
changes in performance due to strategy use were made 
sufficiently large, it might be that young children 
could detect such changes and consequently modify 
strategy behaviour. *
4.9 ■ •Conclusions
seem to
The last two experiments/provide further counter­
evidence against metamemory theories. In Experiment V, 
two, and in Experiment VI, three hypotheses derived from 
metamemory theory were subjected to test. Only one of 
these hypotheses was supported by the evidence, and it 
was not replicated in the following experiment. .
* This may be a somewhat insensitive test of the relation­
ship between maintena nee and effectiveness because children 
have only two trials in which to assess the effectiveness of 
various cues.
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The strength of these claims must, however, be
questioned in the light of the reservations expressed 
above. If the experiments are indeed insensitive, then 
they do not provide convincing evidence against the 
metamemory hypothesis. Despite this, the results are 
consistent with two studies investigating.:the relationship 
in older children (Flavell et at, 1970; Kelly et al,
1976).
210
CHAPTER 5 FEEDBACK, MONITORING AND STRATEGY ACCESS
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter addresses the problem of strategy access. 
There are both general and specific reasons for addres­
sing the problem. The general reasons lie in the pervas­
iveness of the phenomenon of the production deficit, and 
the implications of this deficit for theories of both 
memory and cognitive development. The specific reasons 
lie in the findings of the previous set of experiments, 
which investigated the use of cueing strategies. Both
Brown (1978) and Flavell (1971) have predicted that 
should be . .access / : related to monitoring skills, but no evidence
was found for this.
Chapters 1 and 2 reviewed a number of studies which 
indicate that young children have problems in spontan­
eously accessing cognitive routines which are in their 
behavioural repertoire and which benefit memory. The
failure to access can occur both before and after instru­
ctions in strategy use, as the Keeney et al (1967) • 
experiment shows. They found that children could be 
induced to engage in simple rehearsal after a minimal 
amount of training, but that children would not continue 
to use the trained strategy when the experimenter no 
longer prompted them to do so. The phenomenon of failure
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to access appropriate cognitive routines is not limited 
to memory, however, for both Bruner (1966) and 
Donaldson (1978) offer accounts of conservation failure 
which appeal to the notion of access. . Other studies 
(e.g. Gelman, 1969) have employed training procedures.<to 
demonstrate that children are capable of generating 
conservation responses some years before the spontaneous 
appearance of these skills. The problem of access is 
therefore an important one, because of its pervasiveness 
in different development domains.
A number of accounts of memory development (e.g. Flavell, 
1971; Brown, 1978) suggest that strategy access may 
be influenced by monitoring: more specifically that 
children's assessments of their memory performance 
determine the nature and extent of their strategy use. 
Experiments V and VI found little evidence for the pre­
dicted relationship. It was suggested that there may 
be a number of reasons for this: (a) children may not 
monitor accurately; (b) they may not be able to retain 
the results of the assessments of performance over trials, 
and thus not be in a position to compare any changes 
in performance resulting from the use of different 
strategies; (c) they may actually have difficulty in 
making the comparison between differences in performance;
(d) they may not correctly attribute such changes to 
changes in strategy use.
Some recent studies of strategy maintenance provide
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evidence that these factors may be important. The 
experiments of Kennedy and Miller (1976) and Borkowski et 
al (1976) bypassed the problems which monitoring, eval­
uating and rationalising- . changes in memory may 
provide for young children. They achieved this by 
directly informing children of the relationship between 
their performance changes and strategy use. Children 
given such feedback on the effects of training strategy 
use were found to maintain those strategies. In contrast, 
children who were not given this information did not
maintain.
As I argued in Chapter. 2, however, feedback is not the 
only mechanism by which strategy maintenance can be 
achieved. Not only is strategy maintenance possible 
in the absence of feedback (e.g. Bjorklund et al, 1977- 
Or.nstein et al, 19 77) but the above manipulation of 
providing feedback confounds the various explanations 
of maintenance failure suggested previously. Other 
feedback experiments do allow ns to separate out the 
various explanations. Thus Ringel and Springer (1980) 
and Heisel and Ritter (1981) have shown that children 
have difficulty in monitoring strategy effectiveness, 
in evaluating it, and in attributing performance changes 
to strategy use.
Ringel and Springer employed a task of memorising lists of 
categorisable words. Subjects were given one of three
types of feedback about their performance. One group
were told they were performing better, and that this 
was because they were employing the trained strategy. 
Another group were simply told after the session in 
which they used the strategy, that they were performing 
better, but no attention was drawn to the fact that 
the strategy was responsible. The final group received 
no feedback. Ten-year-olds maintained the strategy if 
informed about their improvements in performance, and 
6- and 8-year-olds only did so when this information 
was related to strategy use. Control groups not given
this information did not maintain. Heisel and Ritter
(1981) used a similar manipulation of feedback-and- 
explanation, feedback and no information. They employed 
a spatial location task. The results showed a similar 
pattern to those of Ringel and Springer. Five-year- 
olds maintained when given information only about 
strategy effectiveness, whereas 3- arid 4-year-olds 
required that this conneetion be made explicit before 
they showed maintenance.
Thus we have evidence that children have difficulty in 
evaluating changes in performance, and also in inter­
preting these changes as being the result of strategy
use. These conclusions are consistent with the results
of Moynahan (1976) who found using questionnaire methods, 
that information about performance level related 1
to strategy use. Experiments V and VI also suggest 
children may have difficulties in accurately monitoring 
their performance.
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The present chapter examines some of the conditions
under which children can be induced to monitor trained
strategies and also investigates the possible explanations 
of the failure to monitor suggested earlier in this
section.
5.2 Experiment VII Does feedback influence strategy
ma in tenance?
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Introduction
The present study attempted to replicate the results 
obtained by Kennedy and Miller (1976), whose experiment 
is itself a modification of Keeney et al (1967). The 
experiment differs from the Keeney et al study only in 
that feedback is given to one group of trained producers 
before the maintenance task. In the Kennedy and Miller 
experiment, non-rehearsing children were first instructed 
in the use of rehearsal .'.'Foil,owing instruction, half the 
subjects were told they were ’’doing much better" when 
they used the strategy. The other half of the subjects 
were not given this information. Only the subjects given 
feedback maintained' the strategy when they were not 
explicitly requested to use it. The present experiment 
consists of three phases: diagnosis, training and transfer. 
In the first phase, children are tested to see whether 
they spontaneously employ verbal rehearsal when required 
to remember the serial order of a set of pictures indi­
cated by the experimenter. It is predicted that children
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who rehearse should outperform those who do not. Children 
who do not rehearse are then taught to do so, which should 
elevate their performance to the level of the spontaneous 
rehearsers. Following training, half the children 
induced to rehearse are given verbal feedback about 
their performance. It is predicted that these children 
will continue to use the strategy when riot directly instruc­
ted to do so. In the absence of such reinforcement,
maintenance should not occur.
Method
Subjects: The subjects were 53 children aged between 6 
and 7 years. All subjects took part in the initial session, 
and 24 subjects participated in both sessions. *
Apparatus: The stimuli consisted of pictures of six common 
objects: chair, cup, brush, saw, clock and pan. These 
were randomly arranged before each test trial. In order 
to prevent the children looking at the cards during the 
retention interval they wore a space helmet with an 
opaque vizor. The vizor was put down during the retention 
interval, and raised for presentation and test.
Procedure: The children were tested individually.
Both presentation of the tasks, and the scoring were 
conducted by one experimenter. The children were 
initially given training in the concept of "same order" 
using toy animals. They were given a series of pretrials
to familiarise them with the task and with the use of
* All subjects attended the same primary school in Cupar, Fife
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the helmet. The children were told to look at each
picture as the experimenter pointed to it, and then to
lower the vizor on instruction. A 15s retention
interval elapsed during which the experimenter modified 
the array. The children were then told to raise the 
vizor and to point to the same items as the experimenter 
in exactly the same osrider. They were also told that 
it did not matter if the spatial location of the items
■had altered. Following Kennedy and Miller 
(1976) the number of items on 10 subsequent trials 
was 5-4-3-4-5-3-2-3-4-5. Following the series of 
10 trials the children were asked how they had tried 
to remember the pictures, and also asked to name all 
the pictures.
The criterion used for identifying producers was whether 
they employed rehearsal on nine of the 10 test trials.
If they rehearsed on none or one and failed to report 
a strategy they were categorised as Non-producers.
Only the children classified as Producers (6) or 
Non-producers Cl8) were involved in the second session 
which took place 3 days later. The children’s recall 
was also scored for how many items they correctly
remembered. •
The second session which took place 3 days later, only 
involved the Producers and Non-producers as indicated 
above. The Non-producers were paired according to 
their recall scores in the first session. They were
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then randomly assigned to Feedback or No-Feedback 
groups. All the children were given a brief pretrial 
to confirm the diagnosis of Session 1. None of the 
children showed strategy use in this pretrial which 
differed from their previous diagnosis.
For the Producers, the procedure was identical with 
the first session; they received 10 trials in the 
order previously given. Non-producers in both groups 
were given instructions in strategy use with a differ­
ent set of pictures. The experimenter told them, "This 
time when I point to each of the pictures, I want you 
to say its name. When I've finished pointing at the 
pictures I want you to put the vizor down like you 
did last time, but this time you've got to keep 
on saying the names of the pictures over and over again 
to yourself" (.Experimenter then demonstrates). There 
then followed a series of practice trials. On the 
initial trials, the experimenter rehearsed the items 
with the child during the retention interval. This 
continued until the experimenter was convinced the 
child was conversant with the strategy. Following this 
instruction, the children were given the same 10-trial 
sequence as they had received in the first session. 
Before each trial the experimenter reminded the chilH 
dren of the need to repeat the names of the pictures
in order.
Following these 10 test trials the experimenter
suggested that both he and the child probably 
needed a rest. During the brief rest period he said 
to the child in the Non-producer-Feedback group 
’’Goodness me, you1 re doing much better when you’re 
saying the names over and over again to yourself.
Saying them over and over again must help you to 
remember them, mustn’t it?” This was not said to 
either the Producer or Non-producer-No-Feedback groups. 
They were told, "My, you must be tired after trying 
to remember all those pictures. Let’s have a rest .
before we do last few".
The experimenter then said to both the Non-producer 
groups: "We’re going to have three more shots now.
I’m not going to tell you to say the names over and 
over again any more. You can say them if you want to, 
but you don’t have to. Okay?" The transfer trials 
were then administered. They consisted of 3,' 4 and
5 items and were identical to the last three instruc­
ted trials.
The rehearsal and recall data were scored as in the
previous session. The present experiment departed 
from the Kennedy and Miller (1976) procedure by not 
awarding children prizes after each session.
Results
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Three different analyses were conducted,- the first
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investigated the relationship between rehearsal and 
performance; the second analysed the effects of training 
on memory; and the third examined the effects of feed­
back on strategy maintenance.
Session 1 The recall data indicated that Producers
(Mean = 24.50) performed significantly better than Non­
producers Mean = 16.94^ ^(22) = 2.85, p<0.01.
When asked about how they had attempted to remember the 
pictures only four children claimed to have employed a 
strategy. All these children said that they had 
rehearsed the names of pictures. All these children were 
in the spontaneous rehearsal group according to their 
overt strategy use.
Session 2 Following training for the Non-producer groups, 
recall scores for the 10 test trials were compared for 
the Producer and Non-producer groups. The respective
mean scores were 23.84 and 21.86 and there was no overall 
difference between the groups> fc£22) ~ 1*25, p = 0.22 . 
The fact that there is now no statistically significant 
difference in performance between the groups suggests 
that rehearsal training has been successful and also 
that the rehearsal strategy was largely responsible 
for the initially observed differences in performance 
between the groups.
If we compare observed rehearsal on the final three trials
of Session 2 (i.e. the maintenance trials), we find that 
of the No-Feedback group, one child abandoned rehearsal 
completely, two now rehearsed on two trials and five 
maintained the strategy. For the trained group who 
received feedback, three children rehearsed on two 
trials, and the remaining six rehearsed on all three 
trials. The difference between Non-producer-Feedback 
and Non-producer-No-Feedback groups was not significant 
(Fisher Exact p = 0.27), nor was there a difference in 
rehearsal levels between Producers and the Non-producers- 
No-Feedback groups (Fisher Exact p = 0.18).
Analysis of strategy maintenance in the three groups 
was conducted by a comparison of trials 8-10 (henceforth 
known as Block 1) and trials 11-13 (Block 2) . The .. 
reason for comparing these trials is that the items in 
them are identical, but they are separated by the rest 
period, during which the feedback group were informed of 
their effectiveness of strategy use. The recall data 
for these blocks are shown in Table 16. The table 
suggests that although the performance of the Producers 
is relatively unchanged over the two blocks, both Non­
producer groups are influenced by feedback and the new 
instructions. The data were subjected to a 3 (Group) 
x 2 (Block) ANOVA for repeated measures. In contrast to 
Kennedy and Miller, there was no overall effect of blocks
(F (2, 47) = 0.01,' ns) , nor was there a group x block 
interaction (F(2, 47) = 0.75, p = 0.47).
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In conclusion, there were no differences between the 
experimental groups either for observed rehearsal, or for
concomitant recall.
Discussion
The results for the first session and the first ten
trials of the second session provide evidence for a much 
documented phenomenon in memory development: the produc­
tion deficit. Children who showed no signs of spontaneous 
rehearsal could be induced to use the strategy when they 
were given minimal instruction. The effectiveness of 
the strategy was demonstrated by the fact that their 
recall performance when rehearsing was elevated almost 
to the level of spontaneous strategy producers.
The present study also replicates two other results repor­
ted by Kennedy and Miller. In the test of strategy 
maintenance, when the children were not directly instructed 
to use the strategy /Producers and don-producers given 
feedback; both maintained strategy.use. The results are 
not consistent, however, with respect to the Non­
producer-No-Feedback condition. Kennedy and Miller and 
the earlier experiment of Keeney et al (.1967) both report 
that children given no feedback information do not con­
tinue to employ the strategy when they are not under
direct instruction.
How, then, are we to account for this discrepancy? One
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explanation may lie in the procedural differences between 
the experiments. Both the two earlier studies employed 
relatively long time intervals (of six weeks) between 
Sessions 1 and 2 (Keeney et al) and 3 weeks (Kennedy and 
Miller). Children may realise*(that a strategy is effec­
tive by means other than being informed this by the 
experimenter. They may, for example, compare performance 
with and without strategy use and spontaneously decide 
on the benefits of the strategy. In order to do this they 
must remember their assessment throughout the periodt 
between the Sessions. We must bear in mind, also, that 
children do not realise that such a comparison may be 
helpful and so are unlikely to make deliberate attempts 
to remember the level of performance in Session 1.
These problems may be much reduced by the procedure 
used in the present experiment.. The interval between 
Session 1 and Session 2 was 3 days. In the present task, 
spontaneous judgements about strategy effectiveness 
may be possible, given that the effects of strategy use 
are large (i.e. it almost doubles performance) and 
thus easily detectable. In addition, other studies 
indicate that children in this age range are well able to 
assess their own performance accurately (Berch and'Evans, 
1973? Bisanz et al, 1978). .
In conclusion, information about strategy effectiveness 
may well be a sufficient condition for strategy mainte­
nance. It is not necessary, however, for under the
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conditions reported in the present experiment? children 
maintained a strategy without such information. This 
suggests that under certain circumstances children may 
spontaneously infer strategic effectiveness, a speculation 
which is examined in Experiment VIII.
5.3 Experiment VIII: Does strategy effectiveness
influence maintenance?
The previous experiment indicated that under certain 
circumstances strategy maintenance occurs in the 
absence of feedback. This result is contradictory to 
most of the received literature on attempts to train 
strategies, but there have been a number of studies which 
have found maintenance without the provision of feedback. 
Thus the studies of Keeney et al (1967), Cole, Gay, Glick 
and Sharp (1971a), and Scribner and Cole (1972) report no 
transfer of trained studies,in contrast to the findings of 
Bjorklund et al (1977) and Ornstein et al (1977) who did
find maintenance without feedback.
These contradictions may be resolved, however, if we
analyse the exact conditions of the experimental tasks.
It was argued in the introductory sections of this 
chapter, that children may have difficulty both in 
evaluating the effects of strategy use, and in inter­
preting these effects. The processes of evaluation and 
interpretation may well be simplified if the effects of 
strategy use are large and hence easily detectable.
Thus, if using strategies results in massive changes 
in performance, then these effects will be easily moni­
tored. The size of strategy effects may also be crucial 
if children are not adept at monitoring: effects may 
have to be large before they are detectable. Inter­
pretation may also be influenced by the size of strategy 
effects, because small effects could be explained by 
factors other than strategy use, such as practice. If 
effects are large, such interpretations of performance 
change are not possible.
The present experiment therefore set out to examine
whether maintenance in the absence of feedback is related 
to strategy effectiveness, i.e. the amount by which 
a strategy improves performance. Two groups of 
subjects were taught the same strategy, but the con­
ditions of the experiment were arranged so that for one 
group strategy use produced massive changes in performance. 
For the other group, strategy use did not result in 
such large changes. It was hypothesised that the group 
whose performance underwent massive changes following 
strategy use would be more likely to maintain the
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strategy in a number of related tasks.
The experiment involved two groups of 3 - 5-year-old 
children who were taught the strategy of using pictures 
of animals to cue the locations of animals they had
hidden. Each child hid the animals at different loc­
ations, and the experimenter placed pictures of the 
animals face-down outside their hiding-places. The 
strategy under study was whether children would use the 
pictures to help them remember where the animals were 
hiding.Both groups were taught the same strategy 
but the perceived improvement resulting from strategy 
use differed for the two groups. This was achieved 
by giving the two groups different numbers of items to 
remember in the no strategy and training phases. The 
control group who were given 3 items to remember in the 
no strategy and training phases, performed reasonably 
well without strategies, and so when they were taught 
the strategy of cueing, the change in their performance 
was not enormous. In contrast the experimental group 
had to remember the locations of 7 animals. They per­
formed poorly in the no strategy phase, but performance 
improved to ceiling when they were taught the cueing 
strategy. For this group, the changes in performance 
resulting from strategy use were therefore highly 
detectable. The experimental group should therefore
il The inferential cuing strategy of Experiments I-VI 
was not used in this study, because it was necesdary 
to find a strategy which leads to large improvements 
in performance when it is used. This does not 
occur with the inferencing- strategy.
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perceive that strategy use is highly effective; it ele­
vates performance from floor to ceiling levels. In 
contrast, performance changes should not be as large 
for the control group, who were performing reasonably 
well before they used the strategy. The influence 
of strategy effectiveness on transfer was assessed by 
examining strategy use in two other tasks. The first 
differed from the training task in the materials and 
locations used, but the trained cusLng strategy could
still be used. This was labelled the near transfer task.
In the far transfer task, it was investigated whether 
children could use a variant of the strategy in encoding
the location of an animal in order to remember it
later. In both these transfer tasks it was predicted 
that the initial differences in perceived strategy 
effectiveness between the groups would lead to greater 
transfer for the experimental group.
Method-
Subjects: The subjects were 60 preschool children who
ranged in age from 3;3 - 5;2. They were equally divided
into the usual three age groups, and the mean ages were
3;4, 4;2 and 4;11. All of the children had taken part 
in earlier experiments on cueing.*
■ ^Procedure: The experiment consisted of a pretrial 
phase, a training phase and two transfer tasks. The 
training phase and transfer tasks were identical 
for both experimental groups, but the pretrial phase
differed in the number of items used on each trial.
* Two children, one from the youngest and one from the 
middle age group, did not complete the procedure. They 
were rephced by other, matched, children.
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Pretrial and training: The procedure for the pretrial „ 
phase was identical to that of Experiments I - III, with 
the children being introduced to the policeman and the 
hiding animals. The hiding animals were the small 
plastic farm animals used in the previous experiment.
The 7-item group hid a pig, a dog, a sheep, a duck, 
a hen, a cow and a goat. The 3-item group hid the pig, 
sheep and hen. The animals were hidden in the plastic 
cups used in previous experiments. After the two pretrials 
the experimenter produced a set of photographs identical 
in size to the original animals, and asked the children 
to put the animals together with their pictures. Again, 
a series of hints were used until the children finally- 
agreed that the animals were identical to their photo—: 
graphs. The experimenter then said "This time, we’re 
going to do it a bit differently, you hide the animals 
and I'll put their pictures outside like this (Models 
hiding and putting picture outside). Now when you want 
to remember which animal is in this house, you just 
look at the picture and then you'll know".
The children were then given two further trials in 
which they hid the animals and the experimenter placed 
the appropriate cue outside each location. The locations 
were then probed by the policeman, and if the children 
failed to use the cues the experimenter employed a series 
of hints to ensure that they did so. If the children 
did not use cues initially the experimenter said "Is 
there anything we can do to help us remember which animal
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is hiding here?” If the children still didn’t use the 
cues, the experimenter said, "Why don’t you look at the 
picture?" There was a possibility that the few-item 
group would be less likely to use the cues than the 
many-item group even on the training sessions. This 
was controlled by matching the 7-item and 3-item groups 
for the strength of prompting required to initially 
induce the strategy. Nine children in each group required 
prompts, and a total of 28 prompts were given to each
group.
Near transfer: After the 2 trial training phase the 
experimenter told both groups of children that they would 
now play a different game. He showed them five brown 
boxes which were placed on a circular turntable. The 
children were shown 5 zoo animals:— a tiger, an elephant, 
a polar bear, a kangaroo and a monkey. They were told,
"this time when the animals hide you have to close your 
eyes while I turn this (indicates turntable) round (the 
experimenter then hides animals). Now look, because I 
turned it round the animal (names it) who was here, is 
now over here. (Repeats for two other animals)." The
use of the turntable on the transfer task means that
direct memory solutions are not possible. Children'
must therefore employ some other means if they are
to respond correctly. The experimenter than produced a 
puppet, who he said wanted to ’play the game first’. The 
experimenter was thus able to show the children what they 
were supposed to do by modelling with the puppet. Following
this, the experimenter said that the puppet would now 
watch while the children had their turns. The experimenter 
then produced photographs of all the animals and told 
the child that each animal had a picture. He then told 
the children to hide the animals while he would put the 
pictures in the right places. This time the picture cue 
was placed on top of the box. The children all received
two sets of trials on this task. On the first trial the
experimenter (in the guise of the policeman) searched 
every location. If children did not use cues, then he 
did not prompt them to do so. On the second trial he 
did prompt, using hints similar to the pretrial, asking 
first: "Is there anything we could do to help us.'.remem­
ber which animal is hiding here?" and if this failed:
"Why don't you look at the picture?" Prompts were 
used for each location probed.
Far' transfer: All the children were given a second 
transfer task which was substantially different from the 
first and similar to that used by Ritter (1978). In 
this task, six cups were placed on the turntable, and
the children informed these were 'houses'. In addition 
six model pigs were placed at one side of the turntable.* 
They were then introduced to 'the naughty little pig' - 
a model piglet of the same type as the animals used in 
previous experiments. They were told "This is the naughty 
little pig. Do you know why he’s naughty? Because he’s 
always running away and hiding. He hides in one of these 
houses (Experimenter hides piglet) and I turn them round
* The apparatus is shown in Fig.2
(Appendix V).
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while you close your eyes. Now, can you find him? The
game is that you have to find him first time. Do you 
12want a shot? Remember, you’ve got to find him the first 
time.” The experimenter then gave the child at least 
two pretrials, explaining if the child was unsuccessful, 
that the idea of the game was to find the piglet first 
time. If the children happened to correctly guess where 
the piglet was hidden they were given the pretrial until 
they had failed the task twice. These pretrials were 
to indicate to the children that they could not rely on 
the strategy of searching each location until they found 
the piglet, because the rules of the game forbade this.
In order to correctly locate the piglet, the children had 
to find some way of making distinct the location where
it hid. What was of interest was whether the children
would think to employ the large pigs for this purpose. 
Again it was predicted that children receiving the 7-item 
pretrial in the first phase of the experiment would be 
more likely to transfer the cuing strategy.
Again a graded series of prompts was-.- used to induce 
the strategy; If children did not employ it spontaneously: 
P^ "Can you think of anything we could do to help us 
find the little pig the first time?” '
P^ "Can we use these (indicating six large pigs) to help 
us find the little pig right away?"
P^ "Would putting any of these (pointing to six pigs)
. on here (indicates cups and turntable) help you find the 
T2 'Shot’ is the Scottish idiom for 'go’.
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little pig right away?"
"If we put this pig on here (revealing hidden piglet, 
concealing once more and putting pig onto baited cup) 
will that help?”
Once the children had actually baited the cup, whether 
spontaneously or under prompting, they were given a 
retrieval trial. They closed their eyes, the experimenter 
rotated the turntable, and asked them to find the little 
pig the first time.
The children were then asked a series of questions 
probing their knowledge of the cueing strategy. This 
was tested by presenting several situations in which the 
original successful strategy could not be used, and 
asking them for predictions of performance given these 
circumstances. In addition they were given a modified 
version of the strategy and asked to predict its success.*
The first question CQ^) involved a single distinctive 
cue (only one pig) but th.e pig was placed on a cup two 
positions away from the baited container. The additional 
information of identifying and remembering the piglet’s 
spatial location relative to the cue, is necessary for 
success. Every child underwent a retrieval trial. It 
was clear from this trial whether children were using 
the strategy in a strict rot.e-reproductive fashion, using 
a modification of the strategy or simply answering ’yes’ 
to every question.
* The stimulus configurations for the various knowledge 
questions are shown in Figure 3,, Appendix V.
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The ambiguous cue condition IC^) comprised ’ the-pig-on- 
the-baited-cup-strategy1, but also three other pigs 
arranged to make the cue ambiguous.
The final question (Q3) required prediction for a modi­
fied version of the strategy. This time the baited cup 
was rendered distinct by placing pigs on every other
cup.
It was predicted that if children did not grasp the 
principle of distinctiveness, but believe that the 
presence of a cue somehow ’induces’ the piglet to be 
underneath, they should respond incorrectly to all these 
questions.
Results
Pretrials As expected the 7-item group performed worse 
than the 3-item group on the no-strategy pretrial illu­
strated in Table 17. The group scores are not directly 
comparable, however, because they receive different numbers 
of items. The data were thus reclassified into three
categories: (a) children who failed to remember any 
items on at least one trial; (b) children who remem­
bered all the items on one trial; (c) the remaining
2 ' children. A x analysis on this data indicated differences
2 'between the groups (x C2) =21.83, p< 0.001). Table 
18 shows the number of children who required explicit
prompting to use the strategy during the training phase-,'
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where an explicit prompt included one or more references
to the pictures. Several children did require one
prompt of the form "Is there anything we could do to
help us remember..?", but these were not scored as
requiring explicit prompting. The number of children
requiring explicit prompts decreases with age, although 
2it is not statistically significant (1) = 2.07, p =
0.15 .
Near transfer Table 19 shows the effect of perceived
efficiency on the first transfer trial, with children
receiving the 7~item pretest showing more cue use on
the first (unprompted) transfer trial. Those who saw
the strategy as efficient were significantly more 
2likely to use cues on one or more occasions X (1) =
5.83, p = 0.015 . Overall, the tendency to transfer also 
2increased with age (2) = 7.98, p = 0.02 .
On the second near transfer trial children received prompts 
if they did not spontaneously use the picture cues.
The children were then given scores, depending on the 
explicitness of the prompts they required. An implicit 
prompt ("Can you think of anything we could do to help 
us remember..?") was scored 1 point, and explicit prompts 
("Why don't you look at the pictures?") was scored as 2 
points. The mean totals for each age group in each
condition are shown in Table 20. The number of children 
who required at least one prompt decreased with age, 
although this trend was not significant X (D =2.95,
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p = 0.09 .
The findings that older children were more likely to 
transfer irrespective of perceived effectiveness, com­
bined with the fact that young children required more 
explicit cues to elicit the strategy initially suggested 
a further hypothesis: children who required little initial 
prompting should be more likely to transfer than children 
who needed explicit prompts. This was not verified for 
either transfer trial x* 2CD - 0.27, p = 0.60, x2 (D - 
1.60, p = 0.20.
Far transfer Table 21 shows the mean number of prompts
which were required to elicit the distinctive cueing
strategy in the far transfer task. For the purpose of
analysis childen were classified according to whether
they required explict prompts ("If we put this pig on
here, will that help?”). There were no effects of 
2perceived strategy effectiveness X (1) = 0.12, p =
20.73 . In addition there were no age trends .X (1) =
0.74, p = 0.39 .
The questions about the far transfer task suggested sim­
ilar conclusions. Children were credited with correctly 
answering a question, if they gave the correct verbal 
response, and searched the location consistent with 
their response. Thus, for when pigs were placed at 
every location except the baited cup, the child must 
respond correctly that this configuration will help search
and also search under the cup without the large pig.
Table 22 indicates the number of correct responses, but there
was no overall effect of perceived strategy success 
2X (1) = 1.17, p = 0.56 . The number of correct responses 
2also showed a developmental increase X (2) = 8.1, p =
0.005 .
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The hypothesis that children who required prompting to 
employ the strategy on pretrials should show less tendency
to transfer was also tested for both measures of the far
transfer task. Again there was no indication that initial 
prompting on the picture cues, predicted far transfer
as measured by prompting, or questions respectively 
X 2(x) = 0.17, p = 0.69,x2ll) = 1.01, p = 0.31 .
Finally, it was hypothesised that for the far transfer 
task alone, children’s knowledge about cueapplication 
may be related to their readiness to use a particular 
strategy. They were dichotomised into low (or 1 question 
correct) versus high ( 2 or 3 correct) knowledge subjects 
and strong (0-3 prompts) versus weak (4-5 prompts) 
required to elicit the strategy. No relationship was 
found between knowledge and initial prompting necessary 
to elicit the strategy.
5.5' Conclusions
The experiment indicates strong support for the hypothe­
sised relationship between strategy effectiveness and
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maintenance. Subjects who received 7 items on no-strategy 
pretrials greatly improved performance following training, 
in contrast with the 3-item group who underwent much 
smaller performance changes. The size of these changes 
appeared to influence application of the strategy in new 
situations. The 7-item group continued to use the 
strategy under conditions where no experimenter prompts 
were given, and several aspects of the task were modified.
This was not true of the 3-item group who did not show 
the same level of maintenance.* Strategy effectiveness 
did not however influence transfer to a task which required 
a rather different form of the strategy.
It was argued that young children may have problems in 
evaluating performance change and attributing this to 
strategy use. The present experiment was designed in 
order to make the evaluation of performance change simpler, 
by making the effects of strategy use large and hence 
detectable. It may be, however, that children’s prob­
lems lie' not in evaluating performance change, but in 
interpreting it. Children may, for example, believe 
that performance changes are the result of practice, 
rather than strategy use. The above experiment may 
have induced maintenance, not by making the evaluation 
component simpler, but the result of making strategy 
effects large may be to exclude interpretations in terms 
of practice which cannot produce such effects.
One problem with this interpretation lies in the fact that the 
7-item group received, more practice with the cuing strategy in 
the instruction condition. Thus, they used cues to find animal.s 
at 14 locations, compared with the 6 locations of ihe 3-item group
5.4 Experiment IX: Is in formation' about' ef fective'ness
sufficient for transfer?
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This experiment attempted to distinguish between the 
explanations of maintenance failure. Two groups of chil­
dren were given different feedback as to the results of 
their strategy use. One group was given no information 
about how strategy use had changed performance. The 
other group was given evaluative information that they 
were performing better, but no interpretation of this 
improvement was offered.
It was argued that if children's problems with strategy 
maintenance lie in their inability to evaluate performance 
change, then providing this information should lead to 
maintenance. However, if their problem lies in inter­
pretation and not evaluation then both groups should be 
as likely to maintain, because both groups will be in 
possession of the same information.*
Children from the youngest age group in the last
experiment were tested. This is because most of the 
older children in the previous experiment maintainedithe 
strategy even in the 3-item condition, suggesting 
experimenter evaluation would not be mf much benefit to 
them. Additionally, Experiments V and VI have shown that 
self-assessment skills are poor in this age range.
* This procedure should also control for possible practice 
effects. It was suggested that one reason why the 7-item 
group transferred, was that they received 14 cued-recall 
trials in contrast to the 6 received by the 3-item group. 
The present experiment gives both groups the same initial 
training.
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Method
Subjects: The subjects were 20 children in the age range
3; 2 - 3; 9. Their average age was 3; 6. All children 
completed the procedure and none had participated in the 
previous experiment.
Method: The children were divided into two equal groups.
The control group received the instructions and tests 
given to the subjects in Experiment IX. The only 
difference for the experimental group was that the experi­
menter gave them some indication of their performance, 
by saying after the instruction trials "You know you’re 
really doing much better than you were before". Both 
groups were given 3-items >oniy in the pretrial and 
instruction phases.
Results
Table 23 illustrates the effects of evaluative information.
The group who were given this information made more spon­
taneous use of cues on the first trial of the near
transfer task, and required fewer prompts to induce them
to use cues on the second' trial. A t test was conducted
on the number of locations at which the children spon­
taneously employed cues over both trials. Children who 
were given evaluative information were much more likely 
to employ cues spontaneously ■( t/jgx = 2.32, p = 0.03).
In the previous experiment, it was suggested that transfer 
may be related to the ease with which a child evokes the 
strategy under instruction. It was predicted that initial
prompting should be negatively correlated with transfer 
as measured by spontaneous cue use. However, this 
relation was not significant for either control (r == 0.39, 
p = 0.27) or experimental C^gy 0-56, p = 0.10).
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The data were also analysed to investigate whether 
evaluative . information influenced performance on the
far transfer task. There was no difference between con­
trol and experimental groups either in degree of initial 
prompting necessary to induce the strategy, or in the
children’s answers to the prediction questions 
0.268, p = 0.21; t^g^ = -0.006, p = 0.99 .
C18)
Conclusions
It was argued that two reasons may underlie children's 
failure to maintain strategies they have been taught: 
either they cannot detect changes in performance•or 
they can detect such changes but fail to attribute them 
to strategy use.
The experiment presented children with information about 
the change in their performance following strategy use.
It was found that children seemed to have few difficulties
in attributing such changes to strategy use, because 
nearly all of them spontaneously used the strategy on 
ail transfer trials. The control group, not given this
information, showed much lower levels of maintenance;.. 
Verbal feedback did not influence performance on the
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far transfer trials, when the task demands were radically 
altered. The experiment supports the conclusion that 
an inability to monitor and assess performance changes
underlies the failure to maintain.
5.5 Conclusions
One of the initialaims of this chapter was to investigate 
the reasons underlying children’s general failure to 
maintain or transfer strategies they have been taught.
Any conclusions drawn from these experiments may well 
additionally apply to spontaneously occurring strategies. 
The corollary of explaining failures to transfer is that
we are able to find conditions in which transfer does
occur, and also suggest possible mechanisms by which 
changes occur in the type and area of application of the 
child’s memory strategies.
It was initially hypothesised that children have problems 
in evaluating changes in performance due to strategy use 
and also in interpreting these changes and correctly 
attributing them to strategy use. Experiments VIII and 
IX indicate that for the cueing strategy studied here, 
children have problems in evaluating or detecting changes 
in performance. Thus, if children are directly informed 
about performance changes (Experiment IX) or performance 
changes are made extremely obvious (Experiment VIII) * 
we do find evidence for transfer to a similar task.
These results apparently contradict a number of studies
* Although in Experiment VIII strategy effectiveness is con­
founded with the original amount of training each group 
received.
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which suggest children also have a problem in interpreting 
performance change, even if evaluation is achieved (e.g. 
Heisel and Ritter, 1981; Mcynahan, 1976; Ringel and 
Springer, 1980). As was noted above, the process of 
interpretation may well depend on the strategy under study 
and on the size of the performance changes it induces.
The suggestion that children have difficulty in evaluating 
performance change is consistent with the results of 
Experiments V and VI which demonstrated young children's 
inability to accurately assess the accuracy of their 
memory performance. It may well be that the improvements 
in monitoring skills in the preschool years can explain 
the increases in maintenance with age in both 7-item and 
3-item groups in Experiment VIII.
In order to evaluatezchildren do not only have to assess 
the level of their performance, they must also retain 
this assessment during the interval between no-strategy 
and strategy training trials. This problem of retention 
was made simple by reducing the interval between these 
trials in Experiments VIII and IX, however, Experiment VII 
suggests the duration of this interval may well influence 
spontaneous maintenance. Thus, Keeney et al (1967) and 
Kennedy and Miller (1976) report no spontaneous mainten­
ance of a trained rehearsal strategy. In contrast, 
Experiment VII did find such maintenance using a procedure 
in which the no-strategy/strategy instruction interval 
was 3 days. In both the above experiments this interval
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was much longer in duration. Thus, remembering
one's assessment of performance may present problems to 
the young child, especially when the procedure used in 
training experiments do not suggest a reason for paying 
attention to one’s level of performance.
These conclusions allow us to explain a number of other 
experimental results. Bjorkland et al (1977) and Ornstein 
et al (1977) both report maintenance only when children 
were taught highly effective category sort and rehearsal 
strategies. These results are completely consistent with 
those of Experiment VIII. Effective strategies induce 
greater performance changes and are thus more detectable. 
Also Heisel and Ritter (1981) report that older children 
spontaneously maintain a spatial retrieval strategy, but 
children below the.age of six years require information 
about changes in performance following strategy use, before 
they will transfer. A similar result is also reported by 
Ringel and Springer (1980) for categorisation study 
strategies. These experiments are perfectly consistent with 
the above explanations of maintenance failure, in terms of 
inability to assess and remember assessments of performance. 
As both of these abilities increase with age, they will make 
it unnecessary for the experimenter to supply information 
about evaluation to older children.
In conclusion there are a number of reasons why young 
children may fail to transfer or maintain . strategies, and 
the present set of experiments offers evidence that the 
effectiveness of the strategy in modifying performance,
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and the presence of external feedback may influence
transfer. The results of Experiment VII, combined with 
those of Kennedy and Miller (1976) and Keeney et al (1967) 
also suggest that the time interval between pre-trials and 
instruction may be crucial. I obtained transfer with a 
short time interval, and no feedback, in contrast to those 
experiments which report no transfer without feedback.
The importance of such a factor must at present remain 
speculative, because it has not been experimentally demon­
strated. In addition to these external factors, transfer 
will be influenced by the abilities of the particular 
subject group. Changes in the ability to monitor and 
remember assessments of performance may well interact with 
these factors.
Finally, it was suggested in the opening sections of this 
chapter that studies of maintenance and transfer might offer 
information about mechanisms of change in memory. It might 
be argued, however, that the present set of experiments can 
tell us nothing about developmental change because they have 
only demonstrated maintenance of strategies, and not that 
trained strategies are generalised to different situations.
As I have argued elsewhere, the criterion of generalisation 
is too strict, because it misrepresents changes in naturally 
occurring behaviours. Naturally occurring behaviours are 
initially limited in their zone of application, and so 
maintenance is an adequate criterion for inferring change.
If this is the case, then the present set of experiments 
suggests two mechanisms which are responsible for change 
in the use of memory strategies. The first, feedback, occurs
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when some other person (experimenter, teacher, parent or 
peer) is present to interpret the results of the child’s 
behaviour. This may well be a powerful mechanism because 
many of the teaching situations in our society do have this 
set-up. The second, self-assessment, occurs in the absence 
of such information, and may well emerge much later in 
development. The importance of self-assessment probably 
greatly depends on the strategies being monitored and the 
exact learning situation.
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CHAPTER 6 CUE USE, INTROSPECTIONS AND THE STUDY OF
TEXT
6.1 Introduction
One recent focus of research in developmental psychology 
has been on the preschooler. The aim of this research 
has mainly been to dispute what Gelman and Gallistel (1978) 
call "the negative characterisation of the preschooler" 
by demonstrating that very young children do possess 
some social, logical and memory skills (e.g. Brown, 1975; 
Donaldson, 1978; Gelman, 1978). A common theme in all 
this research is that the nature of the task itself may 
be crucial in determining the level of the child's 
performance. Tasks which fit into the ecology of the 
young child, i.e. those which "make human sense" (Donaldson, 
1978) or "fit the head of the child" (Brown, 1975) are 
far more likely to elicit precocious competence.
The early chapter describe a number of experiments which 
investigated children's use of different types of cues 
in making inferences in the service of memory. The cues 
consisted of objects identical to those hidden (array 
cues) or leaving the animals at previously searched 
locations exposed (monitoring cues). (See Chapters 4 and 
5 for a more detailed explanation.) In neither case do 
the cues or memory task model a natural memory situation.
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This same criticism can be made of most other studies
of cueing. Given the importance of ecological factors 
in the accounts cited above, it was thought important 
to investigate similar issues to those dealt with in 
Chapters 4 and 5, i.e. those of cues and inferencing, but 
using more naturalistic materials.
6.2 Experiment X: Do children use pictures to disambiguate
text?
This experiment investigated children's use of a picture 
as a source of information about the text. Three issues
were examined:
(.1) Will young children make use of pictures to disambig­
uate stories which..are read to them, and if they do, is 
it the case that older children are more efficient in 
their use of pictorial information?
(2) What insights do young children have into their own 
mental processes? In particular, can they introspect 
about how well they have understood or remembered a 
story?
(3) What is the relationship between ..introspections
and strategy behaviour? Is children's study behaviour or 
memory influenced by their knowledge of their own mental 
processes?
Introduction
The procedure used in this experiment is based upon a
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number of studies conducted on adults by Bransford and 
his colleagues (Bransford and Johnson, 1973; Bransford 
and McCarrell, 1977). In a series of studies they 
demonstrated that both comprehension and recall of ambig­
uous text is vastly improved by providing information by 
means of a picture or story title. One of the stories 
used by Bransford and Johnson (1973) ran as follows:
The procedure is really quite simple. First 
you arrange things into different groups 
according to their make-up. Of course, 
one pile may be sufficient depending on 
how much there is to do....
Subjects provided with the title of the passage (Washing 
Clothes) reported that it is easily comprehensible and 
were able to recall much of the passage verbatim. Subjects 
not given such information rated the passage as difficult 
to comprehend and recalled very little in the memory
test.
An explanation for this result is offered by Haviland 
and Clark (1974) who account for the results in the 
following way: comprehension is seen as a process of 
inference construction in which a picture or title can 
provide information which constrains the range of infer- 
encs which can possibly be made. Thus, the knowledge •>. 
that the passage is about washing clothes allows the 
subject to infer that 'arranging things into different 
groups according to their make-up' is the process of 
separating white from coloured clothes or that 'pile' 
refers to a pile of clothes. It is clearly far simpler 
to construct an internally consistent chain of inferences
when setting information is provided than when it is
absent.
If memory and comprehension are indeed dependent on a 
process of inference-construction, using setting informa­
tion as a source of premises, we may expect developmental 
trends in performance on this task for the following
reasons:
Cl) Young children may fail to use setting information 
altogether. A study by Ritter et al (1973), in which 
pictures were provided as retrieval cues demonstrated 
that on some occasions, young children, aged 3-5 years 
failed to make use of the pictures to recall the names 
of absent objects. Similar results with older children 
have been reported by Kobasigawa (1974) who also used 
a retrieval task. Seven-year-old children failed to 
use cards to cue sets of highly associated objects 
(e.g. a picture of a zoo to cue bear, lion and camel).
Other studies (e.g. Gordon and Flavell, 1977; Rybasigawa 
and Middleton, 1972) also show the failure of young 
children to exploit cues provided to aid their retrieval.
(2) Even if children do think to consult cues, evidence 
suggests they may make less efficient use of the cues 
provided. KQbasigawa (1977) found that some children 
may use the cue cards provided, but instead of .using the 
card to access all category-related items, they recall a 
single category item, and then refer to the next card.
Since in the present experiment the context is visual,
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evidence from experiments on visual search strategies is 
also relevant. Mackworth and Bruner’s (1970) research 
on recognition memory suggests there may be qualitative 
changes in visual search strategies in young children.
If such changes do occur, it may well be that older chil­
dren will elicit more relevant information from picture
cues.
(3) Assuming that children can efficiently access inform­
ation from picture cues, there may be a final reason to 
expect developmental changes in performance on this task. 
It may be that the ability to combine information , 
i.e. inferencing, develops. While this has been a conten­
tious issue as far as transitive inferences are concerned, 
the general consensus is that the types of inferences 
required for text processing should develop with age, 
j(e.g. Paris, 1978b; Trabasso and Nicholas, 1980). These 
sorts of inferences are largely inductive but require 
much social, motivational and causal knowledge of the 
world, and should consequently increase as children’s 
knowledge base becomes enriched.
Despite the persuasiveness of these theoretical arguments, 
empirical studies have failed to find evidence for older
children's more efficient use of contextual information
in text processing. Indeed, some of the studies which 
follow have failed to find any effect of contextual infor­
mation on memory. Brown, Smiley, Day, Townsend and Lawton 
(1977a) provided children with two different contexts
or no context and tested recognition and recall for a 
core story given to all groups. Recognition measures 
showed no qualitative effects of context, nor did the 
groups provided with context out-perform the no context 
group. Recall measures, however, did show developmental 
trends,with older subjects tending to produce more context­
relevant intrusions. This suggests both that context does 
influence recall, and that older children are more likely
to make use of it.
In contrast, Omansen, Warren and Trabasso (1978) found
no influence of contextual information on recall. The
three groups of 8-year-olds were given one of two contexts 
or no context and the same core story. A recall test 
showed no advantage to the groups given context, although 
a questionnaire which tested children’s ability to make 
inferences about material not explicitly stated in the 
story ‘did depend on the provision and type^of context 
provided. u
A third study conducted by Harris, Mandias, Meerum- 
Terwogt and Tjintjelaar (198Q) is perhaps closest to the 
original Bransford and Johnson (1973) experiments. Unlike 
the Brown et al and Omansen et al experiments the story 
was genuinely incomprehensible without context. Harris 
et al found that context (provided by a title) massively 
improved the recall of 8- and 10-year-old children. They
did not find that older children make more efficient use
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of this information.
*2
The above experiments suggest two factors may be crucial 
to any attempts to investigate young children’ s use of 
contextual information. The first concerns "the importance 
of the context in disambiguating the text. Both the 
Brown et al and Omansen et al stories were comprehensible
without contextual information. Under such circumstances'
context may make possible certain elaborations or embell­
ishments to the text, but not radically influence compre­
hension and consequently, memory. In contrast, very 
little understanding could be derived from the Harris 
et al stories without their titles. In the present study,, 
an attempt was made to ensure that certain parts of the 
story would be ambiguous without context.
The other issue concerns the measure used to assess the 
influence of context. It was decided to assess this by 
asking a series of questions about the story. This method: 
was employed because of its greater sensitivity to context 
effects (as evidenced by both Brown et al, and Omansen 
et al) and also because young children have difficulty 
with any form of recall task (Brown and Murphy, 1975) .
A second problematic feature of the above experiments is 
the inconsistent evidence for developmental increases 
in the use of context. They only appear in one measure 
in the Brown et al and Omansen et al experiments, and
Harris et al found no effects. This lack of evidence for
developmental trends may well be attributable to the 
ecological factors referred to earlier. All the
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experiments reviewed investigate children of school age.
It may be that by this stage of development children 
have already had large amounts of practice at information 
integration. Recent accounts of language development 
stress the role of context in the child's comprehension 
(e.g. Shatz, 1978; Clark, 1977; Macnamara, 1973). In 
addition,children may well be familiar with the specific 
skill of integrating information from different sources 
(e.g. adults1 comments, pictures, peer reactions) with 
the story itself. This may explain why previous studies 
which had not looked at children younger than 5 years have 
failed to find the predicted interaction. For this 
reason, it was important to investigate the relationship 
in very young children, and so preschoolers were used.
Another problem with previous studies is that the effects 
of context have been inferred from various memory measures 
without investigating processes underlying this. -It 
has already been suggested that young children may not 
use contextual information in the way older ones do, and 
so the study behaviour of subjects was also recorded. 
Contextual information was provided in the form of pictures 
accompanying the spoken text, and it was predicted that 
young children would not study the pictures for as long 
as older children. The differences in study behaviour 
should be reflected by performance in the memory test for
the contextualised stories.
A second aim of the study was to investigate very young
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children’s abilities to judge their state of comprehension 
and memory. A recent review by Flavell and Wellman 
(1977) suggest that such abilities undergo large changes 
in the early school years. Studies indicate that chil­
dren younger than 8 years are poor at making judgements 
about the adequacy of instructions (Markman, 1977), the 
importance of different parts of text to its central theme 
(Brown and Smiley, 1977) and at detecting contradiction 
or .anomaly (Flavell et al, 1981; Harris et al, 1981; 
Markman, 1979) . All the above experiments require sophis­
ticated judgements and it may be that even preschoolers 
are capable of answering simple questions about their 
understanding of memory for text.
This is an important problem, because the ability to 
monitor comprehension has implications for both study and 
memory behaviour. In the present experiment, children 
realising they have not understood a part of the text 
may attempt to clarify this by consulting an alternative 
source of information (the picture). We should therefore 
expect a close relationship between the ability to monitor 
memory and study behaviour.
Self-monitoring was assessed by. asking the children a 
number of questions about comprehension and recall before 
and after recall had taken place. Before recall, children 
were asked first which story they had understood better, 
and then which they had remembered better. After recall 
they were asked which had been best remembered. On all
occasions they were asked to justify their choice. This 
made it possible to investigate whether children realise 
the relationship between comprehension and memoryr 
i.e. that what they best understand will be best recalled.
The speculations about the relationship between self­
monitoring and strategy use are not limited to text 
comprehension and memory. Recent theoretical accounts 
of cognitive development (Brown, 1978; Flavell, 1978) have 
stressed the importance of highly general skills like 
self-monitoring for many cognitive tasks. However a 
recent series of empirical studies (Bisanz et al, 1978; 
Cavanaugh and Borkowski, 1980; Kelly et al, 1976;
Moynahan, 1973, and Salatas and Flavell, 1976a) have 
all failed to find evidence for s strong relationship 
between memory performance and knowledge about memory.
The present study should enable us to investigate that 
relationship on a task and with a age group which have
not been much studied.
Method
Sub jec'ts: The 36 subjects were randomly drawn from three 
playgroups in St. Andrews, Scotland. They were equally 
divided into three age groups, 3;0-3;9, 3;10-4;6, and 
4;7-5;3. Their mean ages were 3;5, 4;2 and 4;10 respec­
tively. All of them had taken part in Experiments II or III
Materials
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Two stories, one about a girl called Mary and her dog
Fido, CM and F) and another about a girl called Jenny 
and her mother (J and M) were used. Each story had an 
associated picture, but this was not presented in all 
experimental conditions. The stories were made as similar 
as possible; both took approximately the same itime to 
read aloud, and both had a similar story structure (see 
Stein and Glenn, 1979). Both stories and questions are 
presented in Appendix 2.
Procedure: All the subjects were read two stories, one 
with a picture providing setting information, the other 
without. Half the subjects in each age group were 
read Mary and Fido with its associated picture and 
Jenny and her Mummy with no picture. The oither half 
were given the picture with Jenny and her Mummy, but 
nob with Mary and Fido. The order of presentation was 
counterbalanced across subjects. In order to engage 
interest in the task of remembering the stozries and 
also to allow systematic questioning, the children were 
introduced to a monkey puppet called 'Silly” Monkey'.
The experimenter explained that Silly Monkey had an 
appalling memory and asked them whether they would 
help the monkey by trying to remember the stories and 
answer the questions he asked about the stories.
The experimenter then read each story to the child and 
the monkey, mentioning in passing that one of the 
stories had a picture and drawing the child's attention 
to the picture before the story was read. (This story
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is called Jenny and her Mummy and here’s the picture 
which goes with it).
After both stories had been read, the experimenter 
consulted the puppet and asked the children whether 
Silly Monkey could ask them some questions about the 
stories. The monkey then posed the first metacognition 
question which was either to predict comprehension or 
memory - ’Which story was easier to understand?/Which 
story will be easier to remember?’. These will be 
referred to as comprehension and prediction questions.
The child was then asked to justify this choice. The 
order of the comprehension and memory questions and 
the order of mention of the two stories in the quest­
ions was again counterbalanced across subjects.
The monkey then asked the child a series of ten specific 
questions about each story (see AppendixII). The 
questions probed structurally similar parts of the 
two stories and required answers only a few words long.
If a child failed to respond, the monkey repeated 
the question.
After this memory test, the child was asked another 
metacognition question - ’Which story was easier to 
remember?’ - to test the child’s ability to assess 
his own performance after recall. This will be refer­
red to as the post-diction question. The whole experi­
mental procedure was video-taped.
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Results
Memory performance Table 24 illustrates the performance
of the three groups on the memory questions. Two features
of the figure are worthy of comment. Firstly the ability
to answer such questions increases with age, and secondly
performance is superior when pictures are provided. The
importance of both these features is verified by the
results of statistical analysis. A 3 (Age) x 2 (Picture/
No Picture) x 2 (Story Order) x 2 (Picture with J and M/ 
Analysis of Variance
Picture with M and F)/confirmed that both Age (F(2, 24) 
=10.53, p<<0.001) and Picture/No Picture (F(l, 24)=
33.89, p<<0.001) effects were .significant.* There was no 
Age x Picture/No Picture interaction, suggesting older
children do not make more active use of contextual infor­
mation (F(2, 24)=0.34, p=0.71), although this result may 
possibly be contaminated by a ceiling effect, as the oldest 
group were performing at 91% in the picture condition.
There were no effects due to story differences, order of 
presentation or which story was accompanied by the picture.
Study behaviour The amount of time children spent looking 
at the picture during story telling is shown in Table 25.
No clear pattern emerges and a 3 (Age) x 2 (Order of 
Presentation) x 2 (Picture with M and J/Picture with M 
and F) ANOVA confirms this. There were no effects for 
any of these factors. This is contrary to one of the 
experimental predictions.
* Post-hoc tests using Neuman-Keuls revealed that this was 
due to the superiority of the oldest group.
259
Monitoring Self-assessment skills were computed for the
subjects by comparing their responses to the monitoring
questions, with their performance as assessed by memory 
13probes. Table 26 shows the percentage of children at 
the different age levels who responded correctly to the 
three monitoring probes. The scores for the three quest­
ions are collapsed together, and categorised according to
whether children obtained either scores of 0 or 1, or 
2scores of 2 or 3 correct responses. A x analysis on 
2this data indicated developmental trends (x (2)=6.30,
p=0.04). When the questions were analysed separately, there 
2was only a trend for the memory prediction questions (x 
(2)=7.25, p=0.03).* This result suggests that the overall 
developmental trend is mainly the result of improvements 
with age, of responses to this question. Although justi­
fications were requested following probes, only eight 
children actually offered them and six of these were in 
the oldest group. Of these only three children made any 
any reference to the picture. The main explanation offered 
by the other children, was that the ’easier’ story was
the one which was shorter.
T3 The use of the subjects' own performance scores, as 
the criteria for assessing self-monitoring is in 
contrast to other '/studies Ce.g.,Harris et al, I960) 
which' assumed that subjects would perform better on 
the stories with pictures, and assessed monitoring 
scores against this. Not all subjects in the present 
experiment did remember more of the picture-story and 
so the use of the Harris et al procedure would have 
been inappropriate. Even if children are inaccurate 
in their comprehension monitoring and select the 
incorrect story - as being best understood, if they 
understand the relationship, they should, 
select the same story (incorrectly) for memory 
prediction.
♦ In both cases this was due to the superiority of the 
oldest group over the two others (X*(l) = 3.98, p 0.05? 
XZ(1) = 4.03, p 0.05).
260
In addition to demonstrating that monitoring skills
increase with age, it is important to establish the accur­
acy of children's responding given that chance responding 
would result in 33% correct performance. Children's 
responses to the questions were either to select one of 
the stories or to say that neither was easier. If they 
made such judgements without monitoring, they would 
therefore have a 33% chance of responding correctly. 
Application of the Binomial test indicated that perfor­
mance for the Memory Prediction and Memory Post-diction 
questions was above chance (z=3.36, p<0.0l, z=2.65, p<0.01) 
respectively, although this was not true for the Compre­
hension question (z=1.23, p=0.22). Separate analyses at 
each age level indicated that only the oldest group per­
formed above chance, and they did so on all three questions
(z=2.14, p=0.03; z=3.98, p<<Q.001; z=2.14, p=0.03; for 
Comprehension, Memory-Prediction and Memory-Post-diction).
A second aim of the monitoring analysis was to test whether 
children appreciated the close relationships between com­
prehension and memory. If children do realise the assoc­
iation between these processes, one might expect the same 
response to both comprehension and memory prediction 
questions. This prediction was tested against chance for 
all groups, using the Binomial test. Although there was an
overall effect (p<0.03), only the oldest group showed 
it when the groups were individually analysed (p<0.001).
Finally memory prediction and post-diction scores were
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compared for the three groups. There were no group effects, 
nor was there a superiority of post-diction over prediction 
in the overall analysis (Overall McNemar X =2.50, p=0.11).
To summarise the results of the self-assessment data:
monitoring skills increase with age during the preschool 
years, and by the age of five years children perform above 
chance on simple questions about comprehension and memory 
for text. In addition, this oldest group appreciates the 
relationship between comprehension and memory. There was 
no evidence for the contention that young children are better 
at post-dieting than predicting memory.
Monitoring, Study Behaviour and Memory Performance
A correlational analysis was conducted to examine the effect 
of study time on memory. It is clear that other factors, in 
addition to study'time, may influence children’s memory for 
the story with the picture. Memory need not be mediated by 
study alone, as is demonstrated by the fact that children 
can remember the story without a picture. The contribution 
of this factor and the contribution of age were both 
partialled out. Such an analysis revealed no relationship 
between study time and memory for the story with the picture 
(r‘ (32) =0. 30, p=0.l2), where r'is the Pearson product-moment 
correlation when both factors have been partialled out.
It was also suggested that children who were better at 
assessing the state of their memories would be more 
systematic in their study behaviour, and so the relation 
between self-assessment scores and study time was examined. 
The partial correlation coefficient was significant
(r'(33)=0.55; p=0.001)^ when age was partialled out.
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These relationships were also analysed for each age 
group individually. There was no support for the view 
that the relationship between - self-assessment and study 
time, increased with age.
In summary, study time predicts memory in the picture 
condition, but the correlation is not significant if 
we allow that study time is also related to memory in 
the no-picture condition. Self-assessment skills do 
however, seem to induce more careful study behaviour.
Discussion
The present experiment demonstrates that providing 
contextual information in the form of a picture helps 
very young children to remember stories more accurately.
It therefore supports the findings of Bransford and 
Johnson (1973) for adult subjects, and Harris et al (1930) 
for older children,who tested memory by recall measures.
A number of other studies do not report consistent effedts 
of context for recall measures of memory (Brown et al, 
1977a; Omansen et al, 1978); however, both those studies 
did find effects of context when questionnaire methods 
like those in the present experiment were employed. The 
present result is therefore not discrepant with any of 
the above findings. Additionally, as was argued in the 
introduction, whether or not contextual effects are
obtained in recall depends on the ambiguity of the text 
itself. If context is necessary for understanding the 
story, it is likely to influence memory. If context 
provides superfluous or redundant information it may 
not be incorporated in this way.
There was no evidence that older children made more
active use of the contextual information. Younger subjects 
were as adept at combining information from pictures 
and text in order to answer memory questions. This is 
consistent with the data of Harris et al (I960) who used 
an almost identical procedure. In contrast, Omansen et 
al (1978) found developmental increases in the ability 
to answer questions requiring inferences combining text 
and context, and Brown et al (1977) report an increase in 
theme-relevant intrusions in recall. It may well be, 
however, that such inconsistency may be explained by 
differences in the types of inferences required.and ability 
to make these may well differ across inference types. As 
Paris (1978b), Nicholas and Trabasso (1980) and Trabasso 
and Trabasso and Nicholas (1980) argue, there are many 
types of inferences and we lack an adequate taxonomy to 
analyse their differences. Although it remains to be 
demonstrated that there are actually differences in the 
inference types used in the inconsistent studies, this 
is a highly plausible explanation.
In addition to the empirical studies, a number of theor­
etical arguments were advanced supporting the view that
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use of context should increase with age. Other studies 
showed that young children sometimes completely failed 
to use cues (Kobasigawa, 1974; Ritter et al, 1973) or 
used them inefficiently (KQbasigawa, 1977); they were 
poor.at visual search (Mackworth and Bruner, 1970) and 
finally there may be developments in the ability to make 
inferences (Paris, 1978b).
One possible explanation of the failure to find such 
developmental trends is that the above experiments all 
investigated the deliberate use of inferencing.
Now, while this experiment actually gives children instru­
ctions to remember, it may well be that their behaviours 
•such as picture study are not deliberate strategies to 
remember, but simply attempts to understand a story
which interests them.
The study also attempted to establish the relationship 
between study time and performance. There was no evidence 
that children who studied the pictures for longer actually 
remembered better. It may be that study time is not a 
good means of tapping the processes underlying study, 
because it confounds how long children look with what 
they look at. •
The experiment also investigated young children’s abili­
ties to make judgements about the state of their own 
memories. It was found that 5-year-olds can correctly 
judge which of two studies is easier to understand and
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can pre- arid post-diet memory performance, although few 
subjects were able to justify their responses. This 
result is in marked contrast to other studies, e.g.
Markman (1977), Brown and Smiley (1977) and Harris et al 
(1981) which conclude that the ability to assess one’s 
own performance does not emerge before the age of 8. This 
discrepancy may be resolved by consideration of both the 
complexity of the tasks used to assess metacognition in 
those experiments and the simplicity of the judgements 
required in the present study. For example, Markman 
required that subjects not only realise that the instru­
ctions they had been given were inadequate to play a 
game, but that they demonstrate this by questioning an 
experimenter. Similarly the ability to rate units of
text in terms of their relation to the central theme of
a story (Brown and Smiley, 1977) and the detection of 
anomaly (Harris et al, 1981) would seem to demand fairly 
sophisticated metacognitive skills.
This provides further support for the arguments of Chapter 
3, that there is no single age at which a particular meta­
memory item develops. Children’s ability to assess their 
memory for text is clearly dependent on the complexity
of the judgements we require them to make in order to 
demonstrate that knowledge,and also the means by which
we allow them to demonstrate it.
The study also investigated the relationship between 
self-assessment skills and study behaviour. While it
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was found that self-assessment predicted study time,
there was no relationship between study time and memory 
performance. The data do not, therefore support the 
argument that self-assessment closely determines memory.
In this respect they are consistent with the data reported 
in the earlier experiments on the inferential cveing 
strategy.
6.3 Experiment XI: How efficient are children in their
use of pictures to aid text comprehension?
The present experiment attempts to extend the results 
of the previous experiment, by investigating children’s 
use of an array of pictures to answer questions about 
a story they had just heard. There were three major 
questions to which the study addressed itself:
(1) How readily do children think to consult pictures 
as a means to answering questions about a story they 
have been told? (Evocation).
(2) How skilled is children’s search of a picture array? 
(Efficiency).
(3) Are evocation and efficiency related? Are children 
who are adept at a particular strategy more likely to 
evoke it than those who are less proficient?
'Introduction
The previous experiment demonstrated that very young 
children were remarkably skilful at combining information
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from a single picture with a story they had just heard 
read aloud. It may be that experience in listening to 
stories with adults drawing attention to accompanying 
pictures may well contribute to this skill.
This experiment was therefore designed to investigate in 
more detail the extent of children’s skill in using 
pictures to help understand and remember text. Children 
were first told a story aloud, and as the experimenter 
read, he placed the card relevant to each part of the 
story, face-down in front of the children. Afterwards he 
asked them a series of questions about the story. The 
questions probed information which was not actually 
stated in the stories, but could be found by combining 
information from the stories with that in the pictures.
The first aim of the study was to investigate how readily 
children would think to consult the pictures in order to 
answer the questions. A study by Ritter et al (1973) 
found that children would readily employ high-associate 
pictures to cue hidden objects when the cues were visible, 
but not when the cues were face down upon the floor. 
Similarly, Kobasigawa (1974) reported that 7-year-olds 
failed to use high-associate cue cards to access the 
names of a set of pictures. In the present study, chil­
dren's readiness to employ cues was assessed by the number 
and explicitness of the prompts required to elicit cue
use.
The study also investigated the efficiency of cue use.
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There are a number of reasons to suggest young children 
may not be adept at picture search. Kobasigawa (1974) 
also reports that young children used multiple retrieval 
cues (i.e. one card to cue several animal names) in a 
highly unsystematic manner. Instead of retrieving all 
the names associated with one cue, they would remember 
one, and then look at the next cue. On returning to the 
cue, they would often access the name they had retrieved 
on the last occasion. In addition, experiments on
children's search of small-scale and natural environments
suggest that preschoolers are incapable of limiting their 
search to appropriate areas (Drozdal and Flavell, 1975; 
Wellman et al, 1979). For example, Wellman et al found 
that children would search certain locations, despite 
possessing information which would lead them to infer that 
the missing object could not be there. In the present 
picture--search task, it is also possible to limit the 
area of search. If the question probes information late 
in the story, there is little point in searching the 
early cards. It was of considerable interest to see
whether children would realise this. This skill was
examined under two different retrieval conditions. In
the first, the experimenter asked questions in a sequence 
which followed the order of events in the story. In•the 
second, questions probed the events of the story in a
random order.
A final question concerns the relationship between the 
ability to use a strategy, and the ease with which it is
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evoked. Flavell (1970) and several Russian authors
(Istomina, 1975; Leont'ev, 1975) have argued that efficiency 
and evocation are related, but it is not clear whether this 
has ever been tested. If the relationship does hold, 
we should expect children who show systematic search to 
require little prompting to access the strategy.
Method
Subjects: The subjects were 36 children between the ages 
of 3;2 and 5;2. They were divided into the usual age 
groups, with mean ages, 3;5, 4;2, and 4;10 respectively 
with 12 children in each age group.*
Procedure: Prior to any testing the experimenter spent 
some time in each nursery - school introducing the chil­
dren to a glove puppet called ''Silly Monkey’. (The 
same puppet was used in the previous experiment). By 
means of a number of memory games, the experimenter 
impressed upon the children that Silly Monkey had an 
appalling memory and required a lot of assistance in 
any game of this kind.
When this introduction was complete the experimenter 
tested the children individually in a separate room.
They were then shown Silly Monkey again, and it was 
suggested that they play Silly Monkey’s favourite 
game, which is listening to stories. The experimenter 
said "Now we’re going to listen to some stories. I 
want you to help Silly Monkey to remember the stories,
* None of these children had participated in any previous 
experiment.
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’cos you know he's got a very bad memory. If you 
remember the stories you’ll be able to answer Silly 
Monkey when he asks you about the stories. Are you 
both (points to child and puppet) ready, because I’m 
about to tell the stories? I’ve got the stories here, 
written underneath these pictures (offers child a very 
brief glimpse of the set of pictures, each with part 
of the story written underneath). Now as I tell you 
the story, I’m going to put the pictures down here in 
front of you."
The experimenter then proceeded to tell the story, 
face down
placing cards so that they lay/in order from left to 
right in front of the child. There were seven pictures 
in total. When the story was complete, Silly Monkey 
whispered something in the experimenter’s ear. The 
experimenter then said to the child, "Oh dear, guess 
what's happened. Silly Monkey has forgotten the story. 
Can he ask you some questions about it?".*(PTO)
The Monkey then asked the child a series of six 
questions, all of which required the children to look
at the cues in order to answer. If children failed
to employ the pictures the experimenter prompted them 
with the following series of hints:
E : Can you think of anything you could do to find out 
the answer? (Repeat question).
E£: Why don’t you look at the pictures? They might
help you to find the answer. (Repeat).
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* Previously the experimenter had only briefly shown 
the children the pictures. There then followed a 
series of hints suggesting that the picture would 
be useful in recall. So although there was nothing 
in the initial part of the procedure to suggest 
picture consultation/ the hints were increasingly 
explicit in indicating this. What was of interest
was how often the children needed to be told to
use cues during the question phase.
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If children still failed to look at the pictures, the 
experimenter then explicitly indicated the relevant 
picture and if necessary, the relevant part of this 
picture:
E3: I think we should look at this picture. Now....
(Repeat question).
E.: Look here (Experimenter indicates relevant part
of the picture) Now.... (Repeat question).
Many children spontaneously or under implicit prompting 
began to search the pictures. The experimemter noted 
their pattern of search as they turned the pictures
over. If the child terminated the search unsuccess­
fully, the experimenter offered a further prompt:
P^ : Why don't you look at another picture? (Repeat
question).
If the children again terminated search unsuccessfully, 
or if they found the correct picture, but failed to 
answer the question, the experimenter saids
P^: I think it’s this picture we should look at.
(Repeat question).
If the child still failed to answer, then -fche experi­
menter explicitly indicated the relevant part of the 
picture.
P»: Look here..... Now, (Repeat question).
The children received two stories.with six questions 
for each story. The stories were called George the Owl 
has an Idea and Mick the Duck goes on an Adventure.
They were adaptations' of two children’s stories using
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7 of the 12 pictures which went with the original story.
They were of approximately equal length. The stories and 
pictures III. and IV respectively
/are included in Appendices/. As already described, in 
one case question order followed story sequence and 
in the other the questions were random. Story order, 
randomness of which story, and whether questions were 
initially sequential or random was counterbalanced at 
each age level.
Results
The data for the amount of initial prompting to induce 
picture-use, prompting during search, and the number of 
cards searched are all analysed separately. This has 
been done despite the fact that the measures are not 
independent (e.g. a high degree of initial prompting or 
prompting during search should reduce the number of cards 
searched). The fact that the measures are not independent 
does mean, however, that the separate analyses are con­
servative in any results they yield.
(.a) Prompting to evoke strategy use
Table 27 indicates the mean score for prompts required to 
induce strategy use at the different age levels, over all 
trials. Children requiring the most explicit hint (E^) 
were given a score of 4, those requiring E to produce the 
strategy were given a score of 3, and so on for the resp­
ective cues. These scores were summed over questions and 
stories. As Table 27 indicates, very few hints indeed
were required to induce the children to consult the 
pictures. Despite the fact that few prompts were required 
to initiate picture search only one child spontaneously 
consulted the pictures. In addition, there were no 
developmental trends. This was verified by conducting 
a 3 (Age) x 2 (Order of Presentation) x 2 (Story) x 2 
(Random/Sequential Question Order). There were no signi­
ficant effects.
(b) Efficiency of Search
Two different measures were taken of efficiency of search. 
These were the number of prompts required and the number
of cards searched to arrive at the correct answer.
The scores for the prompt analysis were analysed in an
identical manner to the above analysis. Prompts P^, P^
and P^ were scored 1, 2, and 3 respectively and the data
are shown in Table 28. The data were again subjected to
3 (Age) x 2 (Order of Presentation) x 2 (Story) x 2 
ANOVA
(Random/Sequential Question Order)/. This time, age diff­
erences did emerge (F (2 , .24) =3.53, p=0.04)*, and it was 
also clear that with random questions more directive 
prompting was required (F(.l, 24)=5.72, p=0.025). Table 
28 indicates that while older children are equally good 
under conditions of random or sequential questions, and 
younger children equally poor under such conditions, the
questions7manipulation does seem to influence the behaviour 
interaction
of the middle group. This " was not, however, stati­
stically significant (F(2,24)=1.292 , p=0.29).
* Post-hoc comparisons using Neuman-Keuls indicates the oldest 
group required less prompting than either of the younger 
groups (CRW_X = 17.00, p<0.05).
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The second measure of efficiency was the total number of
cards searched. The results are indicated in Table 29.
Overall the number of cards searched does decrease with
age, and random questions again produce less efficient 
search than sequential questions. The data were analysed 
in a 3 (Age) x 2 (Order) x 2 (Random/Serial) analysis of 
variance. The effects of Age (F(.2, 24)=3.45, p=0.048)* **and 
question type were significant (F(l, 24)=8.78, p=0.007).
The data for card search were also subjected to a further 
set of analyses to establish why older children needed to 
search fewer cards to arrive at solution. Table.30 shows 
the frequency with which children were able to select the
correct card first time. It is clear from the table that
Serial questioning leads to far more direct solutions
than Random questioning. This conclusion was supported by
2 ’ a x analysis, when data from the 0-3 cells and 4 and 5 
cells'was collapsed. (x^CD=24.99, p<<0.00l). A x2
analysis of the data collapsed across these cells also
. 2 indicates age differences in direct search.(x (2)=9.72, 
p=0.03). If the data for random and serial question 
order are considered separately, a different picture 
emerges. There are no age trends for direct search for 
the random order questions, but analysis for serial
questions suggests large differences between the age 
2groups (x (2)=11.70, p=0.003). This was because of the 
2superiority of the two older groups (% (1)=6.3, p<0.02).
The reason for the greater direct search skill of the older
*Eost hoc comparisons-using Neuman-Keuls showed a difference 
between the oldest group and the two youngest ones (CR., =
28.08, 0.05) . ~
**This was due to the two older groups showing more direct 
search than the youngest (X2(l)=3.86, p< 0.05)
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children emerged from a detailed analysis of search 275
patterns. It was found that a large number of children 
were employing a search strategy in which they started 
at the left of the array, and turned over each card from 
left to right in sequence. If the questions follow story 
sequence, then children are able to produce a large number 
of direct searches, simply by turning over the card next 
in sequence to the one they used to answer the previous 
question.
Children were classified as using this strategy if they
accessed five of the six cards in correct sequence,
starting at the first card. Sixty percent of the children
were classified as employing this strategy on the serial
questions, and twenty-five percent of the children used
it on the random order questions. The differential use
of the strategy according to question order was statis- 
2tically significant (x (1)=6.91, p=0.009). Separate
analyses for the different question orders showed-that
older children were more likely to use the strategy than 
2younger children for serial questions (x (2)=6.17, p=0.04),* 
but not for random questions (Fisher exact p=0.23).
A number of other strategies were also isolated. One 
involved a sequential search from left-to-right, or • right- 
to-left. The criterion used for such a search was any 
three pictures accessed in correct sequence. Children 
were more likely to search left-to-right (i.e. in story 
sequence) than right-to-left. (z=2.80, p=0.005). Older 
children showed slightly more use of such exhaustive
* Again this was the result of the superiority of the two 
older groups (%2 (1) = 4.53, p< 0.04)
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strategies although this trend was not significant.
The final prediction of the experiment concerned the
relationship between evocation and efficiency. Two
separate analyses were conducted for the directive
prompts and for the number of cards searched. In each 
case, the contribution due to age was partialled out. The 
initial prompt-directive prompt analysis yielded a corr­
elation of r'^33^.35(p=0.10) and the initial prompt-card
search yielded a correlation of r^2 3^j=0.26 (p=0.32)J A 
Pearson
group by group analysis did yield two significant/corr- 
elations for the oldest group (r^Q^=0.54, p=0.03; 
r ^o) • 51 / p<0.05).
Discussion
The data on initial prompting suggest that children
require some assistance before they will consult face­
down pictures even when they know these pictures relate .
to the text they have just heard. This may not be surprising, 
since the children may not have known that they were 
supposed to use pictures. Even given this problem of 
realising picture relevance, the children still need to 
be told a number of times to use the pictures.
In addition, there were no developmental trends for the 
evocation prompts. The younger children would turn over 
the pictures as readily as the 5-year-olds. What was 
interesting, however, was the difference in efficiency 
of search among the groups. The younger children seemed 
to understand that it was appropriate' to look at the cards,
*The correlation coefficients and their significance levels 
are derived from the analyses of Cohen and Cohen (1975).
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but they were unable to find the relevant card without 
the assistance of the experimenter.
The older children showed greater skill at accessing the 
appropriate card, and combining the information in it with 
the information from the story they had heard. This 
was demonstrated by them requiring fewer prompts to find 
the appropriate card and give the answer. Older children 
also searched fewer cards before finding the relevant
one.
In addition to these developmental differences, it was 
clear that there was a massive difference in performance 
between the random and sequential question conditions..
This cannot be explained by memory factors, as the pre­
sentation was the same for both stories. A closer exam­
ination of the search patterns suggests the reason for 
the superiority of the sequential condition. In this con­
dition, children searched efficiently by closely following 
the story sequence by their search. Questions about the 
early part of the story elicit immediate search of the 
appropriate (left-hand) .end of the array. On later quest­
ions, the children bypass the early pictures which they 
have already searched, and directly access pictures later 
in the sequence. Some measure of the accuracy of their 
sequential search is shown by the fact that ten of the 
oldest group managed to access the appropriate picture on 
four out of five trials, at their first search 'attempt.
The results reported suggest precocity in initial cue 
use by the younger children, who require the same amount 
of initial prompting as the older group. Analysis of 
their search behaviour suggests, however,, that initial cue 
use may not be the result of deliberate strategies. These 
children will readily consult the array ofspictures, but 
require much prompting before they can isolate the appro­
priate picture. It is as though they realise that cons-’ 
ulting the pictures is somehow appropriate, but have no 
idea of exactly how they are to be used. Their willingness 
to consult pictures may also be influenced by the experi­
menter’s hints and their previous experience of listening 
to stories from which they have derived the notion that 
pictures 'go with' stories.
The above analysis suggests that stimulus structure and 
previous experience with particular materials does influ­
ence the behaviours children produce.
The results of strategy search are also amenable to this 
type of analysis. At face-value, the data suggest that 
young children are capable of conducting highly sophis­
ticated searches which bypass pictures which have already 
been consulted. This conclusion is somewhat problematic
for a number of reasons. It contradicts the results of
other studies which have found little evidence for such
sophisticated search strategies (e.g. Drozdal and Flavell, 
1975; Wellman et al, 1979), and also the results of
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Experiments II and III which show young children are
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poor at keeping track of previous correct solutions. Two 
pieces of evidence suggest that children’s search patterns 
may not be the result of complex eliminative strategies. 
Firstly, the use of the eliminative search strategy is 
limited to the sequential question condition, and secondly 
the strategy itself may be explained by a simple heuristic. 
The heuristic is to turn over the card to the right of 
the one just searched. The behaviour looks even less 
like a complex inferential strategy if we bear in mind 
that left-to-right exposure is the norm when adults read 
stories with children. These speculations combined with 
the finding that children in the random condition showed 
far more left-to-right than right-to-left searches, 
strongly suggest that left-to-right search is an over­
learnt behaviour for the materials used in this study.
It just happens to be appropriate and effective in achie- 
14ving recall, when questions respect this ordering. The 
findings that young children may consult pictures, without 
understanding how they can help memory, and older children 
employ "strategies" which are highly dependent on the 
nature of the task materials, suggests that behaviours may 
be highly influenced by the subjects’ previous experience 
with the task. It may be that subjects’ actions are more
the result of overlearnt routines with certain materials
than intentional plans designed to benefit memory. In
14 This should not be taken to indicate that there is 
no evidence for "cognitive" strategies which rely on 
inferencing. In fact, the existence of such strategies 
is demonstrated in the random question condition, in 
which direct search frequency was above chance.
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this respect the results are consistent with the specu­
lations of Ryan et al (1970) and Gordon and Flavell (1977) 
about cuing behaviours. These experimenters suggest 
children may often use cues appropriately, in a manner 
which facilitates memory, but without any understanding of
how this comes about.
6.4 General Conclusions
The two experiments in this chapter apparently indicate 
that young children are capable of employing highly 
sophisticated memory strategies when familiar materials 
such as stories are used. Thus, Experiment X suggests 
that preschoolers will readily consult a picture in order 
to disambiguate text, and that 3-year-olds are as able 
to do this as older preschoolers. Experiment XI offered 
two examples of precocity: 3-year-olds are as likely to 
use picture cues to answer questions about text as 5-year- 
olds; and all groups show some ability to avoid the search 
of redundant pictures. There are a number of reasons to 
suggest these may not be intentional strategies, however. 
Firstly, the behaviours are highly-dependent on the pre­
sence of particular stimulus-structures. Thus, children’s 
use of pictures to help understand text (Experiment X) is 
disrupted by having the pictures placed face-down in 
front of them, rather than immediately visible. (Experiment 
XI). If children were employing some form of deliberate 
cueing strategy, the visibility of the cues should make
little difference to their usage.* The stimulus-dependent
* Although as I have already noted, the children may not 
have realised they were supposed to use cues.
nature of "strategic" behaviours is also shown by the 
fact that the ."efficient" search strategy of Experiment 
XI is only evoked when sequential questions are used.
Finally it was found that 3-year-olds in Experiment XI 
would turn over pictures when questioned about text, but 
had no idea of how exactly to use these pictures. In 
all three cases, it seems that what we are describing are 
overlearnt behaviours which are appropriate to the material^ 
in question, which are not intentional plans to benefit 
memory, but which just happen to have memory pay-offs.
There are some theoretical implications which can be
drawn from these studies. The first is that recent
accounts of memory which stress the preschooler’s ability
to employ intentional strategies (e.g. Wellman, 1977a) may
overestimate deliberate memory abilities in this age
range. Secondly the finding that not all "strategic
looking" behaviours are intentional may explain how some
strategies come to enter the child's repertoire. A
possible mechanism by which this is achieved may be that
under memory instructions young children produce behaviours 
are
which/not directed to memory goals. These behaviours are 
overlearnt and dependent on the child’s normal activities 
in the task in question. If the behaviours happen to 
benefit memory arid the children detect this, or they are 
given feedback, the behaviour may enter the repertoire as 
an intentional strategy.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Introduction
In this concluding chapter I wish to focus upon three 
different sets of issues. The first two directly concern 
the data. Two reviews of memory development, (Flavell, 
1971 and Brown, 1975) offer descriptions of the pre­
schooler as being largely incapable of deliberate memori­
sing largely as a result of deficits in metamemory. They 
argue that increases in children’s knowledge of their 
own memory processes is largely responsible for the rapid 
development of strategic memory skills in the early school 
years. In contrast, Wellman (1977a) reviewed a number 
of experiments which demonstrate the ability of pre­
schoolers to use intentional strategies, and conducted 
further studies that demonstrated some metamemory know­
ledge in this age group (Wellman, 1977b, 1978). Since 
the majority of the experiments I conducted have studied 
preschoolers, it should be possible to determine which 
is the more accurate depiction of the memory skills of 
this age group.
The second problem addressed is that of change. It will 
be argued, in contrast to Brown (1975, 1978) and Flavell 
(1971), that memory development is not the result of
changes in metamemory. In fact, I shall argue that
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exactly the opposite view is the case, arid that metamemory 
development is itself the result of the development of 
memory strategies.
Finally, I shall discuss how the views offered here reflect 
on a number of recent controversies in developmental 
psychology. I shall discuss the issue of context- 
specificity, and offer a number of reasons why behaviours 
do not generalise across situations. I shall then look 
at competence in preschoolers, and the characterisation 
of adult memory and focus on the general issue of change 
in memory skills. In conclusionrI investigate the role 
of the environment and suggest it offers some insights 
into the above problems.
7.2 ' Memory in preschoolers
In his 1971 article ’What is memory development the devel­
opment of?', Flavell concluded that "deliberate memorizing 
looks like a clear instance of planful, intentional, 
goal-directed, future-oriented behaviour, and such behaviour 
is hardly the stock-in-trade of the typical 4-year-old".(p.-276) 
This view is endorsed by Brown (1975) who argues that 
"the young child does not seem to realize that he needs 
to memorize" .(p. 112) In direct contrast to this Wellman (1977a) 
reviews five studies which clearly indicate the use of 
intentional memory strategies. In addition he found that 
preschoolers had some idea of the importance of certain 
memory variables such as the number of items or length
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of study time (Wellman, 1977b, 1978). It is clearly of 
some importance to establish the exact nature of pre­
school memory and metamemory because, as Gelman (1978) has 
argued for cognitive .development, this has clear impli­
cations for our model of development.
Gn the face of it, we have in this thesis a number of experiments which 
suggest a high degree of sophistication with deliberate 
memory strategies. Thus, children as young as 3 years
will make use of cues which enable them to infer the
identity of animals they cannot see. They will also.- 
readily consult a picture placed in front of them while 
they are listening to a story. Again this behaviour results 
in improvements in memory. If picture cues are placed 
face-down in front of the children they are a little less 
willing to consult them, but they do so after some promp­
ting by the experimenter.* In addition, the older chil­
dren show highly efficient search behaviours; they directly 
consult the relevant picture, without redundant search 
of previous locations.
A similar picture seems to emerge from the monitoring 
studies. Although children cannot accurately assess the 
absolute level of their performance, they can detect 
changes in their performance on the spatial location task.
By the age of five, they also demonstrate some ability 
to monitor the state of their understanding, and predict 
memory for text. The transfer tasks al&o suggest that, 
if strategy-use results in large performance changes, this
* This need for prompting may arise from children’s failure 
to realise that they were meant to consult cues.
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influencesthe generalisation of the strategy, which implies 
that children as young as three can detect such effects.
This picture of the preschooler with a large and flexible 
range of strategic and monitoring skills is extremely 
misleading, because if we consider the "strategic'' 
behaviours in more detail, it becomes clear that many of 
them do not deserve such a description. If a behaviour is 
to be classified as intentional, it is clear that it 
should be directed towards the achievement of some goal.
If we consider the monitoring data for the experiments 
it becomes clear that strategy use was independent of its 
effect on performance.
Considering first the spatial location task, four pieces 
of evidence suggest that looking at cues was unrelated to 
the goal of remembering. Firstly, children who estimated 
that they were performing at ceiling without cues', still 
looked at the cues when they were provided, as much as 
children who estimated lower levels. (Experiments \rand VI). 
The overestimaters should not have used cues because there'
was no need for them to do so. Similarly in Experiment VI 
children did not seem to modify their behaviour in accord­
ance with memory goals. Thus there was no evidence that 
children who perceived cue use as improving performance 
were more likely to maintain cue use, or that those per­
ceiving a decrease in performance dropped the behaviour. 
Finally, in Experiment VI children continued to use array 
cues despite the fact that they did not influence
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performance. An additional piece of evidence that cue
use was certainly not strategic is that some children
looked at the cues without making the inference. Now
some of these were in the youngest group, so it might
be argued that they were unable to make the inference.
However as inferencing was at ceiling for the older
groups, this argument cannot be mhde for those groups.
Cue use in the story comprehension task also looks
suspiciously involuntary. Despite the avid attention
paid to the picture, children in the two younger groups 
were unable to establish .that it affected performance, and 
only five of the older .children could explain this.
such
Another reason for arguing that/behaviours may not be 
that
intentional is / they are "stimulus-driven". One mani­
festation of this might be that the behaviour depends 
critically on a particular stimulus configuration, any 
modification to which changes the behaviour. So, we might 
argue that if children were intentionally studying the 
picture in Experiment X(one cue text comprehension) • accor­
ding to the strategy of using pictures to improve memory 
for text, we should not expect a minor modification
(placing the cards face-down)* to influence use of the 
15strategy. For the younger children, in Experiment XI
(7 Pictures cues and Text), behaviour also looks "stimulus
15 This finding cannot be attributed to any peculiar 
feature of this experiment. The same result is 
reported by Ritter et al (1973) using a different 
prodedure and materials.
* As I have explained earlier, however, there are problems 
with making inferences from this failure to spontaneously 
consult face-down pictures.
driven”. The children will readily turn over one or two 
pictures at the experimenter’s suggestion, but go no 
further in using the pictures to answer his question.
Finally the search behaviours shown by the children in 
this experiment are also highly dependent on the structure 
of the stimulus. The "direct search” strategy under 
sequential questioning also seemed highly related to 
stereotypical activities when young children look at 
books. This is not to say that all the children were 
producing the behaviour without attention to memory goals, 
merely that left-to-right search is a high probability 
response when adults ask children questions about stories 
in picture books. In fact, some children may discover 
the strategy by such a means. They may produce the behav­
iour on prompting from the experimenter, and find that 
the pictures enable them to answer the questions. This
'accidental discovery' route may provide an important 
means by which new behaviours enter the strategic memory 
repertoire.
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In conclusion therefore, although Wellman has evidence for 
some clear examples of strategy use in very young chil­
dren, the results of the present studies suggest that 
many ’strategic-looking’ behaviours may not be intentional 
plans invoked to mediate memory. This argument is streng­
thened by recent reviews of organisational factors in 
memory by Ornstein and Corsale (1979) and Lange (1978) in 
which they argue that observations of clustering in 
young children are not strategic but the involuntary
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effect of the child’s semantic system. Likewise Gordon 
and Flavell (1977) and Ritter (1976) argue that cue use 
in young children has rather more of the characteristics 
of stimulus-response behaviour than intentional strategy
use.
7.3 What develops?
If it is indeed the case that much of the behaviour of
preschool children in memory situations is involuntary, 
we must explain how it is that such behaviours come to 
be used as deliberate memory strategies. It was argued 
that cue use (in the spatial location task in particular) 
looked to be largely independent of memory performance.
How then do young children learn to associate their 
behaviour with memory goals?
It is argued that two mechanisms may be responsible for 
this: feedback and self-monitoring. Both are means by 
which children become aware of the implications of their 
behaviour for memory. In the case of feedback, others 
such as peers, parents or teachers give them information 
about the results of the behaviours they have just pro­
duced. It is clear that if we are to understand the
importance of a process such as feedback in the development 
of memory or other cognitive skills, we must study its 
role in the natural environment. In addition,as Heisel 
and Ritter (1981) and Ringel and Springer (1980) have 
shown, there may be different types of feedback. Younger
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children may not only require information about changes 
in their performance, but may also need this information 
to be specifically attributed to the behaviours they have 
produced. Experiment IX demonstrates that information 
about the effect of picture cueingon performance does 
significantly influence transfer of this strategy.
Another mechanism by which children may become aware of 
the effects of their behaviours is by self-monitoring. 
Spontaneous checking of memory performance may lead them 
to attribute changes in performance to these behaviours.
Of course, the effectiveness of such a mechanism depends 
crucially upon the monitoring skills of the young chil­
dren and also upon the size and detectability of the 
changes which result from the use of experimenter- 
induced behaviours. One reason why behaviours may not 
generalise to serve the memory function is that young 
children are unable to detect the effects that they- have 
upon performance. Experiments V and VI show that pre­
schoolers are not able to make accurate absolute judgements 
about the level of their performance on the spatial memory 
task. In addition such changes were relatively small
(one or two items), and may not have been detectable. The 
importance of making performance change detectable was
shown in Experiment VIII in whichcueing behaviours 
which resulted in large improvements in performance were 
more likely to lead to strategy transfer than less effective 
cueing strategies. One other factor which seems to influ­
ence detectability of induced strategy use is the interval
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between the assessment (no strategy) session and the
instruction (induced strategy) session. Young children may 
not be able to make a comparison of performance if the inter­
val between non-use and use is long in duration.* It is 
argued that the discrepancy between Experiment VII and the 
Kennedy and Miller (1976) and Keeney et al (1967) studies may 
be due to such memory factors. It is also possible that the 
size of the change in performance following induced strategy 
use also influences children’s interpretations of what is 
responsible for such change. If strategy effects are small, 
they may be attributed by the children to other factors such 
as practice.
It is clear that a number of factors interact to influence the 
detection of the effects of induced and involuntary -behaviours. 
Appeal to such factors may explain the absence of transfer in 
other experiments where the subjects are older children who are 
capable of accurate monitoring (e.g. Rosner, 1971).
It has been argued that young children’s production of certain 
behaviours in memory situations suggests these behaviours are 
not intentional strategies invoked to benefit memory. These 
behaviours may be produced for two reasons: either adults 
instruct children to produce them, or children invoke them for 
some reason other than to remember better. These I shall call 
instructed and involuntary behaviours respectively. It is 
also argued that two mechanisms, feedback and self-monitoring 
may be responsible for the conversion of both types of be­
haviours into memory strategies. Instruction may be one 
setting in which teachers induce certain behaviours and
*This factor was suggested by a comparison of the results of 
Experiment VII with Keeney et al (1967) and Kennedy and 
Miller (1976), it was not experimentally determined.
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provide feedback about the effects of such behaviours on 
memory. The question of how involuntary behaviours develop 
is more problematic.. Monitoring is not likely to be the 
mechanism of change for two reasons. Firstly/ for
monitoring to be effective, there has to be a change in 
behaviour, in order that children can monitor the effects of 
behaviour change on memory' performance. In most situations 
where children do produce such involuntary behaviours, there 
is no such behaviour change. A second reason why monitoring 
may not provide a good explanation of strategy development 
is that monitoring is not accurate in young children, although, 
as Experiments V and VI show, they are not totally
insensitive to the level of their own performance. Feedback 
is also problematic as an explanation of strategy development 
from involuntary behaviours because adults may not always 
be present to provide it.
The above account suggests how involuntary behaviours 
already in the repertoire but serving other ends, and
instructed strategies might come to serve the memory function. 
It leaves a number of other factors unexplained, such as the 
origins of involuntary behaviours, the later development of 
intentional strategy use, and improvements in monitoring 
skills. I shall now try to answer these questions.
The glib answer to the problem of the development cf 
involuntary behaviours is that they are activities (or 
cognitive structures) which have developed in other areas 
of cognition and language. Thus the skills of looking at 
pictures while comprehending text, and also searching
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pictures in story sequence, are learnt during the •
child’s considerable experience of listening to stories.16
Similarly, inferencing may be crucial in the development 
of perception (.Bryant, 19 74) and language (Macnamara,
1972) and hence have developed in these areas. Experiment 
IV however, shows that the particular type of inference 
required in the spatial memory task may not have fully 
developed in the early preschool years. This may be one 
reason why use of the inferencing strategy increases 
during the preschool period. Chi (1978) has demonstrated 
that 5-year-olds are much slower to name objects than 
adults. It may be that changes in underlying skills such 
as naming and sequencing of names are responsible for 
the emergence of the rehearsal strategy. Indeed research 
on the development of rehearsal by Kingsley and Hagen
(1969) and by Ornstein and his colleagues (e.g. Om-stein 
and Naus, 1978) suggests that rehearsal skills are const- ', 
rained by the speed of naming. Thus Kingsley and- Hagen 
report that 5-year-olds were unable to rehearse items in 
sets of two or three "despite understanding in principle 
what was required of them" . Op.45) Omstein and Naus found that
adults were unable to rehearse items in sets of more than
five. Similarly it may be that older children’s greater
facility with category structure, as documented by Rosinski
et al (1975) enables them to apply this knowledge in the
sort of category-sort strategy reported by Moely et al(1969)
l"6 There is a deeper argument that the very structures 
which underlie the comprehension of stories are 
derived from the structure of everyday episodes.
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If memory development does depend on developments in
other areas of cognition, we might expect that subjects 
with no knowledge of those areas would have few available 
strategies. This was substantially what Chi (1978) 
found. Subjects who were highly competent at chess-playing 
were much better at remembering chess positions than 
subjects with little chess ability. In summary then, 
developments elsewhere in cognition or language produce 
either activities (Experiments X and XI)z or cognitive 
structures (Rosinski et al, 1975) which are then utilised 
for memory goals. The argument bears a similarity to 
the cognition hypothesis advanced by Cromer (1974) to 
explain language development, which concluded that although 
some sequences in language development could be explained 
by changes in the cognitive system this could not account 
for all such sequences. In particular, the development of 
certain aspects of syntax seems to be the result of changes 
internal to the domain of language. '
Similarly, changes in cognition, language and social 
activities do not appear to be sufficient to explain all . 
of memory development. The model proposes that strategies 
are limited to behaviours which are produced either because 
they are what the child normally does in that situation 
(e.g. name objects, look at pictures with stories) or 
because the experimenter suggests them. These become 
strategies once the child becomes (or is made) aware of 
their positive effect on memory performance. (cf. McShane's
1979, 1980 theory of the development of naming). However
this model cannot explain what many people consider to 
be the essential feature of adult memory - its creativity, 
(e.g. Reitman, 1970). The model can only explain general­
isation - how behaviours already in the repertoire can 
become part of the memory system. According to Reitman, 
adults are not limited in this way, but can invent 'new'
behaviours to meet situational demands. How is this
freedom from involuntary or elicited behaviours brought 
about? According to Flavell (1971) and Brown (1978) it 
is the result of the development of knowledge about memory. 
Knowledge about memory variables, limitations, processes 
and situations enables the adult to generate an appro­
priate strategy to meet a particular situation. I wish 
to make two points about metamemory: the first concerns 
its existence and the second its relationship to memory 
behaviour. No-one would deny the mass of evidence 
indicating that people are in possession of a wide range 
of facts about memory, and that this body of knowledge 
undergoes large increases with age. Any theory of memory 
or cognitive development must therefore offer some explan­
ation of this. What may be the case, however, is that its 
role in explaining memory has been overestimated. Although
this matter will be dealt with in more detail later I
shall briefly discuss the metamemory-memory relationship, 
before returning to the subject of how metamemory itself 
develops.
It has already been argued that one feature of adult memory 
is the ability to invent 'new’ strategies to meet the
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demands of a novel memory task. If we examine what is 
generally implied in this account, we find that the 
routine generated to solve the novel problem is a modi­
fication of a routine used elsewhere in cognition to 
solve a different problem. This suggests that ’novel’ 
behaviours crucially depend on developments elsewhere in 
the cognitive system. It may be that part of the adults’ 
proposed ability to generate more novel problem solutions 
than the child can be explained by the fact that adults 
have more routines available. In conclusion, part of the 
flexibility and ability to modify strategies to meet new 
demands, which is commonly attributed to metamemory may 
be explained by increase in the number of cognitive 
routines available,elsewhere in the child’s repertoire.
To give an example, children show an increasing tendency 
with age, to cluster together items of the same taxonomic 
category in recall (Onrstein and Co.rsale, 1979) . . It is 
unclear how much of this is due to changes in the child's 
conceptual system and how much to the intentional insti­
gation of a category-structured retrieval plan. My 
point is not that metamemory and intentional strategy use 
is unimportant in memory, merely that some of the develop­
ments explained by appeals to metamemory may be the results 
of developments elsewhere in the system.
All this does nothing towards explaining how metamemory
('the body of knowledge') itself might develop. It is 
possible, however, that the model offered for the
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development of early strategies may shed some light on 
this. It was argued that involuntary or induced behaviours 
influence memory and that the child becomes aware of 
this. This awareness is probably induced by feedback, as 
monitoring is unlikely to be very efficient in very young 
children, although on simple '.searches it may be obvious 
whether or not a behaviour is successful. By one means 
or another, then, young children become aware that the 
things they do have implications for memory. If children 
come to realise that this applies over a variety of 
contexts, then they may form the rule that behaviours 
influence memory. This is the concept of strategy which 
underlies all other developments in metamemory. Exten­
sions to this knowledge may follow from the realisation 
that different behaviours have different effects on memory
which may lead the child to an awareness of the structure 
17of strategies. It may well be possible that metamemory 
does influence strategy use in older subjects under 
certain circumstances, but such influence has yet to be 
demonstrated. In the present discussion I wish merely to 
point out that the concept of metamemory may not be neces­
sary to explain many of the phenomena for which it has 
been invoked, and also that the origins of metamemory may 
be in involuntary routines.
Finally there is the question of the development of
monitoring. It is clear that there is no single cognitive
T7 All this knowledge may not be conscious, and may only 
be accessed when specific questions are asked which 
probe it.
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entity which represents monitoring, because it can consist 
of a whole range of different skills ranging from the 
simple detection of the result of an action Can ability 
in no way unique to man) to the complex multi-factor 
interpretations of ones own behaviour which are a feature 
of adult social cognition. Since this is the case there 
is no one age at which ’the ability’ to monitor will 
emerge. Thus, the child’s ability or monitoring skill, 
will depend on the information-processing demands of the 
particular situation. Thus, in the spatial location task, 
accurate monitoring required children to compare the 
responses they had generated with the actual animals 
situated under each cup. This requires both retention 
(of the names) and comparison skills. In addition the 
experimenter asked the children to make a decision about 
each location. This is clearly more demanding than the 
global approximations which were necessary in Experiment
X. '
Given the important role assigned to the development of 
monitoring in this account, it might be argued that we 
have not solved the problems of memory development, but
resituated them in a new construct. This is not the case 
for we have some idea of the processes underlying moni­
toring. In addition, it has been clearly demonstrated 
that the information from monitoring (or procedures which 
avoid the necessity for monitoring) do influence strategy
selection. Also there are a number of factors which we
can manipulate to investigate its effectiveness.
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7.4 Relevance of these results for recent' issue's' in
developmental psychology
7.4.1 Context-specificity
One of the features of Piaget’s theory of cognitive devel­
opment^ which has given rise to an enormous amount of 
recent controversy is the assumption of the context- 
freeness of cognitive-structures. According to Piaget, 
once a structure enters the child’s repertoire, it 
immediately generalises to all appropriate situations. 
There have been any number of experimental demonstrations 
that this is not the case (e.g. Donaldson, 1978)/ but more 
recently a number of models of development have built in 
the assumption of context-specificity. Thus Keil (1981) 
offers an account of development in which thought is 
domain-specific. A different approach has been adopted 
by Fischer (1980) who argues that specific environmental 
experiences determine the differential rates of develop­
ment of different cognitive acquisitions.
The experiments conducted here provide evidence for the 
context-specificity of memory, but they also suggest that 
there are a number of different reasons underlying the 
failure of a routine to generalise across situations. 
These results suggest that memory, like cognition, is 
context-specific, but that accounts which attempt to 
offer a unitary explanations of context-specificity 
(e.g. Donaldson) are misleading.
The first type of context-specificity - is the failure to ' 
evoke a behaviour or skill which is clearly ’in’ the 
cognitive repertoire. Thus some children do not spon­
taneously rehearse (Experiment VII) or use pictures to 
cue the locations of objects (Experiments VIII and IX) and 
yet they can be induced to do so by minimal amounts of 
prompting or training. This sort of production deficit 
has been widely reported in the literature (e.g. Flavell, 
1970) and the standard demonstration has been to show (a) 
the absence of a behaviour when the experimenter does not 
prompt it J and (b) its presence following- instruction or 
prompting. The experiments reported here also include a 
different type of context-specificity which seems to be 
amenable to the same sort of analysis. In Experiment XI 
children did not consult pictures to answer questions 
about text, and yet they readily did so when listening 
to stories (Experiment X).* This also seems to be a type 
of production deficit, but one which is influenced by 
the structure of the experimental materials and notby 
experimenter intervention. These results are similar to 
the findings of Cole et al (1971a) and Moely and Shapiro
(.19 71) who demonstrated that using blocked presenta­
tion of taxonomically related items in lists (i.e. 
all items from the same category are presented together) 
induced recall patterns which reflected category 
structure. This was much reduced when presentation, 
order randomised category items. The influence of the
structure of the materials is also demonstrated in
Experiment XI where use of the direct search strategy was
* I have already noted the problems with this conclusion.
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influenced by question order and its relation to story
structure.
Another example of the failure to evoke a behaviour ’in ’
the repertoire occurs in the transfer experiments (Experiments
VIII and IX). The children who fail to transfer are
obviously capable of producing the behaviour in the
training session, but do not do so in the new situation.
One factor which seems to influence strategy evocation
in transfer seems to be the effectiveness of the behaviour.
Thus, if children are given information about the
efficiency of a given behaviour (Experiment IX) or the 
behaviour is more efficient and they can detect this 
(Experiment VIII) they are more likely to generalise
it.
Yet another factor which seems to influence context-
specificity is age. Thus, older children seem to have 
fewer production deficits (Flavell, 1970), or are more 
likely to transfer strategies (Experiment VIII). This 
has generally been attributed to the intentional operation 
of memory, in which developments in metamemory enable 
children to 'consider their thoughts as cognitive objects’ 
and hence apply them across a variety of situations.
This explanation may not be entirely necessary how­
ever if we allow that behaviours (or strategies) 
generalise across more situations with age. This may be 
related to the underlying development of the behaviour.
Thus, young children lack the ability to name quickly
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and to sequence items - it is therefore hardly surprising 
that their rehearsal skills are limited. Similarly 
Esposito (1975) has demonstrated that the overlearning 
of a response facilitates positive transfer.
A completely different reason for context-specificity 
is evidenced in Experiments I, XI and III. Children 
seem to produce the inferential skill in Experiments II 
and III despite its absence in Experiment I. Such 
differences are not limited to the youngest group, 
who have deficits in the inferencing skill (Experiment 
IV), but also occur in the two older groups. The reason 
for the failure to inference in these groups would 
seem to lie in deficits in auxiliary skills: children 
are unable to keep track of the objects at previous 
locations, and in consequence lack the information nece­
ssary for the inference. Similarly, some children did 
not look at the monitoring cues and were unable to make 
the inferences until the experimenter indicated the cues.
Thus four factors seem to influence the context-specificity 
of memory skills, these being the stimulus environment, 
information about skill effectiveness, agezand deficits ' 
in auxiliary skills. I shall now attempt to relate -this 
to other research on cognitive and language development.
The notion that features of the stimulus environment
influence the skills produced has been advanced by both 
Bruner (1966) arid Donaldson (1978). These authors both
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argue that cognitive skills first emerge in a privileged 
set of contexts and gradually generalise until their 
usage reflects that of adults. In neither case is it 
clear whether skills are thought to be innate - i.e. if 
we could find the 'right context' such skills would be 
in evidence in neonates. If not, then the theories 
should state how change occurs. If either of these argu­
ments is to provide the basis of a principled account 
of cognitive development it is clear that they must 
offer (1) an analysis of situations to enable us to pre­
dict whether or not they are privileged and (2) an account 
of the generalisation process which enables behaviours 
to be evoked under the appropriate circumstances. I 
shall be more concerned here with the analysis of 
situations offered by the two accounts, the problem of 
developmental change will be discussed in a later section. 
Bruner’s argument seems to be that cognitive skills 
will emerge much earlier If we manipulate the experimental 
context to avoid them invoking the wrong set of rules. 
Bruner offers support for his position by. the demonstration 
that liquid conservation responses are generated by 
young children when one feature of the environment is 
manipulated. This involves the removal of 'perceptual 
seduction' which is achieved by conducting the transfer 
of liquid behind a screen. However, Bruner gives no 
analysis of a dimension of 'perceptual seductivity'.
The same can be said for Donaldson's synthesis. In 
contrast to Bruner, she does however offer some suggestions
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about the features of the situations in which we might 
find early emerging cognitive skills. Donaldson argues 
that if we manipulate the structure of the situations in 
order that they "make human sense" (p. 24) or that the 
"motives and intentions of the characters are entirely 
comprehensible, even to a child of three" (p. 24), then 
performance increases. Additionally she argues that 
children and adults pay different attention to language
"the difference between child and adult... lies in the
amount of weight that is given to sheer linguistic 
form" (p. 63). Unfortunately, although these suggestions 
do have some plausibility they are not tied to a princi­
pled analysis. Thus, it is not possible to arrange 
situations along the dimension of "human sense" in 
order to predict which cues will best induce precocious
ski11s.
The present set of experiments suggests that at least 
two factors are crucial in determining what skills 
emerge in different situations? the amount of prompting 
given by the experimenter and the structure of the mater­
ials used. The experiments quite clearly show a decrease 
with age in the amount of prompting required to elicit 
a skill, which is not immediately evoked. What determines 
whether behaviours are 'immediately evoked' however?
The crucial factor here would seem to be what children
would normally do in the situation when there is no
memory demand. For this it is clearly necessary that 
we analyse children's behaviours in the natural environment.
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From such an analysis it might be possible to offer
reasons for some of the sequences reported here. This 
clearly also relates to the question of the structure 
of the materials. This structure can only be defined 
relative to the everyday cognitions and actions of the 
child. Thus, we have the finding that children do not 
look at face-down pictures to answer questions about 
text, but will do so when the pictures are presented 
along with the text. If we look to ecology we find that 
children have little experience of face-down consulta­
tion, but frequently listen to stories and look at 
pictures. Thus, there are differences in structure between 
the two situations, with structure being defined relative 
to the child’s normal activities. Similarly more chil­
dren produce a 'direct search1 strategy in the sequential 
question procedure of Experiment XI.because it is an 
activity more closely related to their normal picture 
search strategy than is random search. This type of 
analysis can be extended beyond children's overlearnt 
activities to their internal constructs. Thus we may 
argue that children have a set of concepts derived from 
their experience with the natural environment (e.g. scripts, 
story grammars, and prototypes) and that stimuli which 
are 'well-formed' relative to these constructs will
induce appropriate memory skill earlier than those stim­
uli which are less 'well-formed'. Thus Corsale (1978) 
has demonstrated that lists of words containing category 
prototypes induce category sorting in 8-year-olds whereas 
lists of less salient category members do not do so.
Similarly Mandler Cl9791 reviews a number of experiments 
suggesting similar results for story grammars, and room 
scripts. :
Other recent research in cognitive development suggests 
the influence of the ecology of the situation and the 
structure of the materials. Thus Rosch et al (1976) 
found children were able to sort basic-level categories 
several years before they were able to do so with super­
ordinate categories. The influence of what children 
normally do with materials or how they act in particular 
situations is also evidenced by studies of communication 
(Shatz, 1978) and semantic development (Clark, 1973bj 
Trehub and Abramovich, 1978).
All this is to say that ecology is important, and that 
if the skill we wish to study does occur in the natural 
environment, then it will first emerge in those situations 
which most closely model the natural environment. While 
this type of analysis is useful for comparing and 
sequencing ecological versus non-ecological versions of 
'the same situation, it is clearly inadequate for compari­
sons of very different situations, or for behaviours 
which do not occur naturally. Thus cumulative rehearsal 
(saying items in sets of three ) and generating bizarre 
images are not naturally occurring behaviours and an 
ecological analysis would not tell us much about them.
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The notion that children may fail to produce a routine
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in their repertoire because they lack auxiliary skills, 
is also to be found elsewhere in developmental psychology. 
Thus, Bryant and Trabasso (1971) argue that children 
fail the Piagetian inference task because they lack the 
skills to encode the premise information. When children 
are trained so that such information is overlearned, we 
find they are able to make transitive inferences.
Siegler (1978) has offered a similar argument for' deficits 
in children's early understandings of the principle of 
moments. Deficits in auxiliary skills may not only 
occur in encoding, children may well be capable of gene­
rating some skill, but be unable to reveal this because 
they lack adequate response skills. Many recent studies 
have demonstrated that we have severely underestimated
the skills of infants because we have demanded criterial
behaviours not in the repertoire. A similar argument 
has been made by Brain.erd (1973) concerning the use of 
verbal protocols as evidence for conservation abilities.
What generalisation may we draw from all these studies? 
Firstly, it seems that whether or not a particular skill 
emerges in a given situation is a complex interaction 
between the task•demands, and the skill itself and in 
some cases the provision of information about strategy 
effectiveness. One immediate implication of this is that 
there seems to be no 'one age' at which a particular 
skill emerges, and so the task of the developmental 
psychologist becomes the analysis of the exact form of
the skill which does emerge, and also the amount of
support which the environment provides for the behaviour.
As I have already argued, there are a number of ways 
in which the environment can provide this type of 
support. At the stimulus end, these can include promp­
ting or placing the skill in the context in which it 
is normally used. The environment might also avoid the
necessity of involving auxiliary skills, by itself 
auxiliaryproviding the/information necessary for the skill (e.g. 
Experiments II and III). In addition, it may provide 
information about skill effectiveness (e.g. Experiments 
VII and VIII) which render monitoring unnecessary. One 
way of viewing all these findings is to conclude that 
as children grow older they become less and less depen­
dent upon this sort of environmental support.
7.4.2 Competence in preschooTdrs
A second major problem for Piagetian theory in recent 
years has been the demonstration of precocious logical 
skills. Such demonstrations offer a serious difficulty 
for the theory; although the late emergence of skills 
can be "explained" by appeal to notions such as hori­
zontal decalage, the finding that preschool thought is 
in some respects comparable to that . of adults under­
mines one of the central assumptions of Piagetian theory.
The suggestion that thought is similar in adults and 
children exactly contradicts a fundamental tenet of the 
theory that thought undergoes structural changes,
307
and that the thought processes of adults and children are qualit­
atively different. ■
Given the importance of the issue, what is the status
of the evidence for precocious preschool thought?
Certainly claims about early competence have been made 
in a number of different domains, e.g. number development 
(Gelman and Gallistel, 1978) , perspective-taking (Borke,
1977? Shatz and Gelman, 1973), quantity conservation 
(McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1975), concept formation.
(Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem, 1976), 
class inclusion (Markman and Siebert, 1976) and scientific 
concepts (Siegler, 1978). This research has ledi 
several reviewers (e.g. Keil, 1981? Nelson, 1977) to 
conclude that thought processes are fundamentally similar 
throughout development.
However attempts to replicate such work suggest that 
such claims may be unjustified, and in some cases', simple 
rules have been discovered which will explain precocious 
’logical1 behaviours. Thus, Shatz (1978) has argued 
that simple context-derived rules will explain the appar­
ently complex communicative skills of very young children. 
McShane and Morrison (in press) have also argued that 
responses which would seem to require advanced knowl­
edge of liquid quantity relations are explicable by 
a simple perceptual rule. Similar arguments have also 
been advanced by Trabasso, Isen, Dolecki, McLanahan,
Riley and Tucker (1978) for class inclusion and Breslow 
(1981) for transitive inferences.
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The same sorts of issues have also arisen i.n recent
studies of memory development. Early claims (Flavell, 
1970) and Brown (1975) of the preschooler *s incompetence 
at generating intentional strategies for remembering, 
and even their inability to recognise the need for 
memory, have been falsified by numerous demonstrations 
of intentional strategy use (Wellman et al, 1975; Yussen, 
1974; Yussen et al, 1975). However the present set of 
studies suggest that in some cases, apparently strategic 
behaviours may not be the result of intentional memory 
plans. This is also supported by the results of studies 
by Ritter (1978) and Gordon and Flavell (1977).
If we accept for the moment that the demonstrations of 
preschool precocity are not all the result of false 
positive errors, then we are left with the conclusion 
that preschoolers are capable, in some situations, of 
great logical feats, but these skills do not emerge 
in Piagetian tests. We may therefore characterise the 
abilities of the preschooler as being highly context- 
dependent .
7.4.3 The nature of developmental change
As Gelman and Gallistel (1978) so cogently argue, it 
is crucial that we understand the nature of thought in 
preschoolers if we are to understand and model the pro­
cess of change in development. Knowledge of the starting 
point will clearly influence both how we conceptualise
later developments, and will profoundly influence the 
mechanisms of transition we propose.
To this end, it is important that we correctly characterise 
the nature of memory in the later stages of development.
I have just noted that memory seems to be highly context- 
specific in preschoolers. If it turns out to be the case 
that memory also happens to be context-specific in 
adults then our mechanism of change will have to be 
much less radical than if memory becomes decontextualised.
It is necessary first therefore that we characterise the 
nature of memory in adults. Flavell (.1971) and Brown 
(1978) offer us accounts of adult memory which seem 
to be derived from the suggestions of Reitman (19 70) .
A major characteristic of adult memorisers (according 
to these accounts) is the problem-solving nature of their 
skills. Adults are described as being better able to 
modify strategies to meet particular memory demands, 
or to invent new strategies if none are available. This 
is explained by the development of a central executive 
system (Brown, 1977, 1978) which has access to a large 
body of knowledge about memory and available cognitive 
routines. This system selects routines to meet partic­
ular demands, monitors their effectiveness and modifies 
them if necessary. The knowledge of important memory
variables and of available routines enables routines to
be freed from their original context, and employed for 
other functions in the cognitive system. This knowledge
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of available routines should result in the generalisation 
of routines across a variety of contexts.
How accurate a picture of adult memory is this, however? 
There are a number of reasons for believing that adult 
memory may be rather less creative, adaptive and context- 
free than the above account claims. In a summary of 
recent developments in the levels-of-processing liter­
ature, Jenkins (1979) offers a convincing case that adult 
memory is highly context- specific.
The memory pheonmena that we see depend on 
what kinds of subjects we study, what kinds of 
acquisition conditions we provide, what kinds 
of materials we choose to work with, and what 
kinds of criterial measures we obtain. Further­
more, the dependencies themselves are complex; 
the variables interact vigorously with one 
another (p. 431). -
In addition we can find evidence that adult memory is 
prone to the same sorts of deficits as the immature memory 
system. Thus Rohwer, Raines, Eoff and Wagner (1977), found 
that most 17-year-olds had a production deficit for the 
use of aaelaboration strategy in learning word pairs. 
Similarly Bower (.1970) reports enormous improvements in 
memory when college students were instructed in the method 
of loci. Finally, a study by Chi (1978) suggests that 
context-specific knowledge rather than age is crucial in 
determining performance in remembering chess positions.
She reports few examples of adults inventing strategies 
or adapting them from elsewhere in the cognitive system.
It appears that even in adults, strategies may be limited 
in their domain of application.
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This suggests two conclusions: that adult memory may be 
much more similar to memory in children; and secondly that 
metamemory may play much less of a role in adult memory 
than has previously been claimed. This is not to imply 
that metamemory itself does not change with age, but that 
such changes do not directly affect the memory system.
If it is the case that preschool and adult memory are 
similar, this has important implications for an account 
of developmental change. The large differences described 
by Flavell (1970, 1971) and Brown (1975, 1978) provide 
major problems for any such account, because they imply 
a major change in the nature of the memory system. It 
is clear that such a discontinuity is much more difficult to 
explain than the small differences suggested in the 
present account. It has already been argued that one 
mechanism by which memory may develop is by ’borrowing* 
behaviours from other parts of the cognitive system, or 
by instruction. External feedback and monitoring may 
explain how these routines become connected with memory 
goals. This account provides an explanation as to how 
intentional memory may first emerge, and it can be 
extended to cover adaptivity and generalisation. Intent­
ional memory may first emerge from the accidental or 
involuntary evocation of a routine, and the child becoming 
aware of this either by reinforcement or by monitoring.
The account can also explain how strategies become more 
general. As children grow older the number of routines in 
their repertoire will increase, as will the number of
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occasions on which routines are related to memory. It 
has also been argued that the rate at which routines 
enter the memory repertoire may well be influenced by 
developments in the ability to self-monitor. As this 
develops, children will become increasingly sensitive to 
the effects of their behaviour. The problem of how 
strategies become better adapted to memory goals, may
be the result of this increase in the number of available
strategies. The metamemory-based account suggests this 
adaptiveness is the result of the subject^ ability to 
modify a strategy to meet particular goals. It may be, 
however, that older subjects simply have more strategies 
and are able to meet these demands by evoking another 
strategy rather than by modifying the one previously in 
use. A final quality mentioned by Brown and De Loache 
(1978) in their description of memory in the expert is 
creativity. Even given the problems of defining such a 
term, there does not seem to be a vast amount of evidence 
to suggest this characteristic in adult memory. In 
cases in which it does occur it seems to be dependent on 
vast knowledge of an area which allows the generalisation 
argument suggested earlier, as an alternative to appeals
to metamemory.
It could be argued that the present account does not allow 
for the development of novel memory strategies, but 
strategies need not originate only from elsewhere in 
cognition - it is likely that many are introduced through
instruction in schools.
314
What is the role of metamemory in all of this? As I 
have already said, the increase in metamemory is a 
developmental phenomenon which remains to be explained.
I have argued that the initial development of metamemory 
may be the result of feedback on early strategy usage. 
Metamemory was originally invoked, however, to explain the 
differences in memory between adults and children (Flavell, 
1970? Brown, 1975). As I have now argued that much of 
memory in both adults and children does not have the 
knowledge-driven characteristics of this account, its 
importance as an explanatory construct is much reduced.
In addition, most of the studies attempting to demonstrate 
the relationship between metamemory and memory have 
failed to do so (see Chapter 3), the exceptions being 
studies in which children were given information about 
strategy effectiveness which are built into the account 
offered here. All this suggests there are severe problems 
with the metamemory-driven model of memory. This' is not 
to say that memory never has the intentional problem­
solving character described in the early accounts, and 
that knowledge of memory does not influence performance, 
but that models of memory which appeal to metamemory are 
inadequate to explain the data. In view of this it is 
suggested that we attempt to explain the development of 
memory skills without appeal to such a construct.
This account has a number of implications for general 
models of development, and mechanisms of change in such 
models. Firstly it is important that we correctly
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characterise not only the initial state of the system
(as Gelman, 1978 argues) but that we arrive at an accurate
description of the skills of the adult. There are some
parallels between the discussion of memory development
above, and recent findings in cognitive development. In
her summary of empirical research on Piaget’s theory,
Boden (.19 79) concludes that
Recent experimental research has shown Piaget 
to be wrong on many points, such as the inability 
of children at a given age to carry out certain
types of 'more advanced’ thinking.... And adults,
by contrast, are considerably less logical in 
much of their reasoning than Piaget’s theory 
would lead one to expect, (p- 152)
It was also argued that the differences between child and 
adult skills will greatly influence the mechanism of 
change. If adult and child abilities are much more 
closely related and both context-specific then it is 
clear that any mechanism we propose will be itself specific, 
and need not be enormously powerful, as the changes to 
be explained are quantitative rather than qualitative in
nature.
There are parallels between other theories of development and 
the account of the development of intentional memory, and 
the mechanism by which routines come to serve the goal of 
memory. A number of other theories suggest that a major 
feature of development is the increased access to cog­
nitive routines, and the use of these routines to serve 
new functions (e.g. Fodor, 1972; Rozin, 1976). Other 
theories have argued that existing routines are used in 
a qualitatively different way, following the development 
of reflectivity which enables the child to use the routines
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in a logical "decontextualised" manner, (e.g. Donaldson, 
1978; Vygotsky, 1962; 1978). If these are to serve as 
adequate accounts of development they must specify: (1) the 
reasons for the original constraints on routines; and 
(2) the mechanism by which increased access is made 
possible. In addition some of these theories allow for 
the creation of ’new’ routines. If this is the case, 
how is the creation of new routines possible, and what 
contribution does this make to development?
If we deal first with the question of initial constraints 
we find that none of the theories provide a principled 
explanation. Fodor’s account is no more than a series 
of suggestions about possible domains of early competence, 
no reason is given as to why these are favoured. Ro2in
(1976) goes somewhat further in suggesting that early 
skills may be constrained by genetic factors. Thus chil­
dren develop first in those domains which are important 
for their early environment. This line of reasoning also 
seems to underlie the suggestions of Donaldson (1978) 
that thought is initially predominantly "social", but 
as has already been suggested (p.300) she has not proposed 
criteria by which "social" situations may be isolated. 
Similarly Vygbtsky provides little in the way of descri­
ption of early thought.
The theories are similarly flawed in their explanations
of increased access. Rozin and Fodor offer no account of
how this might occur. Both Vygotsky and Donaldson
suggest that children's increased ability to analyse 
the structure of early thought is responsible for their
increased control over its different functions. This
change is attributed in both cases to the development of 
a conventional sign system. Thus Donaldson suggests that 
the onset of reflectivity is determined by the develop­
ment of the skills of reading and writing, and Vygotsky 
argues that thought is modified by the internalisation of 
spoken language. While there is evidence that literacy 
influences thought, this is often confounded by other 
variables such as the use of a cash economy or collective 
farming, (Scribner and Cole, 1973), and the account does 
leave unspecified precisely how this change is brought 
about. There have also been a number of attempts to 
test the hypothesis that the internalisation of speech is 
responsible for a modification in processes of thought.
The results of these studies have largely suggested that 
language and thought functions develop in isolation 
(Jarvis, 1963; Wilder, 1968; Miller, Shelton and Flavell, 
1970). There is an additional problem for the theories of 
Donaldson and Vygotsky. A number of recent volumes on 
adult cognition (e.g. Claxton, 1981; Johnson-Laird and 
Waso.n, 19 77) have suggested that adult thought, like 
memory, may well be context-specific. If this is the 
case, then the theories may well be mischaracterising 
the nature of adult thought, and misrepresenting the 
means by which increased access is made possible.
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The theories are also silent on the issue of novel
behaviours. Although Fodor and Rozin seem to allow the 
new routines may emerge, they do not explain how they 
emerge, nor how frequently behaviours enter the repertoire
in this manner. It is not clear where Donaldson or
Vygotsky stand on this issue.
The theory of memory development proposed here would seem 
to have some advantages over the these theories. Although 
it is yet not possible to specify exactly the constraints 
on early memory skills, it is argued that strategies 
emerge from overlearnt routines in the child’s everyday 
activities, and a mechanism is provided by which these 
routines come to serve memory goals. There is also 
evidence from other areas of cognition that a mechanism 
such as social feedback can bring about change. (Doise 
et al, 1975; McShane, 1979; 1980; McShane and Whittaker, 
in press; Russell, 1982). The notion that early strategies 
are routines developed elsewhere in the cognitive•system 
and are initially evoked in an involuntary manner has 
also been suggested by Lange (1978) , Paris (1978a) and 
Brown and De Loache (1978), but none of these accounts 
suggest the mechanism by which involuntary behaviours 
come to serve memory functions.
7.4 Memory and the Environment
Ecology and Research in Memory I wish finally to point out 
the ways in which our present models of memory fail to
take into account the influence of the environment. I
shall not discuss recent ecological theories of development
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(e.g. Wilcox and Katz, 1981), for as they are formulated
they are not much different from the more traditional
cognitive approach (McShane and Whittaker, 1982). I
shall firstly discuss differences between the types
of memory problems people encounter in everyday life,
and the sorts of remembering they have been asked to
carry out in laboratory studies. I shall then illustrate 
in
the more immediate influence of the environment/iriducing 
memory related behaviours, and in modifying the use of
such behaviours.
The types of problems which occur in the natural environ­
ment seem very different from those we study in the 
laboratory.. In the early 70’s there were a number of 
attacks on the ecological validity of memory experiments 
(e.g. Jenkins, 1974) but these largely resulted in 
researchers modifying the stimuli they used. Thus, instead 
of having subjects remember word lists, the task was 
changed to remembering stories or taxonomically organ­
ised lists. There are a number of ways in which such 
studies still do not approximate to everyday life.
Firstly the task demands, in particular the need for 
verbatim recall, do not model the demands of the natural
environment. In addition, when faced with demands such 
as those of the laboratory task, most subjects would 
naturally respond by producing strategies, which avoid 
verbatim remembering. One such strategy might be to 
use external aids, such as note-taking or writing down 
verbatim or tape-recording the story. We do not attempt
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complex internal mnemonics when attempting to remember 
what to buy at the shops, we simply sit down and write
a list. In addition there are a number of conventional
memory aids available which avoid the necessity of 
remembering, such as books or computer files.
All this suggests that the goals of memory, and the means 
available for achieving those goals may be radically 
different in laboratory and naturalistic situations.
Given recent statements about the context-specificity 
of memory skills, it is difficult to see what laboratory 
studies can tell us about remembering in natural 
contexts. It has been argued, in defence of laboratory 
studies, that they tap the same sort of skills as the
school situation demands. Standard examinations such
as 'O’ and 'A' levels do require the production of 
large amounts of information ' 'in • the absence of 
memory aids, such as notes or books. However the 
situation differs from the laboratory in that verbatim 
reproduction of information is not demanded, nor did 
learning all take place ’in the head’. In everyday 
life, the encoding skills we most often require are the 
skills of organising information in external storage 
systems in such a way that it can be easily accessed, 
e.g. by setting up filing systems, by taking notes, by 
photo-copying, or writing diary entries. The retrieval 
skills are those of accessing the desired information 
from these external sources. Access and storage do 
require cognitive processes, but they are of a different 
order from those described in traditional memory
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studies.
Ecology also has profound influences on young children's 
memory development. Thus while they will have to remem­
ber certain things e.g. their way around their immediate 
environment, few memory demands are placed upon them, 
because other people do all their remembering for them. 
Thus, they will seldom be asked to find their way around 
novel environments, because they will generally be 
accompanied by adults.. If they lose anything (toys, 
books, clothes) the chances are that an adult will be 
available to find the lost object. Thus, when Kreutzer 
et al (1975) asked 5-year-olds how they would remember 
a friend's birthday party, the majority of those who 
suggested a strategy said they would ask someone else
to remind them.
What then is the status of the present set of experiments 
in the light of such criticism? The experiments do 
appear to be naturalistic in a number of ways. Firstly, 
they involve the consultation of external information 
sources (pictures monitoring and array cues). In addi­
tion, an adult provides some structuring of activity, 
by suggesting particular actions, or by providing feed­
back. The activities the child is asked to carry out 
are in most cases familiar ones, e.g. remembering stories, 
being asked questions about stories, and there were no
demands for verbatim recall.
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Models of memory and the environment
In addition to the environment influencing the types of 
problems we select for study, it is important that it 
is incorporated as a variable in any theory of memory.
Environment as stimulus
It has already been argued that task instructions, the 
materials and the amount of prompting are all factors 
in the stimulus environment which influence the accessing 
of a routine. Any predictive account of memory must 
incorporate their interaction, and also allow for the 
fact that these influences of the different stimulus 
components may change with age.1^
Environment as mechanism for change
Finally Experiments VIII and IX suggest that the feed­
back which the environment provides may be crucial in 
structuring the area of application of a particular 
routine. However, we have not established that this 
mechanism is actually in operation in the natural environ­
ment, although it seems likely that such feedback will 
be provided in the school setting. In order to assess 
the importance of this factor, we must study the environ­
ment of the child to establish if and when such reinforcement
"18 E.g. Donaldson (19 78) has argued that the influence 
of the language component of tasks may change with 
age.
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is provided.
Environment as the basis of strategies
Experiments X and XI suggest that the origins of some 
strategies may lie in routines from the child's everyday 
activities. An alternative way in which strategies may 
have their origins in the environment is by teaching.
The environment may also provide strategies by its 
influence at a level deeper than the child’s everyday 
activities.. The use of taxonomic organisation in 
remembering word lists can be seen as the application of 
category knowledge to the domain of memory.. However, 
it has been argued, e.g. Rosch (1977) that categorical 
organisation has its origins in the structure of the 
environment. A similar argument has been advanced for 
both scripts and story grammars (e.g. Mandler, 1979).
Finally, the environment itself may provide search
strategies for children, for example, by* children asking
adults to find objects for them. Perhaps one of the best
examples of the role of the environment in affording
information to the young child emerged during one of-
the cueing experiments:
Policeman (to child): "Who’s hiding in this 
house, then?"
Child: "I. don’t know, let's ask the pig,
shall we.?"
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TABLE 1: Distribution of scores on the first trial
Age
Number of children obtaining score of:
0 1 2 3 4
3;0 - 3?9 3 4 3 4 0
3 ; 10 — 4; 6 4 5 6 2 5
4; 7 - 5; 2 0 1 6 4 4
TABLE 2: :Distribution of scores on second trial
Number of children obtaining score of:
Age 0 1 2 3 4
3; 0 - 3;9 3 7 2 2 0 •
3;10 - 4;6 6 5 3 4 4
4;7 - 5;2 1 4 6 2 2
TABLE 3: Number of children making use of monitoring
cues
Number of children
Age Neither trial One trial Both trials
3;0 - 3?9 2 8 6
3 ; 10 - 4 ; 6 4 5 15
477 - 5?3 4 7 16
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TABLE 4: Number of children making use of array cues
Number of Children
Age Neither trial One trial Both •
3;0 - 3?9 2 8 6
3; 10 - 4;6 4 5 15
4?7 - 5? 3 4 7 16
TABLE 5: Percentage of correct responses at each serial 
position
Serial Position
Experimental
Age Condition 1 2 3 4 •
3?0 ■- 3;9 Cues 38 25 47 72
No Cues 36 17 25 20
3;10 - 4; 6 Cues 44 46 60 97
No Cues 37 39 30 39
4;7 - 5;3 Cues 41 44 56 100
No .Cues. 55 . 50 38 48
TABLE 6: Number of children using monitoring cues
Number of children
Age Neither trial One' trial Both trials'
3;0 - 3,-9 2 2 5
3;10 -- 4;6 1 1 12
4; 7 - 5; 3 0 1 11
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TABLE 7: Number of children using array cues
Number of children -
Age Neither trial One trial Both trials
3;0 - 3? 9 4 3 2
3; 10 -■ 4;6 3 2 4
4;7 - 5; 3 6 5 4
TABLE 8: Percentage of correct responses at each se:
position
Age
Cue
Type ' 1
Serial
2
Position
3 4
3;0 - 3;9 Monitoring 56 33 50 67
Array 34 28 44 56
3; 10 - 4 y 6 Monitoring 39 57 60 93
Array 28 39 28 39
4; 7 - 5-3 Monitoring 47 43 62 98
. Array 47 43 40 33
TABLE 9: Percentage of correct responses at each serial 
position as a function of cue type
Serial Position
Cue Type 1 2 3 4
No Cues 43 35 31 35
Array Cues 38 37 37 42
Monitoring Cues 41 38 54 90
Monitoring and Array Cues . 44. . 47 . 56. 82
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TABLE 10: Summary table for analysis of variance
Source DFl/ DF2 F P Value Mean Square Sum of Sq
MA 3/ 184 12.3729 0.0000 0.0003 26.6409
GP 2/ 184 4.4217 0.0133 3.1735 6.3471
MA GP 6/ 184 1.4200 0.2090 1.0192 6.1149
SE 3/ 552 18.7361 0.0000 7.6340 22.9043
MA SE 9/ 552 6.3113 0.0000 2.5710 23.1461
GP SE 6/ 552 1.8047 0.0960 0.7354 4.4125
MA GP
SE 18/ 552 0.7372 0.7734 0.3004 5.4071
MA GP
SS 184 0.7177 132.0605
MA GP
SS SE .552 .0.4075 .224.9345
?Key
MA are the four cue conditions
GP are the three groups
SE are the four serial positions
SS are the 196 subjects
TABLE 11: Percentage of children making inferences and 
giving justifications
Percentage giving:
Age Inference only Inference with justification
3;0 - 3;9 73 50
3;10 - 4,-6 93 71
4;7 - 5;3 100 91
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TABLE 12: The relationship between children’s assessments 
of memory performance and their actual memory 
performance
Percent correct
Age Mean assessments Mean performance
3;0 - 3? 9 85 43
3;1O - 4;6 66 45
4; 7 - 5? 3 74 50
TABLE 13: Number of children using particular cues
expressed as a function of their post-diction 
ability
Number :of • 'Children using
Post-diction No Monitoring Array Monitoring &
Ability Cues Cues Cues Array Cues
Accurate 1 20 3 I2 .
Inaccurate 5 5 1 8
329
TABLE 14: The relationship between children’s assessments 
of their memory performance under various cuing 
conditions and their actual level of performance
Age
Percent Correct
No Cues Monitoring Array Cues
O-ues
3?0 - 3;9 Assessment 88 90 86
Performance 37 53 40
3?10 - 4; 6 Assessment 71 81 73
Performance 48 63 33
4;7 - 5; 3 Assessment 62 72 60
Performance 35 60 . 36
TABLE 15: Number of children maintaining a cuing strategy 
as a function of its perceived effectiveness
Perceived effectiveness
Improvement No change Deterioration
Maintenance 15 2 10
No maintenance...... 4....... .0. . ... 0
TABLE 16: The mean number of pictures correctly recalled 
on Blocks 1 and 2 by the different groups
Mean number correct
Experimental Group Block 1___________ .-;Block 2
Producers .9.61 9.55
Non-producers-feedback '8.70 9.30
Non-producers-no- feedback 8.88 8.41
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TABLE 17: Percentage of correct responses on the no­
strategy pretrials, for the 7- and 3-item groups
Number of items
Age Seven Three
3;0 - 3;9 23 52
3; 10 - 4;6 25 72
4? 7 - 5; 3 42 82
TABLE 18: Number of children requiring explicit prompts 
to induce the strategy on pretrials after 
training
Age
Number of children
Prompt No Prompt
3;0 - 3;9 7 13
3;10 - 4;6 4 16
4;7 - 5?3 2 18
TABLE 19: Number of cues used by children in the 7- and 
3-item groups, on the near transfer task when
• no prompts were given
Age
Mean number of cues
7 items 3 items
3;0 - 3;9 3.22 1.51
3 ? 10 - 4; 6 4.63 3.96
4;7 - 5;3 4.82 3.52
TABLE 20: Number of prompts required to induce strategy 
use on prompted near transfer task
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Mean number of prompts
Age 7 items 3 items
3;0 - 3; 9 1.58 2.24
3?10 - 4;6 0.38 1.23
4;7 - 5;3 0.10 0.75
TABLE 21: Mean number of prompts required to elicit
strategy use in far transfer tasks
Mean number of prompts
Age 7 items 3 items
3;0 - 3; 9 3.90 3.61
3; 10 - 4 ? 6 3.92 4.11
4;7 - 5;3 4.03 4.02
TABLE 22: Mean number of correct responses on far
transfer questions
Mean number correct
Age 7 items 3 items
3;0 - 3?9 0.91 0.82
3; 10 -" 4; 6 0.54 1.08
4;7 - 5 ? 3 1.54 1.14
TABLE 23: Mean number of cues used and prompts required 
to induce use of strategy in the near transfer
task
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No -^evaluative'information
Evaluative information
Mean Number
Cues Used Prompts Required
2.02 2.08
4.40 0.92
TABLE 24: Number of correct responses given to memory 
questions
Condition
Age Pictures No Pictures
3;0 - 3;9 5.34 3.00
3;10 - 4;6 5.58 3.92 .
4; 7 - 5;3 9.07 6.81
TABLE 25: Mean time children spend studying the pictures
Age Looking Time (seconds)
3;0 - 3?9 23.52
3;10 - 4;6 20.14
4?7 - 5?3 22.02
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TABLE 26: Percentage of children correctly answering each 
type of monitoring question
Age
Question type
Prediction Post-diction Comprehension
3?0 - 3;9 50 50 33
3;10 - 4?6 42 50 33
4?7 - 5?3 92 67 67
TABLE 27: Mean prompt score • required to induce 
picture consultation51
Age Number of Prompts
3;0 - 3;9 6.00
3;10 - 4 ; 6 7..12
4.;.7 - 5;.3 5.46
a Maximum number of possible prompts is 43.
TABLE 28 : Mean number of prompts required to direct 
the strategy
Question Order
Age Serial Random
3?0 - 3;9 3.82 4.35
3;1O - 4;6 2.43 4.07
4;7 - 5; 3 1.67 2.01
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TABLE 29: Mean number of cards searched
Question Order
Age Serial Random
3;0 - 3; 9 9.96 11.64
3 ? 10 - 4; 6 9.85 12.06
4;7 - 5; 3 7.12 9.81
TABLE 30: Frequency of direct searches
Mean Question Number of direct searches
Age Type 0 1 2 3 4 5
3 ? 5 Serial 1 1 4 3 2 1
Random 2 4 3 3 0 0
4? 2 Serial 1 1 2 0 7 1
Random 1 5 4 2 0 0
4 ; 10 Serial 0 2 0 0 6 4
Random 2 2 6 2 0. . 0
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APPENDIX I Predicted distribution of scores if children
employ an inferential strategy
Number Number of
of locations correct
remembered responses probability
4a 4 1.00
3 4' i:oo
2 4 0.50
2 3 0.00
2 2 0.50
1 4 0.16
1 3 0.00
1 2 0.50
1 . 1 0.33
0 4 0.04
0 3 0.00
0 2 0.21
0 1 0.33
0 0 0.42 . ■
The actual distribution of scores will depend upon what 
the children directly remember, but it is important to 
note that strategy should never result in scores of three
items correct.
a Strictly speaking, there is no need to make inferences
when all locations can be remembed by direct memory.
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APPENDIX II Stories used in Experiment X
Story A - Mary and Fido
One rainy day, Mary decided to take Fido for a walk - so
she went out and found he was stuck in the door.
’Come out’ she said.
'I can’t’ he said ’I’m stuck’.
she put a rope round his neck and pulled - but she 
couldn't pull him out.
'I know’/she said, 'drop your bone'.
So he dropped it and he came straight out, and had a 
big drink from his bowl.
Questions
1. At the beginning of the story what did Mary want to do
with Fido?
-> Walk.
2. What was the weather like?
-> Raining.
3. Why couldn't Fido come out?
-> He was stuck.
4. Where was Fido stuck? *
-> In the door.
5. How did Mary try and get Fido out first of all?
-> Rope around neck and pulled him.
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6. What happened when Mary pulled Fido with the rope?
-> He still didn't come out.
7. What did Mary tell Fido to do next?
-> Drop his bone.
8. What happened when Fido dropped his bone?
-> He came straight out.
9. What did Fido do straight after he came out?
-> Drank from his bowl.
10. What sort of an animal was Fido?
-> A dog.
Story B - Jenny and her Mother
Jenny had just finished her cornflakes when her Mummy 
called out,
'Hurry up, or you'll be late. It's nearly nine o'clock? 
Jenny rushed round. She looked under the table but
she couldn't find what she was looking for.
Then her Mummy came in.
'I've found them', she said 'Your schoolbag is under 
your coat and your ball's behind you.'
Questions
1. At the beginning of the story, what had Jenny just 
finished doing?
-> Eating cornflakes.
2. What did Jenny's Mummy shout at the beginning of the story 
-> You're late, it's nearly 9 o’clock.
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3. What did Jenny do after her Mummy shouted she would
be late?
~> Rushed round looking for her things.
4. & 5. What was Jenny looking for?
-> Rail and Schoolbag.
6. Where did Jenny look for the ball and schoolbag?
-> Under the table.
7. Who found the ball and the schoolbag?
-> Her Mummy.
8.& 9. Where were the ball and schoolbag?
-> Behind her, under her coat.
10. Where was Jenny going?
-> School.
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APPENDIX III Stories used in Experiment XI
Story A - George the Owl has an Idea
George the Owl was always having clever ideas. One night 
he was in bed when he realised exactly why people have 
legs. ’’People have legs so they can walk” he thought to 
himself. Now George thought this idea was very important. 
He thought he ought to tell all the animals. He decided 
he would make a speedh in the market square to say why 
people have legs. Soon everyone heard that George would 
make a speech. Lucy the Lamb went to see Percy who was 
standing on the green fence. "George is going to make 
a speech" said Lucy the Lamb to Percy. "He’s going to 
tell us why people have legs." The animals agreed that 
George would make his speech in the market square.
George went to see the square but it was very dirty. "What 
can I do?", he said to Mandy the Mouse. "I can't speak 
in a dirty square." "I’ll clean it up!" said Mandy the , 
Mouse. So Mandy cleaned the market square. At last, the 
day of George’s speech arrived. Everyone came to the 
market square. George stood up and they were all quiet 
as he began to speak. He began to tell them about why 
people have legs. Some of the animals were so interested
in what George had to say that they wrote it all down. 
Others just sat and listened. At last George explained
why people have legs. "It's so that they can walk", he
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’’Isn’t George funny?” they said to each other "he makes 
a big speech about something we already know. We already 
know that people have legs so they can walk."
When George finished his speech he said "Now I’ve brought 
drinks for everyone". So everyone went and had a drink 
except for George who was thinking up his next brilliant
idea.
Questions
1. Lucy the Lamb heard about George’s idea. She went 
and talked to Percy about it. What sort of an animal 
was Percy?
2. Mandy the Mouse offered to clean the market
square because it was dirty. What colour was Mandy's 
jumper? • • •
3. George stood up in the market square and made his 
speech. What did he hold in his hand when he made 
the speech?
4. Some of the animals were very interested in what George
had to say. Some of them wrote it all down. Which 
animals wrote down everything George said? ■
5. After George’s speech everyone had something to
drink. What did all the animals have to drink?
said. Some of the animals laughed when they heard this.
-341
Story B - Mick the Duck has an Adventure
Mick was a big white duck who lived on a farm. Mick was 
happy on the farm until one day he heard about the magic 
stone. He was talking to Rufus the Dog. Rufus told 
him about the magic stone which would grant you any wish 
you wanted. Mick was very excited. "I’m going to find 
the magic stone so I can have all the things I want" he 
said to Rufus the Dog. So Mick began his search for the 
magic stone. First he went to the big tree. "Have you 
seen the magic stone?" he said to the animals who lived 
in the big tree. "No, we haven’t", they said, "but we’ll 
tell you if we see it.". Next he decided to swim up 
the river to the little village, to look for the stone.
He got to the village and an old lady threw him a crust 
of bread. "Have you seen the magic stone?" he asked 
the old lady, but she hadn’t seen it either. "Bye, bye, 
old lady", said Mick. Mick swam past the village but 
round the corner there were five nasty ducks. "Go away" 
they quacked, "this is our river. You don’t belong here!"
cried these nasty ducks. So Mick had to turn back 
because he didn’t belong on that river. By now, Mick was 
very tired,with swimming, so he got out of the river to
walk. But he hadn’t walked more than ten waddles when
he saw a big black thing in his way. He tried to squeeze 
past it, but it was no use. The big black thing jumped 
and grabbed him by the neck. Just then Rufus the Dog 
arrived. Rufus was very cross. "Put Mick down" he
barked fiercely. Rufus took Mick home and Mick never
342
left home again to look for the magic stone.
Questions
1. Where were Rufus and Mick standing when Rufus the 
dogJtold Mick about the magic stone?
2. Mick the Duck went to the big tree to talk to the
animals who lived there. Which animals lived in
the big tree?
3. An old lady threw Mick a crust of bread to eat. What 
was the old lady carrying on her arm?
4. Mick got chased by some nasty ducks. What colour 
were the nasty ducks, who told Mick he didn’t belong
in the river?
5. Mick got out of the river to walk because he was 
tired, but a big black thing blocked his way. What 
was the big black thing?
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APPENDIX IV Pictures used in Experiments
X and XI
Experiment X
a. Mary and Fido
b. Jenny and her mother
Experiment XI
c-e Mick the Duck has an adventure
f-h Ernest the Owl has an idea
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APPENDIX V Experimental Apparatus
Fig.l Apparatus for Experiments I-VI
Fig. 2, Fig. 3 Apparatus for Experiments VIII & IX
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o o
•••X X •
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EXPERIMENTER
O Locations of four cups 
x Position of monitoring cues 
• Position of array cues
Fig. 1.
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S Baited cup — Direction of sheep
